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The word ‘democracy’ today generally signifies a liberal form of democracy, which 
provides citizens with both a public sphere in which they have their say in running 
their affairs, and a private sphere where basic negative freedoms are enshrined.
Globalization and the knowledge economy have served to accent diversity as 
characteristic of late modern democratic societies, and ground belief in individual 
and social construction and consumption of knowledge. Given the liberal 
understanding of democracy, this research argues that diversity, which is 
extending its reach into Arab societies, especially in Arab states that have 
established democratic institutions, puts demands on citizenship education 
programmes in these states not only to help students develop a capacity to 
respect other ways of life, but also to help students develop a capacity for 
reasoning and critical thinking that allows them to make their own choices and 
decisions, which would lead to their development as autonomous individuals.
Individual autonomy as a liberal ideal could be argued to encourage students to 
reflect on their own ‘inherited’ ways of life, which may come into conflict with 
traditional sources of authority such as religion, tradition and the state. This 
research argues that a reasonable approach for citizenship education in 
democratizing Arab states could be grounded in John Rawls’ political liberalism 
which, while providing a framework for liberal democratic citizenship education, 
also provides room for reasonable traditional ways of life to preserve their place in 
society.
To illustrate some of the tensions between democratic citizenship values and 
traditional sources of authority, chapter three sets to analyze some aspects of the 
citizenship education programme in Jordan in which reconciling the traditional with 
the modern is among the overarching objectives. Analysis is based on Norman 
Fairclough’s three dimensional critical discourse analysis model.
List of Abbreviations
AHDR Arab Human Development Report
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
ERfKE Educational Reform for Knowledge Economy
JCE Jordanian citizenship education
MoE Ministry of Education
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Overview
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The main question of this research enquiry is howto reconcile liberal democratic 
citizenship values with traditional representations of the social world dominant in 
Arab societies.
Arab societies, for different historical, cultural, political and economic reasons, 
could be described as traditional. They are traditional in the sense that they have 
a tendency for emphasising the authority of religion, tradition and the state in the 
aim of maintaining political stability and enhancing social cohesion. At the same 
time, there are increasing internal demands in these societies for liberating 
political, economic and social systems. Furthermore, globalization, the knowledge 
economy and the opening-up of Arab societies to the more liberal West, in 
particular, have significant influences on the dynamics within Arab societies, 
particularly those that present themselves to the world as democracies, including 
Jordan.
This same struggle between the forces of tradition and the forces of 
democratisation is transferred to national educational systems in these countries. 
While traditional representations of the social world are powerful and present 
themselves forcefully in different aspects of the curricula, developments in the 
direction of liberal democracy that some Arab societies have made (and are still 
making) place increasing demands on educational programmes to pay more 
attention to helping students develop liberal democratic citizenship values 
including reasoning, deliberation, rational decision making and tolerance of 
individual as well as group diversity.
With this in mind, this study argues that attempts to reconcile liberal democratic 
citizenship values with traditional representations of the social world (dominant in 
Arab societies) are bound to create tensions. Liberal democratic citizenship 
values that this study is concerned with are those that could be argued to help 
students develop a capacity for tolerating group and individual diversity, and, at 
the same time, those needed for helping students develop a capacity for rational 
autonomy.
The citizenship education programme in Jordan is taken as an example to
highlight some of the tensions that may result from introducing liberal democratic 
citizenship values into a citizenship education programme that emphasizes a 
traditional outlook. The interest of this study in the Jordanian citizenship education 
programme arises from the fact that one of its main objectives is to help students 
develop a capacity for reconciling traditional orientations of society with liberal 
democratic citizenship values including tolerance of diversity, openness to other 
cultures, reasoning and critical thinking (Ministry of Education 2005a).
The Jordanian citizenship education (henceforth JCE) approach to addressing 
these tensions emphasises the role of traditional sources of authority which is one 
way for naturalising one form of discourse and suppressing others, which, this 
research argues, highlights the problem of ‘individual freedoms’ as a discourse 
related problem that has social implications. Norman Fairclough’s Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) three-level analytical model is used as a framework for 
analysing aspects of the JCE programme in relation to this problem. The aim of 
the analysis is to highlight reasons for presenting an image of the social world in 
which the issue of individual freedoms is not a main concern. Analysis shows that 
a reconciliatory solution to citizenship education that presents liberal democratic 
citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious values, while it 
has some virtue in presenting Jordan as a ‘decent’ ‘well-ordered’ society, in 
Rawlsian terms, seems ordained to be less successful in helping students develop 
liberal democratic citizenship values of either diversity or autonomy.
Views, within the wider liberal democratic theory, regarding teaching democratic 
citizenship values are divided. Those in favour of teaching democratic citizenship 
could be seen to lie between two opposite ends of a spectrum. On one side are 
those who give utmost importance to tolerating cultural and religious diversity and, 
on the other side, are those who place rationality and autonomy at the core of 
liberal education.
Advocates of tolerance of cultural and traditional diversity argue that a rational 
autonomy-dedicated approach to citizenship education would undermine 
traditional ways of life that do not have the same appreciation for the value of 
rational autonomy. Religious and cultural norms and values in traditional societies 
represent a holistic way of life, it is argued, and adherence to these ways is a 
general expectation from members of these societies. On this account, one of the 
main aims of education is to transmit from one generation to another the
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necessary basis for reproducing cultural and religious heritage, which is 
threatened by a form of citizenship education that advances the development of 
rational autonomy overall other values (Stolzenberg 1993, Galston 1995, 
Wahlstrom 2005).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, advocates of rational autonomy argue that 
while diversity is one of the characteristics of modern democratic societies, liberal 
societies cannot accept all different forms of diversity. On this account, there is an 
ever greater need for individuals to be equipped with the skills and dispositions 
that allow them to look critically at the different conceptions of the good present in 
liberal democratic societies and be able to make rational judgments between these 
conceptions. On this view, a core objective of political education is aiding students 
in developing a capacity for rational autonomy that helps them make better 
informed decisions (Gutmann 1995, Levinson 1999, Jewell 2005).
Developments in the age of globalization and the knowledge economy suggest 
that understandings of citizenship education that side completely either with the 
rational autonomy argument or the tolerance of diversity argument are not 
sufficient for preparing students for living in modern democratic societies. Post­
modern theory provides a convincing account in favour of diversity. The wide 
spread of knowledge and the easier access to its different types has led to 
undermining claims to absolute truth that modernity’s big theories, such as 
Marxism and Hegelianism, make. These developments, as Lyotard (1984) 
argues, have further facilitated the transformation of these theories into ‘little 
narratives’ that exist among other little narratives, which are more or less of equal 
status. At the same time, as Giddens (1998) argues, plurality and choice that are 
becoming more dominant features of modern societies, are paving the way for the 
emergence of a new form of individuality. Youngsters are becoming more than 
ever before in charge of making their own decisions in relation to many aspects of 
social life. As youngsters are becoming more independent, traditional sources of 
authority, including the family, school, religion and state, are pushed to the side 
even further.
John Rawls (1993a, 2001) argues that modern democratic societies comprise 
different ways of life. These different ways of life, while they could be reasonable, 
are often incompatible. The incompatibility of the different reasonable ways of life 
that these societies are bound to accommodate highlights the need for a broader
understanding of citizenship education that brings together the demands of 
tolerating traditional diversity and those of rational autonomy. Rawls, this research 
argues, provides a view of liberalism that can accommodate such opposite 
viewpoints and creates educational opportunities in Arab countries. Based on this, 
this study presents a citizenship education model that is grounded in Rawls’ 
political liberalism. This model, it argues, is more capable than the traditional 
Jordanian model, the tolerance of diversity dedicated approach and the autonomy- 
dedicated approach in addressing the demands and needs of Jordan and other 
democratizing Arab countries that share some common features with Jordan (as 
the first Chapter explains).
Chapter One
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Democratic citizenship and the Arab world
The aim of the account below is to give an idea about the roots of the 
liberal/traditional divide in contemporary Arab thinking and how political 
developments in the region favoured political systems in which authority was 
vested in one party. Two main reasons are identified in literature in relation to the 
slow progress of democracy in Arab countries: political systems that have 
authoritarian tendencies is one (and this, to varying degrees, is common in 
different Arab states) and Islam is identified as another (Abu Khalil 1993). These 
two obstacles are explored in sections 1.4 and 1.5 below.
Despite differences between (and within) Arab societies, emphasis on traditional 
sources of authority, namely, religion, tradition and the state, is one characteristic 
that they, to varying degrees, share and is dominant over liberal representations of 
the social world. Such a dominant representation has its influence on current 
understandings of education in Arab states and is reflected in their educational 
programmes.
This study takes Jordan as an example of one Arab country that started, in the 
nineteen eighties, introducing democratic reform to its political system. Political 
reform was followed by several processes of educational reform, the first 
comprehensive one started in 1987 and the most recent in 2003. Citizenship 
education is one discipline that received special attention in these reforms. A 
citizenship education programme was introduced by the 1987 educational reform 
and continued to be one of the focal points of the 2003 reform.
One of the main aims of the 1987 citizenship education programme, which was 
maintained in the 2003 reform, was to help young Jordanians develop as balanced 
individuals who have a strong sense of belonging to their cultural and religious 
roots, and at the same time, be open to accepting and engaging with other points 
of view (Ministry of Education 1991, 2005a).
While analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education programme will be 
introduced in Chapter Three (in illustration of tensions that may be encountered as 
a result of reconciling traditional inclinations with liberal democratic values), the 
current chapter introduces the rationale for the 2003 educational reform in general
and the citizenship education element in particular.
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This chapter also introduces the concept of ‘liberal democracy’ as an 
amalgamation of two different ideals: democracy and liberalism, taking into 
account that withir. the liberal tradition, there are different understandings of both 
ideals. In order to identify common features of liberal democratic systems, section
1.3 identifies similarities and differences between modern and ancient 
understandings of democracy and introduces a general understanding of the 
concept of liberal democracy.
1.1 The Arab world, a shared classical culture
Politically, the ‘Arab world’ comprises twenty-two countries that currently form the 
Arab League of Nations. These countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco1, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
Despite differences between Arab countries, it could be argued that they share 
characteristics (and interests) that bring them together as a league of nations. 
These characteristics are mainly a religion that is shared by most Arabs, a 
common official language and, to some extent, a shared history. While none of 
these characteristics is uncontested, their influence in creating a culture that 
different Arabs share should not be underestimated.
An example of how these unifying characteristics could be challenged can be 
found in the work of Egyptian writers such as Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed, Salamah 
Moussa and Taha Hussein, whose writings became popular in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century. These intellectuals, among others, did not see Egypt, on 
cultural, geographic, and historical bases, to form a natural extension of an Arab 
world. They argued that the Arab civilization was imposed on Egypt, and 
Egyptians had to seek their distinct Egyptian identity that roots back to the old 
pharaonic civilization (Matloub, 1994). Some Maronites in Lebanon, Kurds in Iraq 
and Berbers in North Africa are among others who present similar arguments. 
Another example could be realized in Arab states such as Djibouti, Comoros and
1 Western Sahara is administered by Morocco and hence is not listed separately. However, this 
area is also claimed by the Polisario Front, which declares a government in exile.
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Somalia, where Arabic language, while it is used for religious purposes, is not a 
main spoken language by the majority of population, who speak Somali instead.
Out of the twenty-two Arab states that form the Arab League, this study only 
concerns those among them in which the Arabic language is spoken by the 
majority of their population. This condition is necessary, as explained in this 
section below, as language is a main vehicle for the spread of cultural norms and 
practices. Among these Arabic language-speaking countries, this study only 
concerns these states that have already done some work towards establishing 
some of the fundamental features of a democracy. These fundamental features 
include a “government based on majority rule and the consent of its governed, the 
existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for 
human rights” (Kekic 2007 p1). Based on this, Arabic language-speaking 
countries that have taken steps towards establishing democratic systems will be 
referred to as ‘democratizing Arab countries’.
The geographic spread of the Islamic Empire, since it started in the Seventh 
Century, brought different nations under its jurisdiction. Many of these nations 
continued, under successive rules, to form a political unit until World W ar One, 
when, as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (that ruled over much of 
the Arab states that currently belong to the Arab League), Arab land started to 
break down into modem nation states.
The 'Arab civilization' that grew during the high period of Islam was not brought by 
the invaders who came from the Arabian Peninsula, nor it was purely Islamic. 
Rather, it grew in collaboration between different peoples who belonged to 
different civilizations. The two main contributions that Arabs brought to this new 
civilization were their language and their faith (Hitte 1946, Lewis 1993). Overtime, 
the Arabic language became the language of a multicultural society as well as its 
means for communicating and transmitting its civilization. As for the other 
contribution, Islam became the official religion of the empire, and law and order 
were maintained through the application of Islamic religious law, the Shari’a.
The spread of Islam throughout the Islamic empire, while it had (and still has) a 
major influence in creating a common culture among Muslims around the Arab 
world, also made the spread of the Arabic language easier. Classical Arabic being 
the language of the holy Qur’an kept its status over the years as the official
language of the Islamic Empire. The use of classical Arabic as the main means 
of communication, including education, jurisdiction, science, intellectual activities, 
official trade transactions, and its projections on the way people think and behave, 
aided the spread of a ‘classical culture’ that Arab societies share (al-Jabri 1994a).
Currently, while different societies within the larger Arab world have their own 
Vernacular cultures’, they share a classical culture that is encoded in classical 
Arabic and which is transmitted from one generation to the next through family 
upbringing, pubic education, television, radio programmes, newspapers and 
magazines, among other means. This is not to say, though, that such means do 
not participate in transmitting private vernacular cultures, but vernacular cultures 
were mostly not preserved in writings. They were mainly transferred, as al-Jabri 
(1994a) writes, from one person to another and from one generation to another 
through tales, food recipes, traditional dances and songs, etc. This part of culture, 
while it kept on developing and adapting under daily living experiences and 
interactions between different people, was kept local. The classical part of culture, 
on the other hand, is the one that is preserved in literature and is transmitted as 
the recorded memory of the Arab world.
1.2 The development of modern Arab thought
Until the advent of the Nineteenth Century, Arabs, living under Ottoman rule, 
regarded their cultural and religious heritage as their main reference (Bulkzeez 
2001). The encounter with the West, which happened through different means, 
starting from the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and then by sending and 
inviting official delegates to and from Europe to benefit from the experiences that 
turned Europe into an imperial power, had a shock effect on Arab societies that 
had been living a long period of stagnation and isolation (Hitte et al 1949, Lewis 
1993, Tamimi 2000).
The exposure to Nineteenth Century Europe challenged traditional Arab Islamic 
epistemologies and general ways of life. It initiated a project that aimed to 
modernize state institutions and different aspects of public life, including the 
military and the introduction of modern schooling systems similar to those found in 
Europe during that period of time (Hitte et al 1949). This marked the start of a 
lively intellectual period in the Arab world, known in literature as the awakening (al-
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Nahdah) period. Writings during this period were influenced by an atmosphere 
of openness and freedom that Europe started to experience earlier (Bulkzeez
2001, Adonese 2002).
!n the Nineteenth Century, two constitutional changes were introduced by the 
Ottoman government of that time that are of relevance to this study. Firstly, equal 
rights were granted to all Ottoman citizens regardless of their race or religion. This 
included equal opportunities for enrolment in state schools and state employment. 
The second was the introduction of new civil coded laws in place of the Shari’a 
law. The new civil laws were based on the French law, but were adapted to suit 
Muslim culture, and the administration of these laws was made the role of a newly 
created Ministry of Justice instead of Muslim judges, qadies (Mansfield 1991, 
Cleveland 2000)
The progress of life in the Arab world along liberal lines prompted the revival of a 
form of literature that was ancestral in its reference (Bulkzeez 2001, Adonese
2002, Gelvin 2005). Despite variations within this line of thinking, its advocates 
generally interpreted the political, military and economic lagging behind of the Arab 
civilization to be a result of abandoning the means of their ancestors who made 
the Arab civilization a central one (Esposito 1988, Gelvin 2005).
This liberal-ancestral divide, while it developed early in the Nineteenth Century, is 
still a main constituent of contemporary political dialogue in the Arab world. At the 
present time, al-Jabri (1994b) writes, Islamists and liberals are two groups in the 
Arab world who present competing visions concerning the type of reform that 
ought to be pursued in Arab societies, and the struggle between them, at least at 
the level of values, is affecting different aspects of life, including education. In 
between these two groups, as Filali-Ansari (1998) writes, lie the majority of Arabs 
who are “alternately attracted to one or the other of these two currents of thought” 
(p157).
Currently, Saudi Arabia is the only modern Arab country that was established 
based on the Shari’a Law. As for the rest of Arab countries, while some of them 
have judicial systems that build on the Shari’a, most countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa maintain a dual judicial system: a religious system and a modern 
civic one which in Jordan, as an example, is still modelled on the French law. The 
religious judicial system regulates marriage, divorce and inheritance issues, while
the civic system regulates all other aspects (Esposito 2000).
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The sustaining of dual judicial systems in most of the Arab world suggests that the 
separation between the religious and the public is not an alien concept at least for 
those who live* under such dual judicial systems. This point, however, will be 
further taken up in section 4.4 below.
Intellectual life that started to progress during the Nineteenth Century was 
disrupted by a major event that cast its shadow over different parts of the Arab 
world. With the end of the First World War, the Arab region was divided, under the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement2, into states that were placed under European colonial rule 
until they claimed their independence at different times around the middle of the 
Twentieth Century. During the colonial period, the lively and diversified 
‘awakening’ literature started to narrow down in its scope (al-Jabri 1994a). 
Literature during this period mainly revolved around military struggle and the 
political situation in the region, and other aspects of intellectual life, as Bulkzeez 
(2001) writes, were brought to a halt.
Arab states that emerged from colonial rule, while they enjoyed high morale, were 
economically exhausted. The struggle for independence and the urgent need for 
development in the post independence era favoured, as Macpherson (1966) 
writes, the emergence of one-party political systems (or in some cases a 
multiparty political systems in which overwhelming dominance is claimed by one 
single party). The priority was to focus efforts on achieving desired economic and 
social developments in the most efficient way possible, and therefore a strong 
disciplined leadership seemed to be, at that time, a reasonable option.
However, in the aftermath of the defeat of the combined Egyptian, Jordanian and 
Syrian forces3 in the six-day Arab-lsraeli W ar (in June 1967) and particularly 
during the 1970s, Arab citizens started to realize that, owing to factors including 
inefficient centralized economic policies, authoritarian tendencies of Arab regimes
2 In May 1916 the Governments of Britain and France (with the assent of the Russian Government) 
signed a secret agreement to divide the Ottoman Empire after its anticipated defeat in World W ar 
One. This agreement led to partitioning the Middle East by establishing nation states (Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) that were placed under the mandate and control of either 
Britain or France. Some argue that the agreement betrayed promises that were already given by 
the British Government to the Hashemite leader, Hussein ibn Ali for his role in the war against the 
Ottomans. These promises, that were made official by the so-called ‘the McMahon-Hussein 
Correspondence’, supported an Arab independence and their receiving an important share in the 
won territory (Milton-Edwards 2000).
3 These forces were backed by troops contributed by Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
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and external pressures, Arab governments were unable to bring about the 
economic and social reform they had promised (Gelvin 2005). It was during this 
period, the nineteen seventies, when Islamists started to build their wide popular 
base (Tamimi 2001, Gelvin 2005).
As far as education is concerned, the need for human capital to push the process 
of development in the post-colonial era placed pressures on Arab governments to 
invest in different educational projects all at the same time. Among these projects 
were literacy campaigns, the expansion of formal schooling systems and 
investments in higher education institutions4. These projects, according to Mazawi 
(2006), placed strains on “planning priorities, the allocation of natural resources, 
the quality of training programmes and the economic viability of many schools and 
higher education systems” (p982).
It was not until the nineteen eighties that different Arab states started to take steps 
towards liberating their political systems (Arab Human Development Report5 
[henceforth AHDR] 2002). Democratic reform that Arab governments started to 
implement was mainly a response to economic crises that prompted, in some 
cases, violent public protests, as in the case of the events in Tunisia in 1984, 
Algeria in 1988 and Jordan in 1989 (Brand 1999, Tessler 1999, Milton-Edwards 
2000). Protests were generally against increasing consumption-oriented 
behaviours of middle and upper social classes at a time when the economic 
situation of the masses was deteriorating (Tessler 1999). But more importantly, as 
Tessler explains, they were directed against political leaders whose actions were 
largely perceived to be responsible for declining economic and social standards, 
and against government systems in which patronage and personal, family and 
tribal contacts were becoming characteristics of these systems.6
4 Three quarters of Arab universities were established in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century 
and 57% of them were established in the last fifteen years (AHDR 2003)
5 The Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) is published by the United Nations Development 
Programme, and is prepared by an independent group of Arab scholars, policymakers and 
practitioners. The report is annual and the first one was published in 2002.
In the case of Jordan, the riots followed the deterioration in the value of the Jordanian currency, 
the Dinar, and the increase in the price of bread and other basic goods following austerity 
measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A document of the demands of a 
group of demonstrators in the city of Karak included demands for the resignation of the government 
and the formation of a new one that could be responsive to the needs of the people; would hold 
accountable those responsible for corruption and embezzlement of public funds irrespective of their 
status; would reverse the rise in prices; would conduct free and fair parliamentary elections; would 
replace the current election law with a modern democratic one, and would declare full solidarity 
with the Palestinian struggle until all their national rights were seen to be fully restored. A  
delegation from the city of Salt presented similar demands to the King (Mahafthah 2001).
In addition to these internal demands for democracy, recent years have also 
witnessed increasing external demands that were mainly initiated by the tragic 
attacks on the United States of America on eleventh of September 2001. These 
attacks invited attention to national educational programmes of different Arab 
states, which to varying extents were accused of nourishing dogma and producing 
young men and women who were incapable of seeing the other point of view. 
Salama (2002), in a report on education in the Gulf states, writes that these 
accusations urged some Arab states, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to start a 
review process for some aspects of their national curricula in an attempt to pay 
more attention to values and attitudes that would encourage cultural openness and 
conflict resolution. Other countries (Yemen, as an example) closed some religious 
institutions that were seen to broadcast radical religious views (Salama 2002).
1.3 What does the term 'liberal democracy’ entail?
In reading democracy, we do not all refer to the same textbook. Historically, the 
liberal democratic model developed and experienced widely in capitalist western 
societies is not the only political system that claims the title ‘democratic’. Back in 
1966, Macpherson, who is an advocate of a more participatory public-based 
democratic model, wrote
“[w]e in the West have achieved a unique political system, a 
combination of liberal state and democratic franchise. But we should 
not appropriate for it a title -democracy- which not only used to have a 
very different meaning, but which also now has a different meaning in 
the whole non-Western world. When we mean liberal-democracy we 
should say liberal democracy” (Macpherson, 1966 p12).
Liberal democracy, as already mentioned in the introductory paragraph to this 
chapter, and as will be further argued in this section, is an amalgamation of two 
different ideals: liberalism and democracy, and the relation between these two 
ideals is not a direct one in the sense that one leads to the other; in fact, they can 
come into conflict with each other.
Macpherson (1966) identifies two models, other than the Western liberal 
democratic model, that claim the title ‘democratic’. The first one is the communist 
model, which not long ago was one of the main rivals for the liberal democratic 
model, and until now it is still dominating in some parts of the world. Despite the
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huge retreat of communism that occurred during the nineteen eighties, some of 
its elements are still echoing within some societies. The second model 
encompasses nationalist political systems like those developed in Arab countries 
in the post-independence period around the middle of the Twentieth Century.
However, since this research is mainly concerned with the implications of 
introducing liberal democratic citizenship values into citizenship education 
programmes of traditional Arab societies, the discussion below will be limited to 
liberal democratic models. This is justified by the fact that relatively recent 
developments in world politics, including the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a new world order, coupled with 
big strides made in the field of technology, particularly the communications 
industry, globalization and the knowledge economy, have given liberal values an 
advantage over other ideologies and paved the way for the acceptance of liberal 
democracy as the standard form of governance.
Historically, our understanding of the term ‘democracy’ and its practices goes all 
the way back to Athens more than twenty-five centuries ago. The word 
‘demokratia’, which is thought to be invented by Athenians of that time to define 
their system of governance, meant ‘rule by the people’ (Dahl 1989). Despite 
differences between today’s understandings of democracy and the classical 
Athenian one, some aspects of the Athenian definition of democracy still hold 
today. The word ‘democracy’, modem and classical, implies that any system of 
governance that does not provide its citizens with a venue to have their say (and 
influence), whether directly or indirectly, in the way their affairs are governed, 
cannot be described as democratic.
The issue, however, of how much authority should be given to ‘the people’ to 
intervene in running public life is still an issue today as it was twenty-five centuries 
ago. Plato, in ‘The Republic’ (1955), showed that he had no faith in the masses 
(who were referred to as democrats), accusing them of acting upon immoral 
beliefs. He also did not have faith in democratic systems of government, and 
predicted that a democracy would inevitably collapse into a tyranny (Popper [1945] 
2003). Plato highlighted two concerns about democratic systems of governance: 
the first one is the fact that minorities could be oppressed by the ‘majority’, an 
issue later addressed with the advent of liberalism in Seventeenth Century 
Europe; and secondly, the fact that the masses may not be qualified to rule so
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they could end up making political choices that are to their disadvantage, an 
issue taken up by elite theorists, early in the Twentieth Century, and then 
developed by Schumpeter into an elitist competitive democratic model (Holden 
1974, Schumpeter 1987, Etzioni-Halevy 1993).
Aristotle, on the other hand, did not have the same bleak image of democracy, yet 
he did not consider it, as it is accepted today, as the best form of governance. In 
‘Politics’, Aristotle (1981) identified three systems of governance that he 
recognized as capable of serving the ‘common good’: kingship, aristocracy and 
polity. Each of these systems could transform into a corrupt system of governance 
that serves the interests of the rulers instead. Kingship (the rule of the one) could 
diverge into tyranny, aristocracy (the rule of the few) into oligarchy when power 
shifts from the educated to the wealthy, and polity (the rule of the many) into 
democracy when power shifts from the educated medium wealth middle class to 
the poor. Polity was Aristotle’s preferred system of government, in which men who 
were knowledgeable and able to rule, while at the same time possessing the 
qualities of prudence, justice and moderation, would be able to rule for the 
‘common good’. Out of the three divergent systems of governments, Aristotle 
chose democracy as the least unjustifiable system, as he saw that the rule by the 
poor majority is better than rule by the wealthy minority who would not be able to 
recognize the needs of the poor. He also saw another advantage in democracy in 
that a large group of ruling people are not easily corrupted and their vision would 
be superior to that of a man committed to excellence (Aristotle 1981).
Despite the resemblance between certain aspects of the classical Athenian 
concept of democracy and contemporary understandings of the term, the twenty- 
five century period of development introduced significant changes to the classical 
concept of democracy to the extent that some theoreticians and observers, such 
as Dahl (1989) and Sartori (1987), argue that the Athenian concept of democracy 
and the modern one are two different things. Greece, as Dahl (2000) explains, 
was not a nation state in the same way as the concept is understood today.
Greece was made up of city-states that were more or less autonomous and had 
their own independent systems of governance. The relatively small number of 
citizens in a city-state, in comparison to a modern nation-state, made it possible 
for citizens to decide directly through general assemblies on the city’s policies. In 
most modern democracies, however, citizens delegate decisions to
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representatives chosen through elections instead of directly taking part in the 
decision making process.
Historically, Holden (1988) notes that while electoral representation emerged as a 
result of liberal ideas that started to gain momentum in Seventeenth Century 
Europe, the merger between liberal thought and electoral representation led to the 
emergence of a new form of liberal representative democracy, which nowadays 
the term ‘democracy’, more or less, signifies. It was not, however, until the 
Nineteenth Century, as Etzioni-Halevy (1993) writes, when the idea of 
representative government started to take over the older view of direct democracy 
in different modern nation states. This move towards electoral representation 
marked the first difference between modern understandings of democracy and the 
classical Athenian one.
The second major difference between modern understandings of democracy and 
the classical direct one is that in the latter only a small proportion of the city’s 
population held citizenship rights and could participate in general assemblies. In 
Athens, for example, participation in general assemblies was limited to male, adult, 
non-slave, native born Athenians, excluding a majority of the city’s population. 
Contemporary democracies, by contrast, assume universal suffrage of adult 
citizens. It was during the second half of the Nineteenth Century and the start of 
the Twentieth Century that different nation states started accepting, though at 
different times, universal suffrage as a basis for their democratic systems (Etzioni- 
Halevy 1993).
The third departure from the classical Athenian conception of democracy, which 
emerged as a result of the merger between liberalism and democracy, could be 
found in Friedrich Hayek’s writings. In describing democracy, Hayek (1960, p117) 
writes, it
“is not the fountainhead of justice . . . i t  needs to acknowledge a 
conception of justice which does not necessarily manifest itself in the 
popular view on every particular issue”.
Majority vote may be regarded as a method for legitimizing a law but this does not 
necessarily make it a good law. Democracy in Hayek’s view is not an end in itself; 
it is rather a means for reaching a certain end. Liberalism, Hayek argues, is the 
ultimate end that the state and its apparatus must seek to maintain through the 
rule of law. Since democracy is just a tool that serves a higher goal, its limits must
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be determined in light of serving that goal, and therefore it must be judged by the 
ends it achieves.
Hayek’s argument reflects a view of democracy as the best form of ‘limited’ 
government, which is a significant departure from the view that regards majority 
vote as the only limitation to democratic rule as in the classical understanding of 
democracy. While a classical direct form of democracy emphasized, as Sartori 
(1987) writes, vesting power in the hands of citizens (narrowly defined), modern 
liberal understandings of democracy place emphasis on limiting the array of issues 
that people can decide on. This eventually means restricting the government itself 
that draws its powers from the consent of its subjects, and in particular the majority 
that puts the government in power.
Liberalism and democracy, while they may come into conflict with each other, may 
also support one another, according to Rawls (1999). To achieve political justice, 
Rawls proposes the principle of equal participation which gives every citizen an 
equal right to participate in and influence political decision making. This principle 
can be satisfied through safeguards such as having one vote for each citizen, free 
and fair elections that are regularly held, a constitution that protects individual 
freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly and political association, 
tolerance of opposition and difference in political opinion, and citizens having 
equal access to public office (Rawls 1999). This suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between liberalism and democracy; as for citizens to exercise self-rule 
effectively in a democracy, individual freedoms such as freedom of speech and 
political association must be guaranteed.
Hayek’s definition of democracy is in line with Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative 
liberty. Berlin (2006) defines ‘oppression’ as the prevention of one’s wishes by 
others, which could be exercised intentionally or unintentionally and/or directly or 
indirectly. On Berlin’s negative liberty account, being free means not to be 
oppressed, which in turn means that one should be able to pursue his/her wishes 
without interference by others (and without harming others). According to this 
account of liberty, being free implies that one’s actions are motivated by one’s own 
ends, which may or may not be governed by self-interest.
Under Berlin’s definition of negative liberty, a political system could be liberal but 
not necessarily democratic. A non-democratic liberal political system provides
(and protects) certain personal (civic) liberties, but it does not take its consent 
from its subjects and it does not involve them in the decision making process. 
Subjects, while they have certain personal rights, do not necessarily have full 
political rights.
Berlin (2006) distinguishes between an understanding of liberty that he identifies 
with the negative notion of liberty and another one that he terms ‘positive liberty’. 
While negative liberty concerns the question “what am I free to do or be?” (p373), 
positive liberty, Berlin writes, concerns the question of “by whom am I ruled?” 
(p373). He identifies the positive notion of liberty with self rule or the ‘freedom to’, 
as opposed to ‘freedom from’ that is associated with the concept of negative 
liberty.
Berlin’s positive concept of liberty assumes the individual to have a ‘real self that 
is identified with reason. Individuals, however, according to this understanding of 
liberty need to be educated to be free, and only then they become self-directed, 
deciding, conscious of themselves and responsible for their choices, as well as 
free of control by other people and their own uncontrolled desires.
According to Berlin (2006), those in favour of positive liberty assume that truth 
exists and that individuals (after they discover their real self) are able to find that 
truth. According to this understanding of liberty, the “real self may be conceived 
as something wider than the individual... as a social *whole’ of which the individual 
is an element” (Berlin 2006 pp373-374). This social whole imposes its collective 
will upon its members, and self-rule is achieved through collective decisions.
This dedication of the positive notion of liberty to set free those who are unable to 
recognize their own good by themselves or those, as Burtonwood (2006) puts it, 
who are “unable to control their weaker selves so that a better self can emerge” 
(p7), could twist the meaning of self rule into the opposite. While the negative 
notion of liberty could be interpreted to lead to an understanding of government 
that is liberal but undemocratic, the positive notion of liberty, as Berlin writes, runs 
the risk of providing reasons for despotism and tyranny.
Berlin’s illustration of self-rule under the understanding of positive liberty is 
criticized by communitarians, such as Taylor (2006), who argue that while the 
struggle between the two notions of liberty is a struggle over what is more 
important, individual liberty or self-rule, self-rule does not have to be associated
with extreme collectivism. Against the concept of negative liberty, Taylor (2006) 
argues that being ‘free from’ is not a sufficient understanding of liberty. One’s 
liberties are restrained if he/she, for any reason, cannot make use of the negative 
liberties made available to him/her. Taylor writes of a concept of freedom that 
leads to fulfilling one’s purposes. To be free, according to Taylor, one needs to 
have the capacities of self-understanding, self-awareness, self-control and moral 
discrimination that would help him/her overcome problems such as false 
consciousness and fear.
In his ‘Capabilities Approach’, Sen (1999b) highlights another limitation of focusing 
on negative liberty. He argues that while none of the negative freedoms a person 
is entitled to may be directly repressed by a state, a citizen, as a result of being 
deprived of necessary capabilities, might not be able to make use of (or even 
recognize) these freedoms. Such deprivation could result from extreme poverty 
that may lead to malnourishment, limited (or no) access to clean drinking water 
and health and education services, or a form of education that does not help 
children to develop the capabilities that would allow them to realize future 
opportunities. There is a direct connection, Sen writes, between human 
development and the enhancement of people’s capabilities to live more freely (Sen 
1999b p36).
Between the two notions of liberty extends a spectrum from anarchism to extreme 
collectivism. However, whether a political system is a dictatorship, takes majority 
rule as its means for legislation, or adopts a minimal state approach, political 
power, as Rawls (1993a) describes it, is always coercive. In a democracy, 
however, this power is the collective power of the people. The extent of how much 
power a democratic state allows for its people and the admissible grounds for the 
exercise of this power are, as Nagel (2003) writes, among the most important 
features that distinguish a liberal form of democracy from democracy understood 
as majority rule.
Political equality, which is one of the main pillars of liberal democracy, is criticized 
by Gould (1988) who argues that economic inequalities created in a society as a 
result of protecting individual liberties result in an unequal distribution of power. 
This renders some societal structures, such as big economic and industrial 
organizations, more influential than others, or as argued by Marxists, divides the 
society into two classes, exploiters and exploited, which in turn puts a question
mark on the validity of political equality that liberal democracies are based on.
In summary, this section emphasizes that a liberal understanding of democracy 
comprises a private sphere that is maintained and protected by the state. In this 
private sphere, an individual is entitled to pursue all activities that are considered 
to lie within it without external interference as long as one’s actions do not violate 
the rule of law. This sphere is distinguished from a public sphere where the state 
is obliged to interfere under the name of the collective will of its people to stop 
something from happening, make something happen or even to inflict punishment 
on those who violate the law.
The absence of a public sphere denies the right of citizens to participate in the 
running of their affairs and therefore such a political system cannot be described 
as democratic. On the other hand, in the absence of a private sphere, a political 
system, while it could be described as democratic, cannot be liberal democratic. 
While this private/public divide is well established in modern liberal thought, where 
to draw the line between the private and the public will always prove to be a 
subject for debate and change (Berlin 2006).
1.4 Political systems and the development of an understanding of 
liberal democracy in the Arab world
Political regimes in the Arab World are identified as one reason for the slow 
progress of democracy (Khuri 1993). This concern is highlighted by the 2002 Arab 
Human Development Report (AHDR 2002) and is reiterated in the more recent 
2004 AHDR (AHDR 2004). The 2002 AHDR describes the situation in different 
Arab states thus:
“[wjhile de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined 
in constitutions, legal codes and government pronouncements, de facto 
implementation is often neglected and, in some cases, deliberately 
disregarded” (p2).
Arab political regimes are also accused of using their authority to place restrictions 
on the development of a wider cross-section of opposition political parties that 
citizens could choose from. According to the AHDR (2002) report, Arab states are 
characterized by having
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“a powerful executive branch that exerts significant control over all other 
branches of the state, being in some cases free from institutional 
checks and balances. Representative democracy is not always 
genuine ... Freedoms of expression and association are frequently 
curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail” (p2).
Given these characteristics, the model citizen, as Arab political systems would like 
him/her to be, is one who is politically inactive, unquestioning and does not hold 
ruling authorities accountable (AHDR 2004).
Among the issues that the observations made by the two AHDRs raise is the 
relation between democracy and liberalism. Concerning this relation, two opposite 
views can be found in the literature. The first view argues that while constitutional 
liberalism may lead to democracy (as a system of electoral representation), 
democracy does not lead to incorporating liberties in the constitution. The second 
view maintains that democracy and constitutional liberalism are intrinsically linked 
and one facilitates the other.
Concerning the first view, Zakaria (1997) argues that the development of the 
political aspect of democracy, i.e. the introduction of general or parliamentary 
elections to a nation state, does not lead to endorsing individual liberties as a 
value enshrined by the state. In Western Europe and North America, Zakaria 
argues, constitutional liberalism preceded and led to the establishment of electoral 
democracy that had to adjust and adapt to already existing established liberal 
constitutions in these societies, which made the two ideals that comprise the term 
‘liberal democracy’ in these societies inseparable. In parts of the world where 
liberal constitutions are not properly established, Zakaria writes, while electoral 
democracy 7s flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not”(p23). According to 
Zakaria, pushing elections on countries where regimes do not have much respect 
for individual liberties will not make these regimes more liberal and less 
domineering over the lives of their citizens, but rather would provide for an illiberal 
form of democracy which is “dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the 
abuse of power, ethnic divisions and even war” (pp42-43).
The progress of electoral representation in the Arab world has led to strengthening 
the position of religious fundamentalism in both the political and social arenas (the 
victory of the religious fundamentalist group, Hamas, in the last parliamentary 
elections in Palestine is a current example). However, the popularity of Islamists 
among citizens of Arab countries is mainly motivated, as Tessler (1999) and
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Gause (2005) argue, by rejecting existing political regimes rather than by a 
commitment to Islamists’ political agendas. This is evidenced, as Gause (2005) 
writes, by the fact that Islamists do not have as much influence on voters’ opinions 
in countries where non-lslamic parties are well established, such as Lebanon and 
Morocco, as they do have in other Arab countries.
Opposite to Zakaria’s view, Plattner (1998) argues that while electoral democracy 
may not eventually develop into liberal democracy, it is a step in the right direction. 
Self-governance, he continues, entails many problems especially for new 
democracies, but abolishing elections can never be the solution. Plattner also 
argues, and the same point is argued by Sen (1999a), that even if democracy fails 
in one country, historical evidence shows that it is more likely that this country will 
have more chances in the future to democratize than other non-democratic 
countries that have never been through the democratization experience before.
Sen (1999b) argues that allowing one type of freedom to develop will pave the way 
for the development of other types. Political freedom, he writes, is most valued for 
the opportunities it makes available for citizens “to discuss and debate -and to 
participate in the selection of- values in the choice of priorities” (p30). Sen (1999a) 
challenges what he refers to as a Nineteenth Century concept of a country or 
society being “fit for democracy” (p2) or not, and argues that this concept is by its 
nature hostile to liberal democratic values. This very notion of ‘being fit for 
democracy or not' does not only divide the world into those who culturally have the 
necessary credentials and those who do not, but also assumes some sort of 
cultural fixity, which makes claims and generalizations that are hard to defend, and 
at the same time ignores any educative effect for democracy. Once democracy 
starts, its sustainable and educative powers will keep it going and its influences 
permeate over the course of time reaching different aspects of life. States and 
societies, as Sen (1999a p2) writes, are to become “fit through democracy” not the 
other way around.
On this account and contrary to Zakaria’s argument, the introduction of electoral 
elections (as part of the political aspect of democracy) is indeed a step in the right 
direction. While a more talk-centric form of democracy could be argued to be 
more favourable over a vote-centric one (Enslin et al 2001, Kymlicka 2002, 
Kymlicka and Norman 2002, Sen 1999a), electoral elections are one of the 
freedoms that help develop other forms of freedom, and hence, encourage the
spread of democratic culture. Education, and in particular citizenship education, 
is one of the means for developing skills, attitudes and values that are necessary 
for the development of such a culture. However, realizing the effects of 
democracy is not instantaneous. Helping youngsters develop democratic values, 
attitudes and skills is an ongoing process that requires, inter alia, time and 
dedication, and this is one of the reasons that makes formal education a suitable 
venue, though not the only one, for this purpose.
This section places emphasis on the importance of introducing electoral 
representation as a step in the right direction towards helping traditional societies 
develop a democratic culture. It also highlights authoritarian tendencies of political 
systems in Arab countries. In The Law of Peoples’, Rawls (1993b) argues that 
liberal societies are obliged to respect “other societies organized by 
comprehensive doctrines, provided that their political and social institutions meet 
certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples”7 
(p37). Arab societies are, to varying degrees, hierarchical in structure, and to that 
effect they could be described, in Rawlsian terms, as illiberal. This, however, does 
not make them essentially not ‘decent’8. A Rawlsian (1993b) view of a well 
ordered hierarchical illiberal (decent) state is one that is peaceful, non­
expansionist, has a legitimate legal system that protects basic human rights “and 
its basic structure contains a decent consultation hierarchy” (Rawls 1999 p5) and 
to this effect it could be described as decent. States that are not well ordered, on 
the other hand, “cannot be accepted as members in good standing in a reasonable 
society of peoples” (Rawls 1993b p37). Taking a Rawlsian stance, while not all 
states are expected to be liberal, not all illiberal states are not decent. Well 
ordered9 liberal states are preferable, but well ordered illiberal states are also 
possible.
Political systems in democratizing Arab states, while they are hierarchical in 
structure, are also drawn to some aspects of liberalism. To take Jordan as an 
example, democratic reform started in 1989, and by the start of the nineteen
7 By the law of peoples, Rawls (1993b p36) refers to “a political conception of right and justice that 
applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice”.
8 In T h e  Law of Peoples’, Rawls (1999 p4) considers “five types of domestic societies”. The first 
two are: “reasonable liberal people” and “decent people” that he refers to as “well-ordered” (p4). 
The other three are: “outlaw states”, “societies burdened by unfavourable conditions”and “finally 
societies that are benevolent absolutisms: they honor most human rights, but because they deny 
their members a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not well-ordered” (p63).
9 The characteristic features of a well-ordered liberal society are, according to Rawls, different from 
these of a well-ordered hierarchical illiberal society, and will be introduced in Section 4.3.
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nineties, Jordan was often cited “as the most encouraging example of 
democratization in the region” (Milton-Edwards 2000 p165). According to the 
National Charter, Jordan is a “state for all citizens regardless of any differences of 
opinion or any pluralism of approach”. Jordan “derives its legitimacy... from the 
free will of the people, and all authorities within it are committed to providing legal, 
judicial and administrative guarantees to protect the rights, integrity and basic 
freedoms of the individual”. The National Charter also emphasizes Jordan’s 
commitment to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Jordanian National Charter 1990).
Regarding parliamentary life in Jordan, the parliamentary elections of 1989 
marked the return to parliamentary life after more than twenty years of disruption. 
The 1989 elections allowed Jordanians from different political and social 
orientations to run for parliamentary seats. They also marked the first experience 
for women to actually run for elections10. Unlike previous elected councils, the 
1989 council comprised three main blocs instead of one group (that used to 
dominate the council and that was known for its support for the government).
While the latter group still managed to present itself in the 1989 council with 35 
seats, it was counterbalanced by two other major groups: Islamists won 32 seats 
and leftists, who mainly included Arab nationalists and communists, won 13 seats 
(Mahaftha 2001). With power distributed amongst the three blocs, no one group 
was able to claim absolute control over power. The three blocs checked and 
balanced each other and delegations between them as well as with the 
government became a necessity.
The importance of the 1989 parliamentary council is that deliberations among its 
members led to introducing many changes that helped revive democratic life in 
Jordan. Examples of these changes included putting an end to the state of 
emergency and martial laws, cancelling the law of anti-communism, amending the 
law of political parties, amending the law for print and publishing, and indeed 
introducing the National Charter (introduced briefly above). The National Charter 
was meant to act as a contract, whereby the different political and social groups 
agreed to be regulated by its principles (Mahaftha 2001, Hadrami and Idwan
2003).
10 It is worth mentioning here that the elections law was amended in 1974 to allow women to join 
the council.
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1.5 Islam and the progress of democracy: the revealed versus the 
intellectual
Democratic experience in the Arab world, Abu Khalil (1993) writes, is argued to 
have been challenged by the presence of a sacred text that represents a supreme 
point of view that cannot be subject to reasoning. As Brand (1999), Tessler (2003, 
1999) and Sen (1999b) point out, there are some who believe that Islam and 
democracy call for two contradictory sets of values: while democracy requires 
openness, plurality and tolerance of diversity, Isiam demands intellectual 
conformity and uncritical acceptance of authority. Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is an example of such views. Huntington (2002 p209) writes that 
contrary to the belief that prevails among some Westerners that “the West does 
not have problems with Islam but with violent Islamist extremists”; the problem, he 
continues (ibid p217), “is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different 
civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power”.
However, it can be argued that there is no one interpretation of Islam. Sen 
(1999b), for instance, argues that a quick review of the history of Islam since its 
birth in the Arabian Peninsula in the Seventh Century shows that while there are 
instances in Arab Islamic history when freedoms were suppressed, there are also 
other instances in which freedoms were protected. The real issue, he writes, “is 
not whether these nonfreedom perspectives are present... but whether the 
freedom-oriented perspectives are absent” (p234).
Commentators, such as Zraiq (1994) and Tessler (1999) argue that the spread of 
the Islamic Empire over a wide geographic area and its inclusion of peoples from a 
wide variety of backgrounds indicate that Muslims of that time were not inward- 
looking. Contrary to that, early Muslims must have been proactive, adaptive and 
accommodating to diversity, as otherwise it would be difficult to imagine how they 
managed to survive over the centuries. What is perceived as traditional in today’s 
measures, Zraiq (1994, p298) argues, is a result of the progressive spirit that 
characterized early Arabs, as it is this progressiveness and openness to other 
cultures that provided the steam that pushed their success forward in the many 
fields of science, medicine and philosophy.
The encounter with Nineteenth century Europe, introduced in Section 1.2, while it
provided the first cultural challenge for Arab ways of life in modern history, is the 
second challenge that Arabs faced since the rise of Islam in the Seventh Century. 
The encounter of Arabs with the Greek civilization, which was most active in the 
Ninth Century, was the first cultural challenge that Arabs had to face in the early 
days of Islam (Adonese 2002, AHDR 2003). The exposure to logic and rational 
thinking brought about by Greek philosophy resulted in the development of 
different intellectual movements and different schools of thought, and the struggle 
between these different movements had a significant influence on the route that 
the Arab civilization took in later years, the impact of which is still felt until this day.
One of the main debates of that time revolved around the relationship between 
‘intellectual knowledge’ that could be acquired through the activity of human 
reason and intellect, and 'revealed knowledge' which could only be obtained 
through divine revelation. Responses to this debate, as Adonese (2002) argues, 
ranged from taking a secular stance, as in the case of I bn al-Rawandi of the Ninth 
Century, to the extreme of rejecting the whole notion of Greek philosophy11. In 
between these two views, different movements emerged in medieval Islam that 
tried in one way or another to come up with a reconciliatory solution that brought 
together intellectual and revealed knowledge. The Mu’tazilites and the Asharites 
were two of the most influential rival theological schools in Islamic history who took 
two opposite views. The debate between these two schools, as this section will 
show, still resonates in current understandings of education and in the relationship 
between knowledge and the individual.
Al-Mu’tazilites, who adopted a Greek inspired rational theology approach, 
regarded religion and rational thinking to be inherently compatible. They argued 
that while religion is inspired by revelation and philosophy is inspired by the mind, 
their ultimate goal is the same, which is to reach the truth. Since the ultimate goal 
is the same, they argued, knowledge, whether it is scientific or religious must be 
approached with skepticism and open-mindedness. The Mu’tazilites’ rational 
approach to theology did cause tensions within Muslim communities as some of 
their teachings challenged basic dominant understandings of religion that were
11 One of the advocates of the latter position was Ibn Taymiya, born in 1263, who believed that the 
guide to a flawless virtuous life must be sought from the Qur’an and the practices of the first three 
generations of Muslims, and that deviations from this route must be forbidden. Later on, this 
school of thought formed the basis of the more conservative Wahabi movement that emerged in 
the Eighteenth Century in Arabia, and the Muslim Brotherhood that was established in Egypt 1928, 
which are both active today.
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assumed to be undisputed facts (Hitte et al 1949, Esposito 1988)12.
It was under al-Ma’moun, in the Ninth Century, who was deeply influenced by the 
Mu’tazilite school of thought, that the translation process of foreign texts into 
Arabic, particularly from the Greek, took an organized form. This period of 
translation and assimilation, as Esposito (1988) writes, “was followed by one of 
Muslim intellectual and artistic creativity as Muslims ceased to be merely disciples 
and became masters, in the process of producing Islamic civilization, dominated 
by Arabic language and Islam’s view of life” (p59). However, al-Ma’moun’s 
attempt to impose Mu’tazilite rational theology as orthodoxy, as Hitte et al (1949) 
write, turned his rule into a period of political oppression. According to Adonese 
(2002), it was not the challenging philosophical ideas that the Mu’tazilites were 
trying to sell, as much as it was the oppression that al-Ma’moun inflicted on people 
in the aim of enforcing Mu’tazillite rational dialectic, that provoked Islamic jurists 
and ended up in the Mu’tazilite thinking becoming marginalized and being taken 
over by the more conservative Asharite theology.
The Asharite School of theology was named after Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Ashari who 
died in 935. Al-Ashari, who himself, before changing allegiance, was a Mu’tazili 
intellectual, set on a journey, as Esposito (1988) writes, to respond to “the 
M u’tazilites tendency to rationalize God and theology” (p73). Unlike the 
Mu’taziltes, the Asharites believed that God’s characteristics were beyond human 
reasoning. By the Eleventh Century, Asharite theology became one of the 
dominant schools in the Sunni world. Among the advocates of Asharite theology 
was al-Ghazali, who was (and still is) one of the most influential Muslim 
intellectuals. Bom in Persia in 1058, al-Ghazali argued that Muslims should make 
use of reason and logical argumentation as utilized by Greek philosophy; however, 
he argued that Muslims must know where to apply these skills. Al-Ghazali 
classified knowledge into good and bad. Good knowledge should ultimately assist 
individuals to identify with God and become more aware of their relation with him. 
Bad knowledge, on the other hand, may lead believers to doubt their basic 
convictions and therefore must be avoided. Human rational capabilities, he 
argued, were limited, and certain facts could only be revealed by God himself.
12 As an example of some of these provocative teachings was the rejection of the idea of pre­
determined destiny. They argued in favour of man’s free will on the basis that God the Merciful 
would not choose to differentiate amongst His subjects. They also argued that the Qur’an was 
created rather than being present and preserved since the dawn of time. Their justification for this 
point was that if the Qur’an was omnipresent, then, pre-determined destiny would become a fact of 
life, and that would contradict their rightful and merciful image of God (Esposito 1988, Hitte 1946).
While al-Ghazali did not reject rational reasoning, he confined it within the limits 
of justifying the religious. He gave the status to revelation and argued that 
intellectual knowledge is only justified because it stems from revealed knowledge 
(Hewer 2001, Adonese 2002, Halstead 2004, Dangor 2005).
At this point it should be made clear that in the Sunni Muslim world, unlike, for 
instance, the Catholic Church, there is no religious authority or church that speaks 
for Muslims. The absence of such a unifying authority allowed for Muslim scholars 
who presented different views and understandings concerning many issues, 
including the relation between intellectual and revealed knowledge, to emerge in 
different parts of the Islamic world. While these different understandings could be 
argued to be equally relevant, after al-Ghazali, Asharite theology became 
accepted in most of the Sunni Muslim world as a standard way of thinking (Hitte et 
al 1949, Esposito 1988).
The importance of this debate is that, while it started in medieval Islam, it still 
resonates in current understandings of education. Halstead (2004), for instance, 
writes that viewing Islam through an Asharite lens was one major factor that 
restrained the pursuit of knowledge in the Arab World, and had its significant 
influence on educational thinking in the years to come. Along the same line, 
Hewer (2001) argues that the way Asharites viewed knowledge placed religion at 
the heart of all aspects of education in which it acted as the unifying factor and the 
guiding principle. In this regard, he writes that the different subjects in the 
curriculum became
"permeated by Islamic values and the divinely ordained harmony should 
be brought out by the educational process. Underlying this is a 
distinctive epistemology: ultimate truth, the relation between all created 
beings and things, is not personally synthetic but is given and 
immutable. Thus knowledge is something existent and defined, which 
is transmitted in the educational process'' (Hewer 2001 p522).
Before devising any curricula, Hewer (2001) writes, teachers must ask themselves 
“what has the Qur’an to say on this subject?” (p523). Consequently, Halstead 
(2004) argues that the different subjects would lose their autonomy if they were to 
comply fully with this view of Islam.
The perceived view of the righteous nature of knowledge has its influence on the 
way young Muslims view the authority of those who transmit this knowledge. By 
the Tenth Century, a consensus among Sunni religious jurists was reached that
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the thus far developed Islamic body of law was comprehensive enough and 
sufficient to regulate legal life in Muslim lands13. Muslim jurists, according to this 
consensus, were no longer allowed to seek new solutions and regulations based 
on their independent interpretation, ijtihad, of the Holy text. Their new role 
became limited to studying and applying what early Muslim jurists had legislated 
based on the principle of imitation, taqleed (Esposito 1988). This consensus, 
known as ‘closing the door of ijtihad’, directed Muslims, as Esposito writes, to 
follow “the past, God’s iaw as elaborated by the early jurists ... [and] ... Islamic 
law, the product of an essentially dynamic and creative process, novs tended to 
become fixed and institutionalized” (p85).
Closing the door of ijtihad (in the Sunni world) suggested that after the early jurists, 
no one was considered to be qualified enough for this responsibility, and the 
teachings of the early jurists were to be trusted, and their knowledge was to be 
uncritically accepted. While this uncritical acceptance of the authority of jurists has 
its spill-over effect on fields other than the religious, the dominating Asharite view 
of placing revealed knowledge as a source that inspires intellectual knowledge 
puts the two types of knowledge in one basket. It ruled out the distinction between 
religious knowledge and secular knowledge and rendered the development of 
each type as a separate entity more difficult.
This stance towards knowledge suggests that students are to be brought up in an 
environment that does not provide reasons for them to question faith matters. This 
may be achieved, as Halstead (2004) writes, through aiding students to accept the 
authority of those who have the knowledge, including their teachers. Teachers’ 
neutrality, according to this view, is not seen to encourage students to cultivate the 
teachings of their belief in their daily life experiences. It may also be seen to 
encourage students to question their own beliefs. Teachers, according to this 
view, have a religious obligation to help students to develop spiritually and morally 
along certain lines dictated by religious hierarchy.
This section, while it argued that there is no such thing as ‘the’ Islamic way of life, 
presents the uncritical acceptance of the authority of religion and tradition as a 
dominant representation of the social world. This representation of the social
13 Islamic jurisdiction draws mainly from the Holy Qur’an and the traditions of Prophet Mohammed 
as two direct sources. The process of interpreting these two sources to apply to specific cases is 
referred to as Ijtihad, and is usually done by scholars of Islamic law, ulama.
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world became part of the common classical culture that is encoded in the Arabic 
language and consumed in Arabic-language speaking countries. The following 
section shows how such dominant representation has its influence on current 
understandings of education in Arab countries.
1.6 Views about current educational systems in Arab countries
The English word ‘education’ has more than one equivalent in the Arabic 
language. The most commonly used are ta’leem and tarbiya. Despite the fact that 
these two terms are often used interchangeably, each one of them could be seen 
to deal with one dimension of education, and the two terms together provide an 
overarching understanding of what the term ‘education’ implies in the Arab world. 
The first term, ta’leem, is used to refer to the process of acquisition of knowledge, 
skills and competencies, which is taken as a separate entity from the second term, 
tarbiya, which refers to character building and helping learners develop morally, 
spiritually as well as socially14. In addition to these two terms, Cook (1999) and 
Halstead (2004) add the term ta’deeb (refinement), which they argue refers to the 
development of the social dimension of the learners’ characters.
These two dimensions of education, ta’leem and tarbiya, are not unique to 
educational programmes in the Arab world; however, dividing education into such 
two realms could be argued to have its significance in emphasizing the demands 
of each and, at the same time, stressing their separateness. Tarbiya mainly 
concerns helping students to develop a higher level of abidance by traditional 
sources of authority (religion, tradition and the state) in which reasoning, critical 
thinking and questioning are not considered favourable. On the other hand, the 
other dimension of education, ta’leem, demands these very same thought 
processes that help students become competent learners. This has to effect of 
juxtaposing the two dimensions of education.
Having said this, ta’leem is not necessarily presented in this way in the Arab world. 
Developments in education that started in the post-independence era have 
focused more, as the 2002 AHDR writes, on making education available for more
14 It is worth mentioning here that ministries of education in many Arab countries, including Jordan, 
the country from which aspects of the citizenship education programme will be analyzed in Chapter 
Three, are referred to as Ministries of Tarbiya and Ta’leem, and many schools of education in 
many Arab universities are referred to as schools/departments of Tarbiya, which reflects emphasis 
on the importance of the character-building side of education.
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students than on enhancing the quality of education itself. The report argues 
that the few available studies that address the development of education in Arab 
countries present the “low level of knowledge attainment and poor and 
deteriorating analytical and innovative capacity” (AHDR 2002 p54) as common 
outcomes of national educational programmes all around the Arab world. The 
same observations are re-emphasized by the 2003 and 2004 AHDRs.
Different factors contribute to the declining quality of education in Arab countries. 
Chief among these factors, as identified by the 2003 AHDR, is the absence of a 
clear vision concerning what is needed out of education. This leads to formulating 
education policies that lack “an integrated vision of the education process and its 
objectives” (AHDR 2003 p54). Teachers’ working conditions comprise another 
main factor identified by the report. Concerning teachers, the report explains that 
low salaries forced many of them to take on other jobs, including private tutoring, 
which consume their time and energy. Poorly designed curricula and low quality 
teachers’ training programmes are also identified to add to the problem. In 
addition to this, most teachers are graduates from institutions where rote learning 
is the norm. This last point, in particular, is not very conducive for helping students 
develop their critical thinking faculties (AHDR 2003).
Arab intellectuals present similar observations concerning the low quality of 
education in Arab countries. Fakhro (2002), for instance, who is a former Minister 
of Education in Bahrain, writes that educational programmes offered in Arab 
countries are influenced by a frame of mind that digs in the past to find ready­
made solutions for current problems. Adonese (2002), a contemporary Lebanese 
intellectual, argues that the influence schools have on students is not so much in 
the subject matter that they teach, which students may or may not remember after 
they move on to another stage in life. What matters, according to Adonese, is to 
help students think for themselves, something which he notes that Arab 
educational systems fail to do. Contrary to this, Arab educational systems, 
Adonese maintains, have a tendency to mould students’ thinking into fixed casts of 
thought that are borrowed from the past.
Along the same line, Biblawi (2002), an Egyptian academic and educator, 
summarizes some of the characteristics that he argues to be common to different 
national educational programmes in the Arab world. He writes that teaching takes 
a form of indoctrination in which information is transmitted by teachers to their
students who have to learn the taught material by heart. Textbooks are viewed 
to present immutable facts. Examinations are designed to test the extent to which 
students are able to memorize the material as it appears in their textbooks. The 
message conveyed through education, Biblawi argues, is that there is true 
knowledge that exists somewhere; this knowledge is packed into textbooks and 
teachers are to transmit this knowledge to their students. The effect this has on 
students is that they come to develop tendencies to accept the authority of the 
written word without much scepticism, and also emphasizes in their minds the 
authority of those who have the knowledge. Biblawi argues that the uncritical 
acceptance of knowledge provides reasons for students to grow as consumers of 
knowledge rather than participants in creating it. Students develop dependency 
on external sources to tell them what to do and when to do it, which puts limits on 
their development as creative, rational, and self reliant individuals. Redha (1992), 
an Iraqi academic, raises similar points, but he addresses university education in 
the Arabian Gulf in particular.
The same observations are also noted by the AHDR (2003). In line with Biblawi, 
Adonese, Fakhro and Redha above, the AHDR (2003) describes current 
understandings of education in Arab countries as a production process: students’ 
fresh minds are to be moulded into curricula that contain incontestable facts. 
Curricula taught in Arab countries, as the AHDR describes them, are inclined to 
encourage15
“submission, obedience, subordination and compiiance, rather than free 
critical thinking. In many cases, the contents of these curricula do not 
stimulate students to criticize political or social axioms. Instead, they 
smother their independent tendencies and creativity” (AHDR 2003 p53).
Concerning the concept of ‘freedom’ and how it figures in textbooks, a study 
conducted in three North African Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) 
shows a deficiency in the way this concept is introduced. The study analysed the 
Arabic language and civic education textbooks taught at the preparatory level16. 
The textbooks mainly identified the concept of ‘freedom’ with the freedom of one’s 
own homeland and the freedom to practise one’s own religion (not the freedom of 
the individual to exit his/her religion or the freedom not to believe in any religion). 
The choice of texts in the textbooks under study for the most part was either from
15 These observations are based on a background study conducted for the purposes of the AHDR  
(2003). The AHDR 2003 only makes reference to this background study without illustrating any 
data collected or explaining how the above conclusions were reached.
16 Corresponding to years 8, 9 and 10 in the UK in terms of student ages.
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the near past colonial/post-colonial era and/or from the distant past of the 
glorious days of Islam. This approach, as the researchers concluded, invited 
students to live in the past, created a disjunction between the textbooks and reality 
and created the illusion in the minds of youngsters that ‘we’ are a glorious nation, if 
only because we were glorious in the past (Lemrini and Marwazi cited in AHDR  
2004 p149).
In all Arab states, centralized state systems regulate the provision of public 
education, which is either offered free or subsidized by the state (Mezawi 2006). 
This section suggests that educational systems in Arab countries are more 
inclined towards glorifying the past and encouraging submissiveness rather than 
helping students to develop a capacity for independence and critical thinking. 
Mezawi (2006) comments that the uncritical unquestioning citizen that current 
representations of education indorse serves the authoritarian tendencies of Arab 
political systems (introduced in section 1.4). Arab educational systems view the 
knowledge that textbooks comprise to represent an ultimate form of the truth that 
students are expected to internalise, which is in line with the Asharite view of 
knowledge presented in section 1.5. Both the Asharite view and current 
representations of education in Arab countries emphasise the authority of the 
written text. They both assume the presence of an ultimate truth, and learners are 
to be directed to reach that truth. Critical thinking and questioning are faculties 
that both views are not keen to help learners to develop.
1.7 Demands for democratic educational reform in Jordan
Section 1.4 introduced Jordan as an example of an Arab country that started, in 
the nineteen eighties, introducing democratic reform to its political system. 
Democratic reform in Jordan was followed by several educational reform 
programmes, the first comprehensive one starting in 1987 and the most recent in 
2003. The 2003 educational reform programme introduced a compulsory national 
and civic education programme for all grade levels as part of the national 
curriculum. Among the aims of the programme is to provide students with a venue 
that is intended to help them develop as open-minded tolerant individuals; develop 
a capacity for rational and critical thinking skills; employ democratic values in the 
different aspects of life; and at the same time help them maintain their Arab,
Islamic and national traditions and values (Ministry of Education [henceforth MoE]
2005a).
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This study takes the Jordanian citizenship education programme as an example of 
an attempt to strike a balance between helping students develop liberal 
democratic citizenship values and maintaining the role of traditional sources of 
authority, namely tradition, religion and the state. While the analysis of some 
aspects of the Jordanian citizenship education programme will be presented in 
Chapter Three, this section provides the immediate background for the 2003 
educational reform.
The development of education in Jordan, as in other Arab countries, cannot be 
simply reduced to the struggle between tradition and modernity or to building 
national identity in a post-colonial era. Its development is rather embedded, as 
Mezawi (2006 p987) writes, in “a society's socio-economic structures and political 
conflicts" in which different factors, including tradition, modernization and national 
development and identity, are main constituents. At the same time, education 
generates interpretations of these very concepts of tradition, modernization, 
national identity, culture, etc., and by doing so it constitutes a certain picture of the 
social world.
In light of the scarcity of natural resources, including water, and economic 
challenges that face Jordan, including high rate of population growth, the 
Government of Jordan recognizes the need for investing in a high quality labour 
force that gives Jordan and Jordanian labour an advantage in the global 
knowledge economy. At the same time, the Government recognises that the 
educational system in Jordan is, in many ways, traditional. The Jordanian Ministry 
of Education (MoE) describes it as teacher oriented, reliant on rote-learning where 
learners are at the receiving end, and to have contributed to widening the gap 
between the needs of the labour market and the outcomes of education (World 
Bank 2002, MoE 2004).
In October 2002, King Abdulla II of Jordan issued a document, “Jordan First*7, 
which aimed, among other things, at enforcing national identity and enhancing 
unity and belonging among Jordanians in a framework of liberty, democracy, 
pluralism, tolerance and social justice. The royal directive came at a time when 
Jordan, as other neighbouring countries, was suffering from unstable political,
17 The “Jordan First” document can be found in Appendix One.
economic and social circumstances. It called on Jordanians of the different 
origins, backgrounds and political and religious orientations, to reconsider their 
priorities, placing the interest of their country prior to any other external interests, 
and to channel their energies in ways that allow them to focus on their home­
grown problems, disregarding any agendas that may be imposed by external 
elements (King Abdullah II 2002). The directive effectively invited Jordanians to 
have a common citizenship code, irrespective of their political or religious 
orientations, that informs their behaviour within the public domain. The document 
could be read as being in line with Rawls’ political liberalism which maintains a 
common political sphere that all citizens share, in addition to multiple private 
spheres in which different reasonable conceptions of the good exist and are 
practised (Rawls 1993a). The interest of the country is part of the shared political 
sphere and must form the inspiration that informs the citizenship code and 
organizes public life. Apart from this, citizens are at liberty to exercise their private 
values as long as the rule of law is maintained.
The importance of the issue of identity for Jordan can be illustrated in the results of 
the May 2004 public opinion poll conducted jointly by the Anwar Sadat Chair for 
Peace and development at the University of Maryland and Zogby International. 
Respondents in six Arab countries were asked about their primary identity and 
where they saw their belonging. In Jordan the most common answer was ‘a 
Muslim’ (33%) followed by ‘an Arab’ (29%), with only 26% identifying their primary 
identity as Jordanian18. When asked to identify a secondary identity, ‘an Arab’ 
came first among respondents in Jordan (Zogby 2004)19. With the turbulent 
political situation in the region, it is not hard to see how affiliations to the greater 
Arab or Muslim worlds can have an unsettling effect on Jordanian politics.
One of the challenges that face the ‘Jordan First’ document arises from the fact 
that people who belong to different political, religious and social affiliations will see 
the best interest of the country differently20, and discussions within the public
18 6% identified themselves as ‘citizens of the world’ and 3% were not sure where they belonged. 
The percentages do not add-up to 100, and the remaining 3% percent is not accounted for in the 
report. It could be the case that respondents within this category see themselves to belong to 
another identity that is not specified in the set of choices presented to them.
19 The responses in the rest of the countries included in the poll indicate that generalizations about 
the Arab world are not possible. The order of primary identities varied from one country to another, 
and people’s belonging, as indicated by their responses, did not show one dominant identity even 
in the one country.
20 For some, the country’s best interest lies in applying the Shari’a law, while for others, it is best 
served by preparing Jordan to join the global market, and different views on where the best interest 
of the country lies never run short.
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domain may not lead to a societal consensus. Here comes the importance of 
helping students to develop readiness, as Rawls (1993a) explains (though he was 
not writing with students in particular in mind), for proposing principles of 
cooperation consistent with the ideal that all society members are free and equal, 
and, at the same time, to help them develop willingness to abide by these 
principles. Rawls (1993a) reminds us that while we hope that political decisions 
that employ arguments, common sense knowledge, weighted evidence and are 
fair to others are acceptable to people who uphold different sets of values, this, 
however, may not always be the case.
Despite ups and downs in the progress of democracy in Jordan, national, regional 
and global challenges continue to exert increasing pressure on the Jordanian 
MoE, which is the party in charge of devising Jordanian educational curricula, to 
develop its educational programmes in ways that will provide students with 
necessary knowledge, skills and competencies that prepare them to compete in 
the knowledge economy and, at the same time, help them develop citizenship 
values in line with the royal directive (MoE 2004).
Given this brief preview, in 2001, preparations for reforming the educational 
system in Jordan started, with economic and social modernization as one of the 
main objectives. These preparations led to introducing an educational reform 
project, Educational Reform for Knowledge Economy (ERfKE), which in 
collaboration between the Jordanian MoE and the World Bank, was launched in 
2003. ERfKE is planned to be a comprehensive educational reform project that 
deals with different aspects of the educational process. It is planned to be 
undertaken over two phases, each lasting for five years (World Bank 2002, MoE
2004).
This chapter argued that despite the wide variety present within Arab societies, it 
is possible to make the assumption that they share common features. Among 
these features is an emphasis on traditional sources of authority as means for 
maintaining political stability and social cohesion. This traditional outlook of 
society, this chapter argued, is transferred, to varying degrees, to educational 
programmes offered in these countries. Yet, demands for democratization, 
globalization and the knowledge economy present a direct challenge to the 
traditional representations of the social world dominant in these societies and 
indeed to educational programmes that reflect this traditional outlook. While
Chapter One investigated reasons and circumstances that paved the way for the 
prevalence of such traditional understandings of education, in the absence of a 
modern theory of education (whether Arabic, Islamic or Jordanian), traditional 
understandings continue to inform educational planning, policy and practice. 
There is a need, this study argues, to look outside such narrow traditional 
understandings of education that different studies and educational literature show 
to be insufficient for preparing youngsters for democratic citizenship. Based on 
this insufficiency of national educational programmes in Arab countries, Chapter 
Two moves on to explore different understandings of education, and in particular 
citizenship education, within the wider liberal democratic theory. The aim is to 
reach an understanding of citizenship education that could address the needs of 
traditional ways of life present in Arab societies and, at the same time, prepare 
youngsters for democratic citizenship.
Chapter Two
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Towards reaching a suitable conception of citizenship
The nineteen seventies witnessed a revival of political philosophy (Kymlicka 2002, 
Enslin and white 2003). One of the landmarks of this revival is John Rawls’ ‘A 
Theory of Justice’, which, since its publication in 1971, invited much debate along 
both sides of the right/left political spectrum. The 1970s political debate focused 
on issues such as justice, rights and liberties (Kymlicka 2002). By the 1980s, 
Kymlicka adds, terms such as ‘community’ and ‘community membership’ started to 
become trendy among political theorists. This period witnessed the rise of an 
entire school in political philosophy known as ‘communitarianism’.
Communitarians, despite differences between them, argue that the “value of 
community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice, or in the 
public culture of liberal societies" (Kymlicka 2002 p208)
Along the same line, but from a different angle, Enslin and White (2003) write that 
the revived interest in political philosophy focused its attention on the world of 
adults, and children did not form a central part of political debate. By the eighties, 
Enslin and White note that citizenship education started to figure as one single 
chapter in modern political philosophy books. Among these books are 
Ackermann’s ‘Social Justice and the Liberal State’, which was published in 1980 
and Walzer’s ‘Spheres of Justice’, which was published in 1983. A few years later, 
full books were published, such as Gutmann’s ‘Democratic Education’ in 1987 that 
were entitled to the subject of political education.
The revival of citizenship and citizenship education theories did not start all of a 
sudden, but rather, it was a corollary of the development of various events that 
affected different parts of the world. Among these factors are the end of the Cold 
W ar era and the breakdown of the Eastern European communist bloc (Haste 
2001); the resurgence of nationalism, particularly in Eastern Europe; issues of 
assimilation versus distinctiveness of more traditional religious and cultural ways 
of life in pluralist societies particularly in Western Europe (Kymlicka 2002); 
declining levels of political participation detected in some of the already 
established democracies including the USA, Britain and France (Osier 2005); 
interest in consolidating democratic ideals in nation states that accepted 
democracy as the system of governance; regional economic and political
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alliances, such as the European Union (Enslin and White 2003); ecological 
concerns; and more recently, global terrorism. Societies and nation states were 
trying to adjust to these developments, and already existing understandings of 
liberal democracy, as Haste (2001) writes, were not readily taken as direct 
replacements for old regimes. Instead, the “task was to re-invent not only 
‘democracy' but national identity and citizenship” (p375).
The development of citizenship theories owes much in the way they are shaped 
today to the debate amongst liberal theorists and between liberalism and 
communitarianism. Kymlicka (2002), for instance, writes that the attractiveness of 
modern citizenship theories came partly from their general orientation to integrate 
the two conflicting theories of liberal individualism and community membership.
In education, and particularly in citizenship education, there is a parallel issue of 
rationality and autonomy arising from the liberal perspective versus tolerance of 
tradition and safeguarding cultural diversity arising from the communitarian 
perspective. Within liberalism, different understandings are possible of the 
importance of autonomy and rationality, and these differences also have 
implications for what it is that different sorts of liberals might like to ‘foster1 through 
education.
2.1 The liberalism debate
This section introduces three liberal political theorists: John Rawls’s egalitarian 
argument is introduced first and is contrasted to both Friedrich Hayek and Robert 
Nozick, taken as two representatives from the Right.
Published in 1971, Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ aimed at defining a coherent liberal 
theory that replaces utilitarianism. According to Rawls (1979), equality and liberty 
are two ideals that are hard to reconcile. Democratic models that developed over 
the course of history focused on one or the other of these two ideals. Rawls in his 
theory set out to find a way to protect basic individual liberties without undermining 
the value of equality (Rawls 1979, 1993a, 1993b, 2001). He argues that the 
freedom of the individual cannot be sacrificed for any material benefits (which 
could be justified on utilitarian terms) (Rawls 1999). According to Rawls, all 
individuals have equal liberties. This ideal, as Ripstein (1997) writes, prohibits 
democratic states from adopting slavery, for example, even if slavery would lead to
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economic welfare that maximizes happiness for the maximum number of society 
members.
With his roots in the social contract tradition, Rawls (1993a, 1993b, 1999 and 
2001) argues that the most reasonable principles of justice are those that persons, 
under fair conditions, would agree to. In Rawls’ theory justice is regarded as the 
cornerstone for democracy. The first of two principles of justice that Rawls’ theory 
affirms is the Principle of Equal Liberty, which states that “each person is to have 
an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty 
of others” (Rawls 1999 p24). The second principle has two parts; the first one 
asserts that offices and positions must be open to all members of society under 
the condition of fair equality of opportunity, and the second part emphasizes that 
social and economic inequalities in wealth and income are only permitted if they 
result in the greatest benefit for the least advantaged members of society (known 
as the Difference Principle). These two principles of justice are to act as 
guidelines that regulate the working of basic society institutions in democratic 
societies, with the first principle taking precedence (Rawls 1999).
Rawls’ egalitarian view of liberalism could be contrasted to neo-liberal views, 
which oppose any state interference in redistributing wealth. In The Constitution 
of Liberty’, which was published in 1960, Friedrich Hayek argued that large scale 
economic and social planning is counterproductive and is bound to failure (Hayek 
1960). Hayek defended market freedoms and argued that the expanding role of 
the state as a welfare provider and its control over market operations allowed 
resources to be used to support inefficient public enterprises and state 
bureaucracies rather than being productively used.
Hayek argued that a free society, more than any other type of society, demands 
individuals to be “guided in their action by a sense of responsibility which extends 
beyond the duties exacted by the law”(p76). More than any other agency, 
individuals, he argues, “know the circumstances surrounding their actions” (p76) 
and therefore, individuals should be left free to decide for themselves. While 
Hayek was aware that the individual is not always the best judge of his/her 
interests, limiting his/her liberties would result in not knowing whether he/she has 
something creative to offer or not.
Hayek’s argument, as Kukathas and Pettit (1990) argue, builds on a pragmatic 
assumption that for markets to run in the most efficient manner (and therefore to 
give people the most satisfaction for their wants), markets must run freely with 
minimal state intervention. Among the main objections to Hayek’s free market 
philosophy, some argue, is that it undermines the demands of those who do not 
have enough material capital to satisfy their basic needs. Bobbio (1987), for 
instance, notes that the less fortunate within a society are more likely to demand 
that elected governments provide services such as health care and public 
education. Politicians, Bobbio argues, hoping for re-election cannot ignore the 
electorate’s demands. They have to provide at least some of the requested 
services, and therefore, deviate from Hayek’s laissez-faire approach, which, 
according to Bobbio, renders the paternalism of the welfare state as inevitable.
In Hayek’s argument, however, short term economic inequalities will turn in the 
long term to the benefit of all members of society (Hayek 1960). Rawls (1979), on 
the other hand, argues that any inequalities must not be allowed unless the least 
well-off within a society would benefit from them. Contrary to Hayek’s free market 
philosophy, Rawls, through the Difference Principle, advocates state interference 
in redistributing wealth for the benefit of the least well-off, but in a way that is 
different than the welfare state system. For Rawls (1979), the reactive (rather than 
proactive) role of the welfare state would allow for disparities in wealth to occur. 
After such disparities become realities on the ground, Rawls argues, the welfare 
state intervenes to alleviate any hardships caused by these disparities. In contrast 
to the welfare state, the aim of Rawls’ theory of justice is to fight injustices and 
inequalities in wealth before they start.
One of the main criticisms to Rawls’ theory of justice came from the same liberal 
camp that Rawls belongs. Three years after the publication of Rawls’ ‘A Theory of 
Justice’, Robert Nozick’s ‘Anarchy, State, and Utopia’ was published, in which he 
responded to some of the arguments presented by Rawls.
Nozick’s libertarian view could be argued to be located to the right of Rawls.
Along the same line as Hayek, Nozick (1974) argues for a minimal state, but as 
Kukathas and Pettit (1990) write, for different reasons to Hayek. Nozick (1974) 
considers individuals’ rights as fundamental and beyond compromise. Society, for 
Nozick, is an aggregation of “individualpeople...with their own individual lives'’ 
(p33) and the sole role of the state is to prevent oppression that hinders the
autonomy of the individual. He sees no justification for a state to infringe on 
one’s entitlements for the satisfaction of others who have less, e.g. “[t]axation of 
earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor” (Nozick 1974 p169).
‘Entitlement’ for Nozick, is acquired through inheritance, voluntary exchange of 
goods and gifts, or as a compensation for wrongs suffered. Individuals should be 
free to spend what they are entitled to in the way they deem appropriate, and any 
interference by the state that involves the redistribution of what one is entitled to is 
a violation of property rights (Nozick 1974).
Nozick’s view of society extends Berlin’s concept of negative liberty to one 
extreme. On Nozick’s argument, the less the state interferes, the more liberties 
individuals have. However, for a state to be able to prevent oppression that may 
be inflicted on individuals, it must put rules and laws that aim to protect individual 
liberties from the interference by others including the state itself. These rules, 
while their aim is to protect individuals’ negative liberty, lead to state interference 
and inevitably limit these liberties.
Despite its appeal among liberals on the right side of the political spectrum 
(libertarians), Ripstein (1997) and Graham (2007) write that Nozick’s argument is 
not as philosophically grounded as Rawls’ theory. Using Ripstein’s (1997) words,
“Nozick’s dependence on intuitive examples [leads] many to doubt 
whether much depth lay beneath. .. [these examples] ... The difficulty is 
that the book’s theoretical apparatus is so thin that it is very difficult to 
know what to make of these examples” (p293).
Rawls and Nozick, despite presenting two opposite views of liberalism, both 
emphasize the private/public distinction introduced in section 1.3. Nozick’s aim is 
to subordinate the public sphere for the service of a maximized private sphere. 
Rawls, on the other hand, justifies expanding the public sphere for what he 
considers to be a more just distribution of wealth.
This debate within liberalism has implications for educational policy. Gutmann 
(1995) writes that liberals are traditionally dedicated to “cultivating individuality in 
citizens” (p562). However, a divide exists within liberal thinking on the best 
method to cultivate this individuality. Some liberals argue that beyond helping 
students to develop a capacity for autonomy through formal general education, 
there should be no citizenship values imposed by the state. This liberal camp 
(which could be argued to be in line with Hayek’s and Nozick’s minimal public
sphere), writes Gutmann, regards state-enforced citizenship education as a tool 
for moulding people to think like one another, which works in favour of promoting 
conformity rather than individuality. Brighouse (1998), for instance, argues that
“[c]ivic education is problematic because legitimacy deprives (liberal)
governments of the authority to condition the consent of future citizens.
Such conditioning is... problematic when it involves teaching any
virtues” (p734).
Brighouse (1998) calls for a capacity for autonomy to be developed through 
schooling. He reasons that the state has an obligation to provide each prospective 
adult a significant opportunity to ulive welt' (p730). He explains that living well 
involves two criteria: that the person’s way of life is good and that he/she endorses 
it “from the inside" (p730). To live well the person needs to have some sense of 
what constitutes good living, which can to an extent be realized by applying critical 
reflection to different ways of life. Citizenship education is permissible, Brighouse 
argues, only if it encourages critical reflection on the very values it was promoting.
Another camp of liberals, which could be argued to take a more Rawlsian view, 
assumes less confidence in the role of family (and indeed in the market place in 
relation to Hayek’s open market philosophy) in promoting democratic values. 
Advocates of this view regard a state-controlled citizenship education as a better 
option than not having one. Enslin et al (2001 p115), as one example, write that 
“since the family and the market place are held together by private interests or 
respect for authority, we cannot rely on them to promote a democratic culture and 
nourish the values dependent upon it”. Along the same lines, Gutmann (1995) 
writes that “the realm of public schooling is a democratic government's single most 
powerful and legitimate means of teaching respect for reasonable political 
disagreement”.
2.2 The communitarian critique to liberalism
Nozick’s objections to Rawls are contrasted to objections from the left side of the 
political spectrum. While Nozick accused Rawls’ theory of not doing enough to 
protect the individual, objections from the left side of the political spectrum 
accused Rawls of not doing enough to protect the community.
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Emphasis on the community, while it started to surface during the 1980s in the 
writings of modern communitarians, can also be found in Marxist literature as well. 
Marxists argue that governments in modern capitalist societies are agencies that 
look after the affairs of bourgeois minorities who become dominant not only 
economically but also politically. As a result of this domination, the proletariat 
majority suffers from class oppression and market exploitation and they need to be 
set free. Recognizing the value of community in the Marxist sense can only be 
achieved by revolutionary means. The revolution or “battle for democracy” as 
described by Marx (1954 p518), starts by taking over power from capitalists and 
abolishing all private property. Communitarians, on the other hand, do not believe 
that the community has to be built anew. They argue that communities already 
exist but they need to be protected.
Communitarian thinking, while some dismiss it as being a developed form of 
collectivism that has its roots in Rousseau’s general will as well as elements from 
the Marxist theory, Etzioni (1995) argues that modern communitarian thinking 
belongs to the liberal Western tradition. It aims, according to Etzioni, to correct 
liberalism’s excessive emphasis on individual’s negative liberties.
Etzioni (1995) argues that excessive individualism has led individuals to become 
increasingly demanding of the state and less aware of their responsibilities 
towards it. For individuals to act rationally and morally, Etzioni writes, they need to 
feel part of a stable community that helps them do so, and on this basis, liberal 
ways of life must presume a communitarian foundation. Haste (1996) explains 
that communitarianism is based on the social constructionist view that emphasizes 
the role of language and social interaction in the formation of identity. This is in 
contrast with the liberal rationalist understanding of the individual as an 
autonomous and sovereign entity who is in control of his/her environment. In 
stressing individual autonomy, Haste argues that an ‘individual’ is not seen as 
essentially a social being, but rather is asked to step outside his\her culture and 
time and make impartial decisions.
Communitarians generally agree with Rawlsian liberals on the importance of 
justice. However, they argue that imposing a universal conception of justice, 
which liberal theories tend to do, is unjust. A universal conception of justice 
undermines the particularities of different ways of life. Communitarians, such as 
Walzer (1983), argue that requirements of justice can only be identified within the
community itself. Justice within a community begs the shared understandings of 
its members. These understandings are reflected in the practices specific to every 
community and in the institutions that enforce these practices, which renders the 
requirements of justice as cultural rather than philosophical.
Mulhall and Swift (1992) review the work of four communitarian thinkers: Michael 
Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer. Despite the 
different approaches and arguments presented in their work, Mulhall and Swift 
come to a conclusion that what binds the four thinkers together and earns them 
the communitarian label is that they are “united around a conception of human 
beings as integraily related to the communities of culture and language that they 
create, maintain and inhabit’ (p162). However, Mulhall and Swift note that these 
communitarian thinkers do not reject autonomy, but rather they do acknowledge it 
as a human good and only aim to set limits to the priority it is given by liberalism.
In defence of liberal ideals, Brighouse and Swift (2003), reflecting a Rawlsian 
liberal background, argue that liberalism is a rich theory (in educational policy 
making and evaluation), which is often misunderstood. On individual autonomy, 
they explain that defending the right of the individual to make his/her own choices 
in life and not having to conform to society’s norms, is not the same as assuming 
that individuals are detached from their social background. As for excessive 
individualism, Rawls’ (1993a) liberalism is an example of a trend in the liberal 
tradition that concerns itself with justifying principles of justice that guide the 
workings of basic societal institutions. Rawls’ view of liberalism builds on the idea 
of society as a fair system of cooperation between persons who are free and 
equal. The liberal ‘private’ life, according to Brighouse and Swift (2003), is not
t
atomistic, but rather it is a life within the civil society, in which individuals use their 
liberties to work with others in the pursuit of shared ends. The idea of private life 
does not aim to free the individual from society, but to free society from political 
interference.
In response to the issue that liberalism emphasizes individual rights without 
emphasizing responsibilities, Hayek (1960) argues that liberty and responsibility 
go hand in hand and that a free society cannot function in the absence of 
responsibility. He explains that freedom gives a person the choice of what action 
to take in a particular situation, and the act of choosing therefore leads the person 
to bear the responsibility of his/her actions. Hayek writes “[l]iberty is an
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opportunity for doing good, but this is so only when it is also an opportunity for 
doing wrong” (p79). Brighouse and Swift (2003) give an example in support of the 
complementary relationship between rights and responsibilities: if individuals have 
a right to a trial by jury, then they also have the duty to do jury service in order to 
provide that right to other individuals.
2.3 The implications of the debate on citizenship values
Burtonwood (2002) writes that since the publication of Rawls’ earlier work, ‘A 
Theory of Justice’, much of the political philosophy debate has been focusing on 
reconciling liberalism and its communitarian rival. A main criticism to trends of 
liberal thinking that promote individual autonomy as a way of good general life 
comes from advocates of religious and cultural diversity. Individual autonomy 
dedicated ways of life are described, as Burtonwood writes, as “monistic” (p243) in 
the sense that they are not welcoming to traditional ways of life. In education, 
those involved in the debate have been trying to find a balance between the 
demands of fostering rationality and autonomy and the demands for tolerating 
traditional cultural and religious ways of life.
One of the democratic values that different liberals (along the liberal spectrum) 
endorse is tolerance of diversity (Galston 1995, Gutmann 1995, Macedo 1995, 
Levinson 1999, Enslin et al 2001). Having the value of tolerance aids individuals 
in acknowledging reasonable points of view that oppose theirs, which leads to 
peaceful coexistence and stability in liberal democratic societies. Gutmann (1995) 
explains that if individuals strongly believe that their own points of view (and 
values) are the only acceptable ones, they will consequently have less faith in the 
democratic process. Besides this practical justification of tolerance, Stolzenberg 
(1993) argues that knowledge claims inevitably have a level of uncertainty and 
establishing their truth beyond doubt is not possible, therefore different 
conceptions of the good that are reasonable must be tolerated.
Given the centrality of tolerance in liberal democratic thinking and the pluralistic 
nature of modern democratic societies, conflict arises between demands of 
tolerating traditional and religious ways of life and demands of rationality and 
autonomy. Views within the liberal tradition concerning this paradox vary from 
those who, in the name of tolerance, give utmost importance to protecting and
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maintaining group diversity (such as William Galston), to those who place 
rationality and autonomy at the heart of liberal education (such as Amy Gutmann 
and Meira Levinson).
Galston (1995) argues that autonomy and group diversity are not coherent as the 
standard liberal view presents them. He writes that the standard liberal view of the 
relation between these two values could be summarized as follows: while diversity 
demands toleration, critical reflection on the different ways of life, including one’s 
own, is needed to sustain this toleration. Adopting this standpoint, Galston 
continues, means that ways of life that do not welcome critical reflection on one’s 
own commitments do not exemplify good citizenship, and therefore are not worthy 
of support.
Helping children of traditional parents to develop a capacity for individual 
autonomy paradoxically undermines the liberal ideals of tolerance and free choice 
for parents. A common liberal response would register that moral and legal 
responsibility of parents over their children does not imply that parents are to 
enforce their own conception of the good on their children. Walzer (2003 in 
Burtonwood 2006) argues that while parents have the right to maintain their way of 
life and therefore have the right to raise their children the way they see 
appropriate, the state also has a right to educate children who are the future 
citizens. When it comes to traditional communities, these two rights will come into 
conflict as parents and the liberal state have different conceptions of what 
constitutes an appropriate education. Walzer recognizes that compromises need 
to be made on both sides in order for traditional religious communities and the 
liberal state to be able to live together.
Historically, Galston (1995) explains, autonomy is linked to the ‘Enlightenment 
Project’ in which reason, not faith or tradition, provides the justification of 
knowledge. Valorising the Enlightenment Project, he argues, through placing the 
ideal of rational autonomy at the heart “of liberalism is in fact to narrow the range 
of possibilities avaiiable within liberal societies’^  p523). In the pretence of 
defending diversity, he continues, “the autonomy principle in fact represents a kind 
of uniformity that exerts pressure on ways of life that do not embrace autonomy” 
(p523).
The point that Galston (1995) raises is that autonomy as a way of life must be
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respected, but its enthusiasts must not assume its triumph over other ways of 
life. Autonomy enthusiasts must accept the fact that it is only a way of life that 
exists alongside other ways, and that they need to learn to coexist among others 
who do not look at it through the same lens. For Galston, the protection and 
preservation of cultural and religious diversity, not autonomy, should be the 
hallmark of liberalism. He argues that, while students must be exposed to a 
minimum level of awareness about other ways of life, political education must not 
“require or strongly invite students to become skeptical or critical of their own ways 
of life” (p529). He recommends “a pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than 
rational” {Galston 1998 p 471) to help students accept the commitments of liberal 
societies, basically a commitment for tolerating diversity. Although Galston’s 
conception of tolerance does not demand critical reflection on ways of life, he does 
stress the importance of the ability of individuals, safeguarded by the state, to 
freely associate with any group they wish to join, and likewise individuals having 
the right to exit a group they belong to.
Gutmann (1995) argues that mere exposure to other ways of life, as suggested by 
Galston, is not sufficient for good citizenship for two main reasons. Firstly, while 
diversity is one of the characteristics of modern democratic societies, liberal 
societies cannot accept all different forms of diversity. Political conceptions of 
justice are often associated with certain ways of life. Hence, to recognize 
reasonable from unreasonable ways of life, democratic citizenship education must 
help students develop a capacity for rationality and autonomy that would allow 
them to understand and evaluate these different ways, something that mere 
exposure to other ways of life does not do. Secondly, mere tolerance that is not 
tainted with mutual respect cannot solve discrimination problems within society.
As an example of this form of discrimination, she argues that in privately owned 
businesses, while business owners may be tolerant towards other ways of life, this 
tolerance may not necessarily rise to the level that allows them to hire ‘outsiders’ 
who belong to ‘other” systems of belief. Gutmann (1995) recommends that 
democratic citizenship education must be “constitutionally constrained not to 
indoctrinate or discriminate against minorities” (p563) if it is to succeed over the 
demands of parents who are opposed to teaching their children to respect other 
ways of life. She also argues that while citizenship values, including rationality, 
mutual respect and autonomy, encourage children to reflect critically and criticize 
their parents’ ways of life, they also encourage them to understand the virtues of 
these ways. This, according to her, renders the assumption that mutual respect
and autonomy would necessarily reduce diversity as unjustified.
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Along the same line as Gutmann, Levinson (1999) argues that liberal political 
education cannot but promote the development of students as autonomous 
individuals; as otherwise, liberalism would lose its coherence. For Levinson, 
“liberal political education is in fact Liberal extra-political education: education for 
autonomy” (p46). For a student to develop a capacity for respecting other ways of 
life, he/she needs to develop a certain level of detachment, both intellectually and 
emotionally, from his/her own commitments, culture, group and religious affiliations 
and his/her conceptions of the good. Individuals, Levinson writes, “can accept 
other people’s conceptions of the good as reasonable-and therefore as worthy of 
toleration and respect-only if they are able to see their own background and 
commitments as in some way contingent” (p45). The development of such an 
outlook, Levinson stresses, is conditional upon the development of students as 
autonomous individuals. However, once students develop as autonomous 
individuals they start to reflect not only on political issues, but also on socio­
cultural and personal ones. Students who learn that values and beliefs are not 
absolute, i.e. can legitimately be questioned, turn to evaluate their own, and, as a 
result, may choose to revise them. Levinson, though, departs from Gutmann’s 
analysis by arguing that pre-existing social and cultural diversity will inevitably be 
reduced by the development of students as autonomous individuals. It is 
inevitable, she writes, that students will look back at their own systems of beliefs 
and some of them may decide to revise them.
Macedo (1995) shares Gutmann’s view that the “indiscriminate embrace of 
difference and diversity should be resisted” (p469). Some groups and individuals 
will unavoidably feel discriminated against by liberal public policies and the wider 
culture such policies are trying to promote. Such feelings, Macedo argues, 
highlight the need for such groups to adjust to these policies and not the other way 
around. However, unlike Gutmann, Macedo objects to promoting rationality and 
autonomy as a way for good general life, and instead he argues for the need for 
helping persons to develop a capacity for rationality and autonomy as a 
requirement for good political life. Macedo, in line with Rawls’ political liberalism, 
argues for a form of liberalism that aims to satisfy the demands of rationality and 
autonomy and at the same time provides protection for religious and cultural 
diversity. Macedo’s position will be explored further in section 2.5 below as part of 
Rawls’ political liberalism.
Singh (2000), who like Galston objects to imposing a form of liberalism that 
pushes aside non-liberal conceptions of the good, argues that culture plays a 
crucial role in determining one’s identity, and a liberal state that takes a strict 
stance towards enforcing liberal ideals will cause anxiety and ill feeling among 
those who do not belong to the liberal camp. To make cultural understanding 
possible, democratic citizenship education must help future citizens drop the view 
that there is only one way for good life, and this approach, Singh writes, does 
demand the values of tolerance and mutual respect for other individuals and for 
their right to pursue their own views of the good life. He argues that all members 
of society, majority and minorities, need to develop and adapt to their living 
together. When values come into conflict with one another, Singh points out that 
there “is no overarching standard or principle ... whereby such conflicts can be 
arbitrated or resolved” (p227). Unlike Gutmann’s liberal response that employs 
reason alone as a basis for deliberation, Singh argues that a liberal state cannot 
rely on reasoning alone to settle moral conflicts, as pure reasoning is not suitable 
for addressing cultural and religious practices and beliefs. At the same time,
Singh rejects extreme versions of cultural relativism on the basis that if what could 
be considered moral or immoral is a matter of a particular culture, then it becomes 
difficult to challenge any form of discrimination perpetrated by one cultural group 
over another, or even by some members of a group over other members. He 
points out that practices that offend basic liberal values, like for instance the 
practice of female circumcision or polygamy, cannot be allowed in a liberal society, 
as they offend in this case the fundamental principle of equality among sexes.
The solution that Singh anticipates lies in engaging the different groups in a 
deliberative open-minded dialogue, which resorts to both reasoning as well as to 
traditional cultural systems of beliefs with the aim to explore “where and why they 
disagree and where some agreement can be reached” (p215).
Burtonwood (2006) identifies two goods that can be threatened by accepting non­
liberal communities in liberal societies, and allowing them to raise their children in 
faith schools that transmit their way of life in a holistic manner. The first is the 
autonomy of children in these groups and endangering their right of exit from these 
groups when they become adults. The second is social cohesion as groups can 
isolate themselves. At the same time, Burtonwood recognizes a wide variety of 
traditional groups who have widely varying degrees of tolerance toward rational 
autonomy and tolerance toward other ways of life. Similarly, he acknowledges a 
wide variety of practices in the faith schools. While Burtonwood recognizes that
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minority groups seek status and recognition by the liberal state, he suggests that 
these groups need to be judged by the way they treat individuals and on whether 
they allow practices that harm individuals. After presenting a wide variety of views 
from liberals about the ways of reconciling faith schools that cater for the needs of 
traditional communities with an education that meets the needs of the liberal state, 
Burtonwood (2006) comes to the conclusion that these needs cannot be 
reconciled, and that difficult choices need to be made between the competing 
goods of community belonging and security versus individual autonomy and social 
cohesion.
2.4 Globalization
Development, as described by the 2002 Arab Human Development Report,
“is being reinvented by new markets (e.g., foreign exchange and capital 
markets), new tools (e.g., the Internet and cellular phones), new actors 
(e.g., non-governmental organizations, the European Union and the 
World Trade Organization) and new rules (e.g., multiiateral agreements 
on trade, services and intellectual property)” (AHDR 2002 p1).
Such developments that are brought about by globalization21 and the knowledge 
economy left the door wide open for new opportunities and at the same time 
created new challenges that nation states, societies and individuals had to deal 
with. A cause and a consequence of these developments is that knowledge is 
becoming increasingly shared, which has undermined the distinction between the 
domestic and the foreign and made events that happen in distant geographic 
locations not faraway any more.
While knowledge is becoming increasingly shared, which could lead to the 
argument that the world is heading towards some sort of unified culture, Lyotard 
(1984) argues that diversity, individual and group, traditional and secular, is 
presenting itself as an inescapable consequence of the spread of knowledge. At 
the same time, Giddens (1991) writes of a new form of individuality that puts 
demands on individuals to make decisions concerning their own lifestyles from an 
early stage of life. Lyotard’s diversity and Giddens’s new individualisation are two 
developments in the post-industrial era, this section argues, that have important 
implications for education. While the effects of these changes can be readily
21 For a brief account of what the term ‘globalization’ could mean from a Middle Eastern 
perspective, see Appendix Six.
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noticed in pluralist democratic societies, they are also influencing more 
traditional societies, including these in the Arab world22. In light of these two 
developments, this study argues for a broader conception of citizenship that, while 
it fosters rationality and autonomy, accommodates reasonable diversity in a way 
closer to Macedo than to Galston or Gutmann.
2.4.1 The post-modern condition and the challenge of diversity
One of the challenges posed by the wide spread of knowledge is well articulated 
by post-modern thinking. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge’, 
Lyotard (1984)23 argued that as the status of knowledge in post-industrial societies 
was profoundly changing24, the means of legitimization of the claims of truth of the 
different types of knowledge were becoming more diversified as well. This, 
according to his argument, rendered grand theories, that claim their legitimization 
through making reference to universal narratives, dysfunctional on the basis that 
there is no one universal doctrine that could encompass human diversity (Lyotard 
1984).
Lyotard distinguishes between ‘scientific knowledge’ which he argues not to 
represent “the totality of knowledge ... [but rather] . . . i t  has always existed in 
addition to, and in competition and conflict with” ‘narrative knowledge’ (1984 p7). 
What is classed as ‘scientific knowledge’ is composed of denotative statements 
that demand true or false responses based on dialectical scrutiny by experts who 
are not less qualified than the sender him/herself, while ‘narrative knowledge’ 
comprises different types of statements e.g. denotative, prescriptive, evaluative 
etc. Narrative knowledge is not restricted to the true/false criterion that scientific 
knowledge is confined to; it extends to taking into account different criteria like 
efficiency, beauty, justice, happiness, etc. In light of this, legitimizing narrative 
knowledge is done in reference to “the relevant criteria (of justice, beauty, truth 
and efficiency respectively) accepted in the social circle of the ‘knower’s ’ 
interlocutors” (Lyotard 1984 p19).
22 The discussion concerning demands of citizenship education in Arab societies is dealt with in 
Chapter Four after introducing some challenges that face democratic citizenship in traditional Arab 
societies in chapters three and four below.
23 Lyotard’s T h e  Postmodern Condition’ was originally published in French in 1979. English 
translation of the book was first published in 1984.
24 Writing back in 1979, according to Lyotard, the changing status of knowledge is mainly due to 
developments in computer technology and cybernetics. Surely, by now, technology has moved 
much further and Lyotard’s argument remains profoundly valid.
The pragmatic nature of scientific knowledge, however, cannot be used to claim 
that scientific knowledge is superior to narrative knowledge. Using Wittgenstein’s 
terminology, these two different types of knowledge use different types of 
language games that have different rules. Reality, Lyotard (1984) argues, cannot 
be captured through the use of one type of language game (that is of science), 
and therefore there is a need for narrative knowledge that captures other aspects 
of life that scientific knowledge fails to do. Therefore it is not possible to verify the 
claims of truth of one type of knowledge by referring to the rules of the other type.
Lyotard (1984) argues that as modern societies move from modernity into post­
modernity, meta-narratives or grand theories that make universal claims to 
absolute truth, whether they are scientific or narrative, have lost their convincing 
power as a source for legitimizing their truth-claims. Post-modern societies, 
Lyotard argues, are characterized by pluralism and fragmentation, which make it 
impossible for any meta-narrative to encompass such diversity, including that of 
scientific knowledge, which in modernity, claims its legitimacy by resorting to one 
among many meta-narratives that have claims to absolute truth25. On this basis, 
Lyotard rejects any kind of grand theory or meta-narrative that presumes 
uniformity in opinion and argues that “[a]ll we can do is gaze in wonderment at the 
diversity of discursive species, just as we do at the diversity of plants or animal 
species” (p26). In advanced societies, post-modernity is exemplified by the rise of 
different little narratives that reflect this wide ‘diversity of discursive species’.
The fragmentation that the post-modern condition suggests places emphasis on 
cultural and value diversity and relativism, and at the same time, provides more 
solid grounds for the belief in the individual and social construction of knowledge 
and the way this knowledge is understood. Using Lyotard’s argument, it could be 
claimed that a significant number of struggles between groups (and individuals) 
are struggles between competing meta-narrative mind sets that resist accepting 
that others are entitled to their own views of the world. The least to be said about 
individuals who are brought-up in sheltered societies -that do not recognize the 
diversity that this new era exposed (and created) - is that they will be traumatized 
by the fact that their allegedly true ways of life are questionable and that there are 
other ways of life that offer a direct challenge to theirs. One of the demands of 
such a challenge is to educate students about how to deal with the new reality that
25 Lyotard (1984) mentions two principal meta-narratives, one is Hegelian in nature and the other is 
Marxist.
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what they have always accepted as facts of life are only facts of their own lives 
which are not shared by many others. This approach might undermine affiliations 
of citizenship discourse with meta-narratives, whether these narratives are 
religious, nationalistic or even scientific.
2.4.2 Choice and the ‘new individuality’ challenge
In addition to Lyotard’s political and social fragmentation, globalization, Giddens 
(1998) argues, has left the doors wide open for the rise of a new form of 
individuality or “life politics”(p33). This development, according to Giddens, 
presents a challenge for collectivism as an ideology behind social democracy that 
has always relied on the role of the nation state to emphasize its two main themes 
of solidarity and equality. At the same time, it has increasingly challenged 
conservatism that looks for traditional means, like the family, customs, cultural 
norms, and/or religion, to justify authority. Social and political coherence, Giddens 
writes, that is traditionally “guaranteed by top-down action of the state or by appeal 
to tradition” (p37) is more and more challenged by a lifestyle that demands 
individuals to make their own decisions from an early stage of life. Along the same 
line, Stables (2003) writes, children “have become less and less the unquestioning 
recipients of a role allotted to them by society, and more and more the conscious 
agents of their own career and lifestyle choices” (p4).
Lyotard’s post-modern condition and Giddens’ life politics suggest that a form of 
education that seeks to eliminate differences between different people is 
unrealistic as differences, as Stables (2005) writes, are inevitable. Contrary to 
that, such developments highlight the need for an understanding of citizenship 
education that helps students to develop a capacity for accepting group and 
individual diversity. It is difference, Stables writes, “that draws people to seek 
solace from each other” (p194). In this regard, it could be argued that a 
multicultural form of citizenship education could be useful. However, a 
multicultural form of education that makes a clear distinction between the two 
notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ runs the danger “of treating others as abstractions, or 
examples, rather than fully human individuals, and of promoting the easy adoption 
of assumptions” (Stables 2005 p188). Instead, what is needed is a moral 
understanding of citizenship education that, as Stables writes, allows all to 
“flourish in their diversity” (p195).
Furthermore, some of the choices that an individual makes have effects on the
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society at large. Some of these impacts are social, economic and ecological.
The progress of societies toward pluralism and diversity, while it puts demands on 
citizenship education to help students to develop a capacity for accepting 
individual and group diversity, also highlights the need for core democratic values 
that people of different backgrounds would agree to accept as basic principles for 
organizing their living together. In this regard, it could be argued that helping 
future citizens to develop a capacity for reasoning and deliberation is a useful tool 
for political bargaining in pluralist democratic societies.
Deliberation among society members, as Kymlicka and Norman (2000) write, 
gives citizens, minorities in particular, an opportunity to articulate their opinions 
and try to persuade others of their points of view. Kymlicka (2002) notes that 
minorities are likely to accept the legitimacy of political decisions made after they 
have had a fair hearing, even if the final decision achieved through voting opposed 
their view. As well as giving legitimacy to democratic decision-making, 
deliberation has the advantage of producing more solidarity and understanding 
among citizens, by helping to expose misunderstandings and judgments that are 
based on incomplete information.
Deliberation among society members also gives citizens the opportunity to learn 
from one another and helps society to form its values and priorities, which Sen 
(1999a) refers to as the ‘constructive’ role of democracy. An active public sphere 
in a democracy provides opportunities for citizens to understand their rights and 
duties and determine their needs, which is something that requires public 
discussion and exchange of information, views, and analyses. On the 
effectiveness of deliberation in addressing social and political problems, Sen 
(1999a) gives the example of fertility rate in the state of Kerala in India, which he 
notes to have fallen to a similar level to that of Britain and France, and well below 
that of China, without employing state coercion. This drop is attributed to political 
and social dialogue that led to a change in the values of the community, which was 
aided by a high literacy rate in the state especially among women, higher than that 
in any province in China.
The importance of deliberation in democratic citizenship education is also 
identified by Enslin et al (2001), who argue that students should be helped to 
develop their abilities “to make a reasoned argument, written or oral, as well as the 
abilities to cooperate with others, to appreciate their perspectives and experiences
and to tolerate other points of view” (p116). Along the same line, Kymlicka 
(2002) writes that students need to develop willingness to listen to others’ points of 
view, even if they are alien or obnoxious to them, and try to understand what is 
being said and respond politely, in order to engage others in political dialogue. 
However, it is important to note that it is not always possible to reach consensus 
on issues of public concern. There are always sources of disagreement between 
persons, which Rawls (1993a) refers to as the ‘burdens of judgment’26. This, 
however, begs the virtues of accommodation and compromise (Kymlicka 2002), 
which could be argued to be part of helping students develop as responsible 
citizens.
Given the centrality of rational autonomy in liberal thinking, the progress of 
societies toward Giddens’ ‘life politics’, assumes a more autonomous role of the 
individual. However, given the fact of pluralism that characterises modern 
democratic societies, adopting an understanding of citizenship education that is 
solely dedicated to rational autonomy, would, more than ever before, run the 
danger of coming in conflict with traditional ways of life. In light of these conflicting 
demands, the following section introduces the main features of Rawls’ political 
liberalism and argues that a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme 
(which emphasizes the need for public reason and deliberation) is better tailored to 
address the needs of diversity and autonomy at the same time.
2.5 Rawls’ political liberalism: main definitions
After briefly introducing Rawls’ theory of justice in section 2.1, this section presents 
Rawls’ political liberalism, which introduces the concept of ‘justice as fairness’ as a 
political conception rather than a comprehensive way of life.
During the 1980s, Rawls started revising his previous account of justice which he 
had presented in his earlier work (the most substantial of which is ‘A Theory of 
Justice’, which was first published in 1971). While the revision process did not 
have much impact on the two principles of justice (as introduced in section 2.1), 
changes were introduced, as Graham (2007) writes, to the “justificatory basis of 
the theory” (p124). Rawls’ revised work appeared in a set of articles followed by a 
book, ‘Political Liberalism’, which was published in 1993, in which he articulated
26 Rawls’ notion of the ‘burdens of judgment’ will be further introduced in the following section, 2.5.
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his later ideas.
In ‘Political Liberalism' (hereafter PL), Rawls (1993a, also Rawls 2001) criticizes 
his previous account of ‘Justice as Fairness’ on the basis that it was presented as 
a fully encompassing (comprehensive) way of life that “is not distinguished from a 
strictiy political conception of justice” (Rawls 1993a pxv). ‘A Theory of Justice’, 
Rawls clarifies, presumes that citizens living in liberal well-ordered societies 
accept the conception of justice as fairness as a comprehensive moral or 
philosophical doctrine that aims to replace ‘utilitarianism’ as another 
comprehensive doctrine. The problem with this account (as well as with 
utilitarianism) is that it is incompatible with reasonable plurality that characterizes 
modern democratic societies. In his revised work, Rawls (1993a) argues that 
modern democratic societies are characterized by encompassing different 
reasonable ways of social life that are often incompatible. In such circumstances, 
the maintenance of justice as fairness in democratic societies (in which citizens 
who endorse different ways of life are free and equals) becomes a challenge for 
any democratic society.
Rawls (1993a p19) writes that individuals have two moral powers, "a capacity fora 
sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good”. In addition to these 
two moral powers, he continues, individuals also have a capacity for reason. A 
just person who knows what is good for him/her and can pursue that good through 
reason is, according to Rawls, a free individual. As for equality, citizens who have 
opportunities to develop these capacities could act as fully cooperating society 
members and to that effect they are, on Rawlsian terms, equal27.
Rawls (1993a, 2001) presents PL as a solution that has potential to address the 
demands of reasonable diversity. PL, Rawls argues, assumes that a shared 
reasonable political conception of justice offers common grounds for reasonable 
persons that enable them to decide on fundamental political issues. The aim of PL 
is not to replace comprehensive doctrines, but rather it aims to reach a political 
conception of justice that could be accepted by those who uphold different 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines within a society.
27 As already introduced in Section 2.1, Rawls’ theory of justice was proposed as a moral solution 
to problems that are bound to arise as a result of adopting comprehensive doctrines to inform 
political theory, particularly Utilitarianism, which, according to Rawls, placed liberty and equality at 
two opposite ends.
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Before going any further, there are few terms in Rawls’ PL that need clarification.
According to Rawls’ PL, a person, while he/she may uphold a private 
comprehensive doctrine, shares with other members of society values that inform 
the working of basic societal institutions. These shared values do not necessarily 
belong to one’s own comprehensive doctrine. Such values that different members 
of society share are, in Rawlsian terms, ‘political’. They support a political 
conception of justice (as opposed to a comprehensive one).
Comprehensive conceptions of justice could be fully or partially comprehensive. A 
‘fully’ comprehensive conception of justice “covers all recognized values and 
virtues within one rather precisely articulated system” (Rawls 1993a p13). While a 
‘partially’ comprehensive one “comprises a number of, but by no means all, non 
political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated” (Rawls 1993a p13). 
Many religions and philosophical doctrines, Rawls writes, seek a comprehensive 
status.
A ‘political’ conception of justice, on the other hand, concerns “certain fundamental 
ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls 
1993a p13). It draws its values from different religious, moral or philosophical 
reasonable doctrines, but at the same time, it does not advance any doctrine over 
others.
According to Rawls (1993a), comprehensive doctrines are part of “the culture of 
the social, not the political” (p14). They inform daily life activities from supporting a 
football club to joining a scientific, social or religious society, etc. A Rawlsian 
political conception justice, however, is a moral conception that applies to a 
society’s main social, economic and political institutions (its ‘basic structure’, in 
Rawls’ terms). It concerns “fundamental ideas . . . in the public political culture” 
that all citizens share. This includes “constitutional essentials and basic questions 
of justice” (p10).
Moving on to the word ‘reasonable’ in Rawls’ long list of vocabulary, Rawls writes 
of ‘reasonable persons’ and ‘reasonable doctrines’. Persons are reasonable when
“among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards 
as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the 
assurance that others will likewise do so” (Rawls 1993a p49, 2001).
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‘Reasonable persons’ are also willing
“to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their 
consequences for the use of public reason in directing the exercise of 
political power in a constitutional regime” (Rawls 1993a p54, 2001).
‘Burdens of judgment’ are
“the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons 
so defined” (Rawls 1993b p55). 777he burdens of judgment set limits 
on what can be reasonably justified to others” (Rawls 1993a p61, 2001).
Rawls assumes that “reasonable persons affirm reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (1993a p59). A reasonable comprehensive doctrine recognizes the 
burdens of judgment and allows for freedom of conscience (Rawls 2001 p191).
The existence of different reasonable comprehensive, yet incompatible, doctrines 
highlights the need to present basic political values as freestanding (Rawls 1993a, 
2001). These values “should be justified in terms of reasons and arguments that 
can be shared with reasonable peoples whose religious and other ultimate 
commitments differ” (Macedo 1995 p475).
This characteristic property of Rawls’ PL could be argued to render it more 
accommodating for cultural diversity than other liberal models. In this regard, 
Macedo (1995) writes that it is only reasonable for people of different 
comprehensive doctrines to disagree about their basic beliefs or about attempts 
that aim to come up with “a comprehensive set of moral values governing all of our 
lives”(p474). Instead of highlighting people’s basic disagreements, PL embraces 
these fundamental ‘political’ values “such as peace, prosperity and equal liberty” 
(p474) that most reasonable people, despite of their differences, would agree to.
In order to affirm fundamental political values, while Rawls’ PL refrains from 
making reference to any particular doctrine, citizens are encouraged to consult 
their private comprehensive doctrines. Since different reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines inform Rawls’ PL, citizens, as a result of their consultation, as Rawls 
(1993b) writes, may find that their private beliefs are not conflicting with, or they 
may even be in agreement with, fundamental political conceptions of justice.
While it is totally up to citizens to find their own ways to affirm political values, the 
above could be seen as one way to help citizens come to terms with Rawls’ PL.
Rawls’ theory of justice, whether it is the older version or the revised one, provides
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two main elements: firstly, a method for deriving principles of justice, and 
secondly, an account of what would the application of this method lead to, namely, 
the two principles of justice (Graham 2007). Therefore, while Rawls’ PL does not 
allow any comprehensive doctrine, be it religious, philosophical or moral, to 
present itself as the only possible one, it also provides a general framework for 
how free and equal citizens, who uphold different reasonable doctrines, could live 
and cooperate together on a fair and just basis. While it is true that Rawls’ PL 
concerns liberal societies, his account, as argued in Chapter Four, could be 
adapted to serve growing reasonable plurality in ‘traditional’ Arab societies that are 
keen to consolidate democratic ideals.
Rawls (1993a) writes that Kantian and Millian forms of liberalism are 
comprehensive in nature. They foster individual autonomy as a way for good 
general life, and therefore a liberal form of education that builds on this form of 
liberalism would also embrace individual autonomy in the same way. Various 
religious and cultural ways of life, he adds, would oppose their children being 
exposed to this sort of autonomy-dedicated education that comes in conflict with 
some of their basic beliefs. PL, as will be argued in Chapter Four, invites 
members of reasonable religious and traditional ways of life, along with members 
of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines, to practise their role within society 
as equal, free and fully cooperating members. Children’s education, Rawls 
(1993a) writes, should
“prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable 
them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtue 
so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their 
relation with the rest of the society (p199).
In addition to this role,
“children’s education includes such things as knowledge of their 
constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty 
of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal 
crime” (p199).
Despite Rawls’ PL dedication to accommodating diversity, the above 
quotation reflects its liberal roots. There are basic rights that are beyond 
negotiation. However, the reason for emphasizing this liberal aspect of 
education is not to undermine traditional ways of life, but rather, to ensure 
that children’s membership in a society
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“when they come to age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic
rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist” (p199).
These demands that Rawls’ PL places on education suggest two of its related 
characteristics. Firstly, while plurality is a main theme in Rawls’ PL, embracing 
diversity does not necessarily mean to indiscriminately embrace groups or 
individuals who refuse to recognize other ways of life. Secondly, PL, while it does 
not ask people to abandon their private beliefs, demands putting aside some of 
these beliefs for the sake of laying the grounds for building public life and 
institutions that are based on shared public principles acceptable to reasonable 
people (Rawls 1993a, Macedo 1995).
Rawls’ PL, Gutmann (1995) argues, is not more welcoming to traditional ways of 
life than a rational autonomy dedicated approach. Once students, she adds, 
develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking they may become skeptical 
of their own private beliefs and, as a result, may choose to revise them. Along the 
same line, Callan (2007) writes that Rawls’ PL brings individual autonomy through 
its “back door* (p126). In response to this criticism, Macedo (1995) argues that 
while Rawls’ PL aims to confine its scope within a shared political domain, a 
capacity for liberal democratic values will have a spill over effect on other aspects 
of life. Rawls (1993a) himself does not deny this effect and in this regard he writes 
that the “unavoidable consequences of reasonable requirements for children's 
education may have to be accepted, often with regret” (p200).
Another challenge that Rawls’ PL faces is the difficulty of dividing social life into 
two domains, political and private. What could be considered to belong to the 
political, others would place within the private. Life is entangled in many ways and 
therefore many issues could prove to be difficult to put a label to. As an example 
of this conflict, Macedo (1995), refers to the Mozert versus Hawkins County Board 
of Education case in 1983 in which ‘born again’ Christian parents charged a 
primary school for offering a reading programme that they regarded as impeding to 
their desire to raise their children the way they wanted. The reading programme 
itself was not accused of advancing religious claims of one faith over others. The 
main concern of the parents of these children, whose demands were turned down 
by the court, was that exposing their children to a variety of ways of life would 
encourage the children to exit the faith communities that their parents belong to.
A typical comprehensive liberal would argue, in relation to the Mozert case above,
that children are not the property of their parents. Children have rights of their 
own and education, as one of these rights, has an obligation to help students 
develop a capacity for rational autonomy as a way for good general life, which is 
what the language programme is aiming to do. A political liberal, on the other 
hand, while he/she would agree with the comprehensive liberal on the outcome of 
the court’s decision, would adopt a different justification. He/she would 
differentiate between two notions of tolerance: civil tolerance, which is a shared 
political value, and religious tolerance, which PL would not endorse. Civil 
tolerance, which is what the language programme was helping students to 
develop, is a value necessary for peaceful coexistence of the different groups 
within the same society. It is necessary to maintain social order in pluralist 
democratic societies, and on this basis public schools are obliged to expose their 
students to a variety of ways of life in order to help them develop this value. 
Religious tolerance (tolerance of other religions), on the other hand, may not be 
accepted by extreme fundamentalist religious groups, who place biblical (or 
Qur’anic) authority beyond any question. For such groups, their system of belief is 
not just one among others; it is rather the one and only true way.
Rawls’ PL cannot claim that the different conceptions of the good are equal in the 
eyes of any particular religion. However, it maintains that all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines are constitutionally equal: they are all equal and free 
from a constitutional point of view (Macedo 1995). In line with Rawls’ PL, 
regarding parents who reject teaching their children that all conceptions of the 
good are morally equal, the reasonable amongst them would not object to 
expanding constitutional equality to include holders of different conceptions of the 
good.
For this reason Rawls’ PL would not approve of formal education to teach any 
specific doctrine of religious toleration. At the same time, as Macedo (1995) 
writes, it rejects attempts to present science and experimentation as the only 
certain route to truth. By taking this stance, PL accepts as free and equal peoples 
coming from the different walks of life, including reasonable religious 
fundamentalism, as long as they do not seek political authority and are “willing to 
acknowledge for political purposes the authority of public reasonableness” (p476). 
PL, Macedo argues, asks of religious fundamentalists what it asks of others, 
including proponents of secular ideals.
This chapter has argued that as democratic societies are becoming more 
diverse, there is more reason for adopting an understanding of citizenship 
education that helps students develop a capacity for accepting diversity both at the 
individual and group levels, traditional and secular: an understanding that brings 
youngsters to appreciate that being different is not something wrong that warrants 
discrimination or deserves pity. After all, globalization, the wide spread of 
information, the weakening of the role that used to be played by traditional sources 
of authority and the availability of more choice in life, are emerging pieces of 
evidence that highlight the need to help students come to appreciate the benefits 
of ‘reasonability’ on Rawlsian terms, while at the same time maintaining the liberal 
demand for rationality. Based on these demands, this chapter suggested Rawls’ 
PL as a framework that resorts to the value of reasonability for reconciling the 
demands of diversity and rationality. While this chapter introduced the main 
features of Rawls’ PL, the issue of how Rawls’ PL can be translated into 
educational policies and practices will be the subject of Chapter Four.
Chapter Three
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Analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education programme
This chapter analyses some aspects of the citizenship education programme in 
Jordan in which reconciling the traditional with the modern is among the 
overarching objectives of the programme. The general aim of the analysis is to 
highlight some of the tensions between liberal democratic citizenship values and 
traditional representations of social life that place emphasis on tradition, religion 
and the state as sources of authority. The analysis is based on Norman 
Fairclough’s three-level critical discourse analysis model, and focuses particularly 
on the problem of emphasizing traditional sources of authority at the expense of 
individual freedoms as a discourse related problem that has social implications.
3.1 Introduction: discourse analysis and Fairclough’s three-level 
critical discourse analysis model
The realization of the importance of discourse emerged as a result of social 
constructionist thought which views discourse as the source of knowledge. In 
categorising objects and phenomena, social constructionism sees that we actually 
create reality, rather than describe a reality that already exists (Phillips and 
Jorgenson 2002). Social interaction is seen to lead to establishing common truths, 
as representations of the world are formed through discourse and as we argue the 
truth and falsity of propositions. The significance of this view of knowledge, as 
Phillips and Jorgenson write, is that it is contingent on our worldviews and 
identities, and it is therefore changeable over time and culture. This means that 
struggles about definitions and identity can change social phenomena and social 
structure. This does not mean that constructionist thought denies the existence of 
physical objects or reality, but it stresses the role of discourse in giving them 
meaning (Phillips and Jorgenson 2002). According to this view, language ceases 
to be regarded as a mere communicative tool and instead, it is a tool that shapes 
reality, and therefore, is worthy of study in its own right.
Discourse theorists, in general, agree that discourse is a social practice that 
shapes our social world. They, however, disagree on the relationship between 
discourse and reality (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). On the one hand, there is the 
Laclau and Mouffe model, which considers all social practices as discursive.
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Reality, from their perspective, is what is represented in discourse, and there is 
no reality that exists outside the boundaries of discourse. They do not regard the 
economy, for instance, as an entity on its own that should be studied outside the 
domain of discourse. The economy, as other fields, is part of discourse that is 
itself fully constitutive of the world (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). On the other hand, 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theorists limit the concept of discourse to 
recognised semiotic activities, whether these are “language, body language, visual 
images or any other way of signifying’ (Fairclough 2001 b p229). In contrast to 
Laclau and Mouffe, Norman Fairclough distinguishes between discursive and non- 
discursive elements of any social practice, and assumes a dialectical relation 
between these elements. According to Fairclough (2001b p234),
“social relations, social identities, cultural values and consciousness are 
in part semiotic, but this does not mean that we theorize and research 
social relations, for example, in the same way that we theorize and 
research language -  they have distinct properties, and researching 
them gives rise to distinct disciplines”.
While the different social elements shape discourse, discourse also has a role in 
defining and shaping other social elements, and both discourse and other social 
elements constitute our world.
The starting point of any CDA research is a social issue or problem (Fairclough 
2001 b). It aims to expose unequal power relations, manipulation, domination and 
hegemony applied through discourse. Power can be regarded in different ways. 
Foucault (1980) considers power "as a productive network which runs through the 
whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repressive” (p119). This productive nature of power, according to Foucault, 
“traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge [and] 
produces discourse” (p119). Power is also considered in a negative way as 
exclusively oppressive. It justifies domination and control of one group\individual 
over other groups and\or individuals (van Dijk 2003). Control extends over acts 
and minds and can be achieved through having access to scarce social resources 
such as money, force, information, status, and forms of communication (van Dijk
2003). When control is pervasive in laws, habits and norms, and is not challenged 
by the majority but enjoys a general consensus, then ‘hegemony’ in Gramscian 
terms is achieved, Van Dijk writes. Hegemonies, according to Forgacs (quoted in 
Fairclough 2001 b p232),
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“are sustained ideologically, in the ‘common sense’ assumptions of 
everyday life, and hegemonic struggle penetrates all domains of social 
life, cultural as well as economic and politicaf'.
CDA maintains that economic, social, cultural and other realities inform discourse 
and inform a certain biased image of the social world. CDA relies on the Marxist 
concept of ideology as an important aspect that establishes and maintains unequal 
power relations between different social groups. CDA, argues Wodak (2001 p10), 
seeks
“not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of 
delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory 
Intends to create awareness in agents of how they are deceived about 
their own needs and interests”.
This Marxist outlook of CDA, Fairclough (2001b) explains, has its root, not in 
classical Marxism, but in Western Marxism that “highlights cultural aspects of 
social life, seeing domination and exploitation as established and maintained 
culturally and ideologically’ (p232). The reason for bringing this point up is that 
while this research studies how liberal democratic values figure in the curriculum, it 
uses a CDA framework that has its basis in cultural Marxism in order to carry out 
the needed analysis. The difference in emphasis that these two traditions have, 
suggests that trying to recruit Fairclough’s CDA framework (or any other CDA 
framework) in order tackle a problem that is at the heart of the liberal democratic 
theory is not free, as the following paragraph argues, from philosophical 
contradictions.
It could be argued that the self-acclaimed enlightening and emancipatory role of 
CDA (as regarded by CDA theorists) has an underlying assumption that 
underestimates the capacity of the individual to pick up hidden ideological 
messages (hence the need for a means for helping individuals to identify the truth, 
which could be argued to be in line with Berlin’s illustration of the concept of 
positive liberty introduced in section 1.3). By defining itself as ‘critical’, CDA seeks 
to expose latent ideological effects in dominant discourses. This aspect of CDA is 
at odds with the liberal tradition, which is more inclined towards presenting the 
individual as a rational and autonomous agent who is in charge of his/her actions. 
However, despite this difference in emphasis, the absence of an analytical 
framework that builds on such a liberal view of the individual, and at the same time 
combines linguistic textual analysis with social and cultural analysis, makes CDA, 
as the following paragraph explains, suitable for the purposes of this study.
Social practices, according to the social constructionist theory, while shaped by 
social structures and power struggles, are encoded in discourse. Taking this view 
as a premise that underlies the analysis of the text that will follow, it could be 
argued that linguistic text analysis, while it provides an insight on how semiotic 
practices operate in specific texts, does not shed enough light on the relation 
between the text under study and the bigger societal and cultural picture that 
shapes the realities that the text is representing through the use of discourse. 
Hence, the interdisciplinary nature of CDA, which is by no means restricted to 
Fairclough’s CDA, allows researchers, as Van Dijk (2001 p98) writes, to draw on a 
range of theories that “account for the complexities of the relationships between 
discourse structures and social structures”. In CDA, Van Dijk continues, “theory 
formation, description, problem formation and applications are closely intertwined 
and mutually inspiring" (p98).
While there are different approaches to CDA that share common aspects, it could 
be argued that Fairclough’s approach is one of the most developed, theoretically 
and methodologically, for researching socio-cultural discourse related problems. 
Although Fairclough’s approach is under constant development, this study draws 
mainly on Fairclough’s three level analysis model introduced in more than one of 
his books, including Fairclough 1 9 9 5 ,1992a, 1992b and 1989. This study also 
utilizes some other details that are introduced in other publications, mainly 
Fairclough 2001(a) and 2001(b).
Fairclough’s model is an interdisciplinary model that contains a range of different 
concepts that are interconnected at three levels (diagram 3.1 below). This makes 
it not only a tool for data analysis, but also a general framework for studying 
discourse related social issues.
The three levels of the analytical model are:
Level A. The wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs.
Level B. Process relating to the production and consumption of the text 
(Discursive Practice).





Diagram 3.1: Fairclough’s three-level critical discourse analysis model
3.2 The Problem
This study argues that attempts to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values 
with traditional orientations dominant in Arab societies are bound to create 
tensions. The Jordanian citizenship education (henceforth JCE) approach to 
addressing these tensions emphasises the role of traditional sources of authority 
which is one way for naturalising one form of discourse and suppressing others. 
The use of power in this way is both productive as well as constraining. While 
power is responsible for creating a certain image of the social world, it is also 
responsible for suppressing other representations of it.
The struggle, within the JCE discourse, between demands placed on students by 
traditional sources of authority and demands placed by liberal democratic 
citizenship values, highlights the issue of ‘individual freedoms’ as a discourse 
related problem that has social implications. Such potentially conflicting demands 
that the JCE programme asks from students makes the individual freedoms issue 
a “needs-based” (Fairclough 2001 b p236) problem. The three-level analysis 
below aims to show how the JCE discourse contributes to the individual freedoms 
problem.
3.3 Applying Fairclough’s three-level model
Each of the subsections below deals with one of the three levels of Fairclough’s 
model (diagram 3.1). It starts with the wider social practice to which the individual 
freedoms problem belongs (level A) and finishes with linguistic features of the text 
(level C).
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3.3.1 Level A: the wider social practice to which the communicative 
event belongs
According to Fairclough (1 9 8 9 ,1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2001a and 2001b), discourse 
is both constituted by and constitutive of social life. This section focuses on the 
‘constituted by’ aspect of discourse. The analysis below aims to show how the 
JCE discourse is constituted by dominant socio-cultural, political and economic 
representations of social life. It also aims to show how such dominant 
representations stand as obstacles to the problem being tackled in the sense that 
they “become hegemonic and so become part of legitimizing common sense’’ 
(Fairclough 2001b p235), which serves as an agent for sustaining the status quo 
rather than embracing desired changes. The struggle between such dominant 
representations and (some) of the aims of the JCE programme -namely helping 
students develop democratic values including tolerance, respect for others, 
reasoning and critical thinking skills, and respect for human rights (MoE 2005a)- 
contributes to making the individual freedoms problem a needs-based one.
Part of the practices of a government is to produce social and economic changes 
(Fairclough 2001b), and in this case the reformation of the Jordanian educational 
system is one of the means of the government to achieve desired changes. 
According to The Development of Education National Report of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan’ for the year 2004, educational programmes aim, among other 
things, to empower young Jordanians as
“change agents for future national growth... to...become the human 
resource wealth and resource to face internal and external economic 
and social challenges in a rapidly changing region and world.. .[A sound 
education leads to the rewards of] young citizens who will be well- 
qualified and trained, multitalented, capable of self-learning and lifelong 
learning, flexible and open to other cultures, and entirely comfortable in 
coexisting and integrating within their environment” (MoE 2004 
Foreword).
The quotation stresses ‘change’ as one of the characteristics of the current age. 
The message that the quotation conveys could be read along the following line: ‘in 
order not to be left behind in this ‘changing’ world, we must reconsider our 
economic and social priorities in light of internal and external challenges’. An 
implication here is that citizens have to adapt socially in order to develop 
economically. Adaptation to change is justified via pragmatic reasons, as without
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it, both citizens and the government (that works for the benefit of citizens) would 
suffer the consequences, and these consequences are mainly economic. An 
example of this kind of social adaptation that may lead to economic development 
comes as a result of normalizing the relations between Jordan and the State of 
Israel in 1994. Cheap labour in Jordan is an attraction for foreign capital, and 
investments by Israeli businessmen can have economic benefits for local citizens 
as well as the government. But this very idea of accepting Israeli investments on 
Jordanian land, not to mention Jordanians accepting job offers in these 
investments, is one thing that demands social change.
The quotation also stresses the fact that ‘change’ requires preparation, and one 
way for preparing for it is through good education that focuses on empowering 
young Jordanians as ‘change agents’. In a country that has limited natural 
resources, good education is a form of investment for future ‘national growth’.
It is instructive to consider the main educational outcomes of the newly reformed 
JCE programme, as stipulated by its ten overarching objectives (MoE 2005a28 
p10), of which the following four are directly relevant to this analysis:
T o  expose learners to a variety of sources of knowledge ... [aiming]... 
to help them develop a capacity for interacting positively with other 
cultures (thaqafat) in ways that allow them to have their influence on 
and be influenced by these cultures” (Objective 2).
“To help learners maintain authentic and positive Arab cultural 
practices, traditions and values, in the new world order, and to help 
them develop a capacity for reconciling the traditional with the modern” 
(Objective 5).
“To help learners to reject imitation (taqleed) and blind fanaticism, 
employ rational thinking skills and to deepen their critical thinking skills” 
(Objective 6).
“To emphasise the role played by the Hashemites in the modern Arab 
rise, and in the practising and applying of democracy, both verbally and 
practically, in the different arenas of life” (Objective 10).
One of the obstacles that contribute to the individual freedoms problem could be 
realised in the way these objectives are worded.
In the fifth objective, for instance, the use of the word ‘authentic’ is problematic. It 
could be seen to imply an invitation by those who come under the category ‘Arab’
28 Quotations from this source (MoE 2005a) are translated from the original Arabic text by the 
Author.
to accept these ‘Arab cultural practices, traditions and values’ without any 
reflection and as matters of truth. This implies an image of conformity and 
underplays the view of students as ‘agents of change’. It could even imply that 
these ‘Arab cultural practices, traditions and values’ are omnipresent realities that 
draw their meaning from a superior authority and keep their value despite the fact 
that everything else around them may be changing. This may lead youngsters to 
believe that they are, by default, better than others who belong to other cultures. 
While the objective calls for reconciling the traditional with the modern, this 
approach of describing and presenting ‘Arab values and traditions’ has the effect 
of suppressing and marginalizing ways of life that do not valorise these values in 
the same way as the textbook does. More specific examples of how the language 
of citizenship education textbooks itself contributes to this problem (suppressing 
other ways of life) are delayed to the next section that aims to have a closer look 
at the language of these textbooks.
In line with the image of conformity presented in the JCE programme objectives, it 
could be argued that an emphasis on shared interests and values is more helpful 
to social cohesion than highlighting diversity, which would lead to fragmentation 
and incomprehension among the different groups within a society. However, as 
Putnam and Putnam (1993) argue, when values are imposed from the outside, 
individuals do not make these values their own, as exemplified by the alienation 
among non-Anglo-American US citizens. If the dominant group, such as the 
Anglo-Americans in USA, or religious Sunni Arab Jordanians, fails to interact 
cooperatively with other groups, the society fails to have shared values developed 
through democratic inquiry.
Putnam and Putnam (1993) highlight the importance of seeing values as socially 
constructed rather than fixed. They argue that if students feel that values cannot 
be subject to rational analysis, then they will see each other’s norms as absolute 
and hence the chance for these groups to develop respect for each other 
diminishes. This puts limitations on positive interaction that leads to having an 
influence on and being influenced by other cultures as described in Objective two 
above.
In the foreword to The Development of Education National Report above (MoE
2004), ‘change’ is one major theme. However, in the overarching objectives of the 
citizenship education programme (MoE 2005a p10), four of which are quoted
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above, the emphasis on change is played down. In fact, the word ‘change’ 
(taghieer) does not appear in any of the ten objectives. The second objective 
(quoted above) emphasises the importance o f "... interacting positively with other 
cultures in ways that allow [students] to have their influence on and be influenced 
by these cultures”, which has an aspect of change to it. The sixth objective also 
emphasises the importance of critical thinking, which is necessary for producing 
change, but there is no mention of the word ‘change’ itself.
The tenth objective (quoted above) introduces the word ‘democracy’ for the first 
time and presents it as a way of life. This, however, is not done, at least in the 
objective above, by referring to democracy itself, but rather by referring and 
emphasising the role the Royal family in Jordan “in the practising and applying of 
democracy in the different arenas of life" (MoE 2005a p10). Democracy, 
according to this objective, is in collocation with the conduct of the Royal family, 
which suggests that students leam by referring to a role model(s) as far as 
democracy is concerned. This is not to make any judgements concerning the 
royal family in Jordan and to what extent they are democratic role models, but the 
issue at stake is that the message conveyed defies liberal understandings of 
democracy. In order to develop as democratically oriented citizens, students have 
to watch, observe and follow, rather than reflect and reason. It follows that a non- 
democratically oriented individual is one who thinks or behaves in a different way 
than the role model does. The message conveyed is that citizens are to follow the 
lead of their leaders, which is another dimension where the citizenship education 
overarching objectives prove to take a non-democratic turn. This way of 
presenting democracy stands in sharp contradiction with Amy Gutmann’s (1987) 
view about deliberative democratic citizenship, which states that children at school
“must learn not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think 
critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal of 
sharing political sovereignty as citizens ... [PJeople who possess sturdy 
moral character without a developed capacity for reasoning are ruled 
only by habit and authority, and are incapable of constituting a society 
of sovereign citizens” (p51).
While this approach to teaching about democracy (definitely not teaching for 
democracy), asserts in the minds of youngsters the authority of traditional sources 
of authority, it is also not conducive to the development of critical thinking, and 
therefore it adds to the individual freedoms problem within this study.
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The unsettled political and economic situation in the region has its say in 
constituting the JCE discourse. Jordan is reliant on tourism, foreign investments 
and aid, which are negatively influenced by an anti-Western image of Islam, 
particularly portrayed by the incidents of 9/11 in the United States of America. In 
November 2004, according to the Jordanian Embassy in Washington website, 
Jordan issued “a message on Islam to Muslims and the world” (Embassy of 
Jordan 2004). Known as ‘Amman Message’29, its aim, according to the embassy’s 
website, is to “reveal a message of tolerance and humanity; rejecting extremism 
as a deviation from Islamic belief; thus stressing the true value of Islam”. The 
Amman message was delivered by the Kingdom’s Chief Justice, in a religious 
ceremony, in the Presence of King Abdulla II.
In line with this message, JCE discourse aims to present a moderate middle 
(wasati) image of Islam that excludes interpretations which take a radical stance. 
For example, this moderate image of Islam is emphasised in the grade ten 
“National and Civic Education” textbook on more than one occasion and is 
enforced by quoting the Qur’anic verse “thus We have appointed you a middle 
nation” (verse 143 from Surah al Baqara) on page 27 and then again on page 71 
of the textbook (MoE 2005b). The Amman message is also introduced in a grade 
ten lesson entitled “Coexistence and Tolerance", describing its purpose as to show 
“the real tolerant image of Islam, to protect it from external attacks and to stop 
false accusations against i f  (MoE 2005b30 p72). At a time when acts of terrorism 
are done in the name of Islam, using traditional sources of authority to defend a 
moderate image of Islam that rejects associating it with such actions has value in 
itself (allowing students to feel proud as Muslims) and, at the same time, militates 
against the radicalization of young men and women by radical Islamist groups that 
are active in the region.
Another reason that justifies the reference to traditional sources of authority is 
constitutional in nature. According to the constitution of Jordan (the second item 
of the first chapter), Islam is the religion of the state. While the constitution is 
informed by many factors, including the social, the political, the economic and the 
historical, the constitution itself has a major role in constituting the government 
discourse and the citizenship education programme is part of that discourse.
While this constitutional obstacle could be argued to contradict the ethos of
29 A copy of ‘Amman Message’ can be found in Appendix Two.
30 Quotations from this source (MoE 2005b) are translated from the original Arabic text by the 
Author.
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pluralistic modern democratic societies, it could be justified by the fact that the 
majority of Jordanians are Muslims (92%), which makes it natural to turn to Islam 
as a major constituent of JCE discourse. This could be seen as a ‘majority’ 
obstacle that forces itself on citizenship discourse as the dominant form of social 
life.
In the same way as many other religions and philosophical ways of life, Islam 
seeks a comprehensive status. This comprehensive nature of Islam could act as 
an obstacle to realizing certain individual freedoms that liberal democratic 
citizenship would enforce. This ‘comprehensiveness’ obstacle, when taken with 
the ‘majority’ and ‘constitutional’ obstacles above makes it more difficult for the 
citizenship discourse to avoid being constituted by representations of social life in 
which the heavenly transcends the social. This could be seen as another turn 
from the ethos of modern liberal democratic societies in which individuality and 
diversity are two main features.
The perceived ‘glorious’ image of the Arab Islamic civilization and history is 
another obstacle to the individual freedom problem of this study. As introduced 
earlier in the section 1.2, Arab societies, until the start of the Nineteenth Century, 
were culturally and intellectually self sufficient in the sense that their main 
references were their own. In medieval times, the Arab Islamic civilization was 
one of the influential civilizations at the global level both intellectually and indeed 
imperially (Bulkzeez 2001). Despite the retreat that the Arab Islamic civilization 
has suffered since31, the image of a ‘glorious’ past that once assumed a universal 
status is still persistent and is reflected in today’s literature, songs, as well as 
textbooks. For example, in the grade ten citizenship education textbook, in a 
lesson about the values of citizenship, the book presents a list of six traits that, 
according to the textbook, make Jordan a very special place “and emphasise the 
pride and sanctity of belonging to i f  (MoE 2005b p33). Among these traits is the 
following:
“Jordan is land blessed by God, and it is a patron (aknaf) of Jerusalem 
(beit al-Maqdes)... its civilization is Arab and Islamic, and is the cradle 
of human civilizations. .. its leadership is Hashemite that goes back in its 
root to Prophet Mohammed.” (MoE 2005b p33).
31 As discussed in section 1.2, since the Renaissance started in Europe as early as the fourteenth 
century, the centre of gravity started to shift from the Arab Islamic world towards the West. From 
that time, while the Arab world was suffering a period of stagnation and isolation unaware of what 
was going on outside the walls of the Ottoman Empire, Europe started to emerge as a political, 
intellectual, industrial and also as an imperial power.
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The perceived view of the ‘glorious’ past of the Arab Islamic nation started to 
regain momentum through the rising power of Islamist movements, which started 
to become socially and politically more influential on the Arab scene during the 
1970s32. Furthermore, some Western policies in the region provide reasons for 
some to play-up the West-East divide and to encourage others to look with 
suspicion on what could be perceived as Western values altogether. These 
developments provide reason for some to turn to the past as a grand theory 
hoping to find solace there.
By mixing the past with the present and the future, this approach to citizenship 
education has the effect of imprinting in the minds of youngsters a false and 
unrealistic image of the current state of affairs. While it is true that the past is a 
springboard for moving forward, the move forward demands evaluating the past on 
the basis of the demands of the present and the future. This puts demands on 
democratic citizenship education to help learners look critically at the past rather 
than presenting it as the normal and expected way of life.
As already discussed in section 2.4, one of the main characteristics of modern 
democratic societies is that they are becoming more and more diverse and 
individuals are exposed to other ways of life more than ever before. In 1979, 
Lyotard defined post-modernity “as incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard 
1984 pxxiv), and since then, globalization and technological breakthroughs in 
ways of storing, transmitting and accessing knowledge never slowed down, but 
quite far from that, they continued to challenge modernity’s meta-narratives. 
Individuals in this era are becoming more in charge of their own lifestyles, which 
Giddens (1991) describes as the emergence of “life politics /that]  presumes 
emancipation from fixities of tradition and from conditions of hierarchical 
domination" (p214). Whether it is defined as post-modernity (c.f. Lyotard) or high 
(or late) modernity (c.f. Giddens), globalization has deep influences on the way 
individuals perceive themselves. Individuals can compare and contrast their ways 
of life with others’, and are more free to mix and match between these different 
ways of life. This, however, is not suggesting that a society can tolerate all 
different ways of life. While meta-narratives that claim universal status could be
32 The resurgence of these groups is exacerbated by occupation or invasion of some parts of Arab 
and/or Islamic land (Palestine, and lately Iraq and Afghanistan) and is justified partly by lack of 
ability of secularly oriented Arab regimes to obtain independence in Arab land (mainly Palestine) or 
to achieve desired social and economic changes (democratic reform is among them) that were 
hoped to be achieved in the post-independence period (Section 1.2 deals with this issue at more 
length).
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argued to be losing their appeal, there are limits to tolerating other ways of life. 
These limits, however, are not fixed and one does not run short of examples of 
how they are constantly changing in different areas.
In conclusion, while claiming the title ‘democratic’ places emphasis on the 
demands of individuality and diversity, powerful social, economic, political and 
historical networks, of which the JCE discourse is part, act as obstacles in the face 
of realizing such values. These conflicting demands make societal consensus 
concerning individual freedoms related issues harder to achieve. Analysis at the 
second level (the following section) will highlight how these tensions feature in the 
JCE programme.
3.3.2 Level B: process relating to the production and consumption of 
the text (Discursive Practice)
This section moves from the social, economic, political and historical 
circumstances that inform the citizenship education programme and its general 
objectives to how these circumstances figure in the discursive practices of the text 
itself. The aim of this section is to show how the author of the citizenship 
education textbooks draws on existing discourses (and genres), which are 
introduced in level A above, to create the text, and therefore create a special 
version of social life. It also aims to show how the text interacts with its ‘implied’ 
readers: how readers of the text rely on available discourses (and genres) to 
interact with, and interpret, the text (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002).
The analysis will focus on paragraphs from lessons chosen from the grade ten 
“National and Civic Education” textbook, which is part of the JCE programme. The 
choice of these lessons was not made randomly, but rather they were selected to 
illustrate the individual freedoms problem that this study focuses on. This does not 
mean that other lessons in the textbook cannot be used for the same purpose, but 
the selected lessons are better suited than others33. Furthermore, given the space 
provided for this section, confining the analysis to few lessons is seen as sufficient 
since they contain enough material to illustrate the problem and allow for more 
detailed analysis.
33 The selection of these lessons by its very nature could be described by some as a biased 
process, as CDA, as Van Dijk (2001 p96) writes, “is biased-and it is proud of i f .  The purpose of 
this bias is seen necessary to draw attention to instances in the use of language where power is 
used to establish certain representations of social life.
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The choice of the grade ten textbook is made based on the lessons it includes. 
These lessons cover issues which are related to the individual freedoms problem 
and democratic citizenship values. An English translation of the table of contents 
of the textbook can be found in Appendix Three. This however, does not make 
“National and Civic Education" textbooks studied in grade levels other than year 
ten, unsuitable for analysis34. The grade ten textbook, however, in addition to its 
suitability in terms of content, comes at the end of the compulsory stage of 
education in Jordan, and therefore, it could be regarded as the most advanced 
within that compulsory stage in terms of the level of complexity of the concepts it 
introduces.
The grade ten textbook presents Jordan as a democracy, which is evident in more 
than one instance in the book. The second paragraph of the fifth lesson, “The 
Democratic Experience in Jordan", of the third unit, “The State of Jordan and its 
Democratic Institutions", states that
“the 1952 constitution of Jordan is recognised by its emphasis on the 
rise of a democratic rule, thereupon, the state is democratic and the 
form of government is parliamentary, monarchical, hereditary where the 
people are the source of legislation" (MoE 2005b p52).
The second lesson, “Democracy: its Domains and Applications", of the same unit, 
states some requirements for democracy to succeed, which include:
T o  ensure that individuals and groups have the freedom to express 
their opinions and beliefs... [and]... a belief in human intelligence and 
creative abilities, that allow the individual to effectively participate in the 
affairs of his/her society" (MoE 2005b p41).
These requirements for the success of democracy, the textbook states, are 
guaranteed by the Jordanian constitution that was issued in 1952 (MoE 2005b
p61).
However, despite this emphasis on the importance of liberal democratic citizenship 
values, the following paragraphs argue that this emphasis is not well served by the 
language of the textbook. The way the social world is talked about in the textbook 
could be seen as a manifestation of the use of power by the dominant culture that 
sets the agenda for painting one form of the social world and suppressing other 
discourses and therefore suppressing alternative ways for creating the social
34 Citizenship education is presented in schools in Jordan as a separate subject for grade levels 
five to ten, and incorporated within the social studies textbooks for the first four and the last two 
grade levels.
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world. Furthermore, as argued below, this dominant voice that narrates the 
citizenship education story assumes to have access to true knowledge, and the 
justification for its claims is often made, not through argumentation and presenting 
and weighing evidence, but rather by making recourse to traditional sources of 
authority.
Fairclough (1992a) writes that modern democratic societies witnessed a shift in 
the way power and social control are exercised, which is illustrated in the 
replacement of force and physical coercion, as means for setting-up, producing 
and reproducing power relations, by “the routine workings of particular social 
practices” (p3). Power relations and hegemonies are practised more implicitly, 
Fairclough (1992a) argues, through the use of language whether it is a textbook, a 
TV commercial or a doctor’s consultation. While this has wide implications, as far 
as democratic citizenship education is concerned, it places demands that students 
develop a capacity for identifying patterns of domination and power that stand 
behind and inform mainstream language. Democratic citizenship education, on 
Fairclough’s account, has an obligation towards helping students learn to critically 
read between and behind clauses and paragraphs if they are to learn to make 
rational and independent decisions.
The domain of the grade ten textbook is Jordanian future citizens (Jordanian 
students of the different backgrounds) and other non-Jordanian minorities who 
attend schools in Jordan that follow the Jordanian National Curriculum. Out of all 
students who study this textbook, the language of the textbook effectively 
addresses only students committed to Islam. This is manifested by dedicating a 
relatively large space in the textbook for direct quotations from the Qur’an, sayings 
of Prophet Mohammed and/or one of the First Four Caliphs in the early days of 
Islam, while at the same time, failing to balance this by quoting, or at least making 
reference to, others who belong to other systems of belief, religious or secular. To 
illustrate this point in numbers, out of the 27 lessons that constitute the grade ten 
textbook, 14 have a minimum of one direct quotation, and the total number of 
direct quotations in these 14 lessons is 47. The lessons that do not include any 
direct quotations could be argued to be descriptive in their nature and therefore do 
not invite the use of direct quotations from any of the religious sources above. A 
summary of how these quotations are distributed per lesson can be found in 
Appendix Four.
Among the objectives of the fifth unit of the textbook (MoE 2005b p63) is to help 
students “reject fanaticism and discrimination”, “to adopt an open-minded outlook 
towards other ways of life” and “to appreciate tolerance as a democratic value”. 
These democratic citizenship values are not justified by argumentation and 
reasoning on most occasions but rather by making recourse to religion and 
revelation as a source of authority. This suggests that religious directives are the 
inspiration for ‘good’ citizenship and that accepting the ‘Other1 is a religious duty 
that a good citizen must comply with35. As an illustration of this, under the subtitle 
“Forms of Tolerance and its Means” (MoE 2005b p73), the grade ten textbook lists 
four different forms of tolerance. The four listed forms are: “religious tolerance, 
tolerance in dealings, racial tolerance and cultural tolerance”. The first two forms 
of tolerance are followed by one verse from the Qur’an each, and the third one by 
one of the sayings of Prophet Mohammed. Apart from the religious quotations, 
nothing else is written in support of these three forms of tolerance. Under the 
fourth form of tolerance (cultural tolerance) there is one statement that reads 
“every society has its own culture and has the right to be proud of it and to 
promote it’ (MoE 2005b p73).
The complete reliance on religious quotations to support the first three types of 
tolerance reflects an assumption that students who use this textbook are all the 
same; they are Muslim students bound by their religious commitments. This could 
be argued to be acceptable in light of the constitutional and majority obstacles 
discussed under level A (section 3.3.1). In fact, it is one of the objectives of the 
grade ten textbook, as stated in the “General Guidelines for National and Civic 
Education” and reiterated in the textbook itself, that it is an expectation from all 
students “to make mention of verses from the Qur’an and sayings of Prophet 
Mohammed that instigate tolerance” (MoE 2005a p76, MoE 2005b p63).
Nevertheless, addressing all students as being devout Muslims has profound 
implications on the individual freedoms problem which forms the subject of this 
analysis. Firstly, it blocks the exit way for any of these students who may wish to 
break free from this closed representation of social life or even to think differently. 
Secondly, by addressing Muslim students only, the textbook is effectively dividing 
the world into the two distinct realms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the ‘them’ voice,
35 A distinction is to be made here between ‘toleration’, which implies a relationship between two 
parties that do not enjoy equal status in the way they are perceived socially, and ‘respect’, which 
could be seen as a more serious attempt to bring the two parties up to the same level and hence 
differences are celebrated rather than merely tolerated.
including the voice of non-Muslim students who study this textbook, is absent 
from the picture the textbook draws of the social world. By failing to incorporate 
but the voice of one form of social life, individuals who do not belong to that 
particular form, feel intimidated and even threatened by that dominant 
representation that excludes their voice.
In another chapter, the textbook states that one of the “main characteristics of a 
good citizen... is to... believe in God, His books and Messengers” (MoE 2005b 
p26). The God that the textbook refers to is the God of Abraham that the three 
monotheistic religions have in common, and this is again part of the constitutional 
obstacle (introduced in level A above). Stressing this characteristic of good 
citizenship provides reasons for learners to divide the world into believers and 
non-believers, and at best they would feel obliged to tolerate ‘non-believers’. It 
could also be understood as an encouragement to discriminate against all those 
who do not believe in the God of Abraham or in any God altogether. The textbook 
certainly denies non-believers the right to be good citizens, which contributes to 
the individual freedoms problem of this analysis. The message portrayed in the 
textbook is that ‘we are not prepared to accept social changes that may result in 
undermining our collective belief in God’.
It could be argued that the concept of tolerance that the textbook presents is, in 
certain ways, in line with the concept of ‘religious toleration’ as was understood by 
the Ottomans during their rule between the Fourteenth Century and the collapse of 
their empire in World War One. While understandings of religious tolerance in 
Europe (during the age of Reformation) started to conceptualize along the lines of 
individual freedom of conscience, in the Muslim world, religious toleration took a 
different route. The Ottomans adopted a millet system, in which Ottoman subjects 
were organized in religious communities that were given some sort of self-rule.
The expansion of the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries (to include parts of the Middle East, East Asia, North Africa and 
East Europe) brought peoples of different religious backgrounds under their rule. 
Under the millet system, Christians and Jews, in particular, were recognized as 
self-governing units within the larger Muslim Ottoman Empire. They were not only 
allowed freedom to have their own worship places and schools, but also their own 
courts and legal codes. Despite restrictions imposed by ruling Muslim authorities 
on religious communities (non-Muslims for instance were not allowed to advocate 
their religious beliefs while Muslims did), Muslims were prohibited from interfering
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in the internal affairs of these communities (Goldschmidt 2004, Kymlicka 2002).
In hindsight, the millet system could be regarded as a communitarian solution (or 
at least along one understanding of it) to incorporating religious diversity.
However, the division of the society along religious lines and the self-rule that 
Christian and Jewish communities were given made it possible for these 
communities -as means for protecting and maintaining their own religious and 
cultural ways of life- to impose orthodox religious restrictions on their own 
members. Within these communities, as well as within the larger Muslim 
community, individual freedom of conscience was a punishable crime. The way 
the Ottomans dealt with religious toleration emphasized the authority of religion, 
be it Islam, Christianity or Judaism, over individual freedom of conscience, and to 
that effect the Ottoman conception of religious toleration was illiberal (Kymlicka 
2002).
The grade ten JCE textbook presents an image of social life that is based on 
Islam; it also advocates tolerance as one of the values that Islam calls for. Like 
the Ottoman millet system, it seems to advocate the right of collective worship and 
practising beliefs for non-Muslims, while excluding those who do not adhere to one 
of the three monotheistic religions.
Furthermore, the language of the textbook presents Islam as one collective voice 
that does not make mention of the different sects of Islam, including Shi’ism. This 
may be justified in terms of the majority obstacle (the majority of Jordanians are 
Sunni Muslims). However, in a country that is dominated by Sunni Muslims, such 
as Jordan, the citizenship education textbook is a reasonable venue to help Sunni 
students develop a capacity for respecting moderate non-Sunni Muslims (indeed 
as well as non-committed students of Muslim background in general and non- 
Muslim students altogether). Recognizing Shi’ite Muslims would help young 
Jordanian students, who often hear about struggles between Sunni and Shi’ite 
Muslims in the media, to build bridges of respect and trust with their fellow Shi’ites.
In addition to emphasising the authority of religion, the textbook also draws on and 
emphasises the role of the state as another source of authority. An example of 
this is found in the lesson “Citizenship Values and its Demands". Citizenship in 
this lesson is described as a “coin that has two sides: one is belonging and the 
other is loyalty (wala’a )” (MoE 2005b p31). The lesson proceeds to explain the
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meaning of these two terms; it states that
“Belonging and loyalty are bound to obedience (ta’ah), devotion (ikhlas) 
and faithfulness (wafa’). These traits start to develop during childhood 
when a child learns (yata’allam) to be loyal to his/her parents, relatives 
and those who are in charge (oli al-amr) in his/her clan (asheera).
He/she learns to belong to his/her house, school and town. Later on, 
belonging and loyalty develop to become more associated with one’s 
own home country (watan) and the authority that looks after It...
Loyalty... is an internal feeling that pushes the human being (al-insan) 
to be devoted and faithful to those in charge of his country, to his 
culture and history, and to look after the good, interest and wellbeing of 
his country.” (MoE 2005b p31)
Loyalty, according to the textbook, progresses as if the individua! is at the centre of 
concentric circles where in the outermost circle comes the state. Introducing 
loyalty in the hierarchical order of parents, relatives, clan, town and the state, 
establishes and legitimizes hierarchy within society. The inclusion of the term 
‘obedience’ could be seen by students to suggest that authority must not be 
questioned, and that a level of conformity is desirable. In order to promote liberal 
democratic values more successfully, this lesson could have benefited from 
focusing on participation in the political debate as part of loyalty to one’s country. 
As Kymlicka (2002 p289) writes
“fflh e  ability and willingness to question political authority, and to 
engage in public discourse about matters of public policy... are perhaps 
the most distinctive aspects of citizenship in a liberal democracy...”
Furthermore, the textbook presents loyalty in a rather simplistic manner, assuming 
it develops naturally without the need of an agent to promote it. According to this 
model, there is no conflict between different loyalties but rather one contains the 
other and loyalty to the state contains all. The lesson does not make any 
reference to the fact that loyalty for one’s own clan, for instance, might come into 
conflict with being loyal to government. In modern democratic societies, however, 
loyalties could be represented by scattered circles that may or may not have 
shared space and each individual could be loyal to different issues at the same 
time as individuals, as Sen (2006) argues, are not bound to one single identity. 
Belonging to a certain family, job, religious background, political party, 
environmental group, civil society organization, and even retail store and football 
club, present different demands on the individual who needs to make choices and 
decide on his/her priorities.
The textbook recognises some of the challenges that face the democratic 
process in Jordan. One of these challenges, as summarized on page 53 of the 
textbook, is “the adoption of the Western model as basis for evaluating Jordanian 
democracy' (MoE 2005b p53). It is true that every society has its own features, 
and for some Jordanians ‘individual liberty’ talk is seen as unwarranted Western 
interference that threatens their way of life. At the same time, to claim that one of 
the challenges for the democratic process in Jordan is evaluating Jordanian 
democracy by Western standards could be argued to emphasize the tension 
arising from trying to reconcile democratic citizenship values with traditional 
values, and could even be argued to undermine the liberal aspect of democracy.
To conclude this section, the grade ten “National and Civic Education" textbook 
mainly resorts to appealing to traditional sources of authority in supporting its 
claims, presenting a hierarchical view of Jordanian society. It paints a picture of 
conformity and does not acknowledge diversity within Jordanian society or Islam. 
While this may aim to enhance a common identity and solidarity among students, 
it is more likely to alienate students who come from backgrounds that do not share 
the same assumptions as the author, and does not suit a pluralistic democratic 
society.
Rawls’ political conception of justice emphasizes that citizens in democratic 
societies, who constitutionally share equal powers, are entitled to be different. 
Unity and stability in well ordered democratic societies, Rawls (1993a) continues, 
should be established along the lines of reasonable pluralism. Based on this 
account, the use of the citizenship education textbook as a stage within the public 
domain to advocate for a comprehensive dominant doctrine has the effect of 
marginalizing other reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, on Rawls’ 
account, such an approach to citizenship education is unreasonable, on the 
grounds that comprehensive doctrines, even reasonable ones, cannot always 
provide answers for political questions based on public reason and therefore are 
not suitable as a basis for social unity (Rawls 1993a).
The reliance on religious quotations, in particular, addresses devout Muslim 
Jordanian students who would identify with the text. It encourages tolerance 
toward others, but at the same time it rejects citizens who do not belong to one of 
the three monotheistic religions, placing limits on the freedom of such groups and 
individuals, and limiting Muslim students’ ability to develop respect for them and
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deal with them as citizens who enjoy equal rights.
By repeatedly presenting knowledge in an assertive non-argumentative manner 
and resorting to traditional sources of authority for justifying claims of truth, the 
textbook does not help students to develop the values of public reason, which 
according to Rawls (1993a) are necessary for helping individuals develop an 
appreciation for reasonable plurality.
3.3.3 Level C: the linguistic features of the text
This section provides a closer look at some of the linguistic features of the grade 
ten “National and Civic Education” textbook (which is part of the JCE programme). 
The analysis will focus on certain linguistic features identified mainly in one single 
lesson, with support, where necessary, from examples from other lessons from the 
same textbook. The title of the lesson under study is “Coexistence and Tolerance" 
(which is part of a unit entitled “Reason, Logic and Dialogue”) for which an English 
translation may be found in Appendix Five. This lesson is chosen as a sample of 
how linguistic features of the textbook contribute to the individual freedoms 
problem in Jordan, and the linguistic features chosen to be analysed are those 
considered to contribute the most to this problem. There may be other linguistic 
features that other lessons in the textbook (or other textbooks offered as part of 
the JCE education programme) make use of, but confined within the space 
provided for this section, identifying certain linguistic features of one single lesson 
is an example of how a single teaching unit, a lesson, is organized within the 
larger picture that the textbook provides for the social world. Four linguistic 
features of the lesson will be analysed (whole-text language organization, clause 
combinations, clauses and words), and analysis is intended to illustrate how these 
features contribute, collectively, to the complexity of the individual freedoms 
problem. The choice of this particular lesson is made based on the assumption 
that coexistence and tolerance, that constitute the title of the lesson, are both 
liberal democratic citizenship values.
The lesson under study is made-up of five brief sections and each section is made 
up of short paragraphs. Most of the clauses in these paragraphs are linked with 
an ‘and’, which makes the structure of the sentences that make up the lesson
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mainly compound rather than complex36. The declarative nature of the 
compound sentences used in the lesson disregards the need for legitimizing the 
information declared in any one clause. The lesson is not written as a set of 
arguments, but as a set of assertions that aim to inform students of the ‘right’ way 
of behaving.
As argued in section 3.3.2 above, the declarative language of the textbook is 
obvious in the excessive use of religious quotations as justification for statements, 
and this particular lesson is no exception. The lesson starts with a Qur’anic verse 
that is placed inside a text-box positioned right under the title of the lesson. The 
lesson also quotes two other Qur’anic verses and one saying for Prophet 
Mohammed, as well as three more Qur’anic verses that appear in the evaluative 
set of questions at the end of the lesson.
The declarative nature of the lesson is also reflected in the use of listing syntax 
and illustrative diagrams that contribute to its paratactic syntax. Sections four and 
five of the lesson are mainly constituted of numbered points, and each of these 
points conveys a certain message without going through the process of justifying 
it. The lesson also contains two illustrative coloured diagrams: the first one is 
comprised of eight boxes each instructing the student to refer to a Qur’anic verse 
(or verses) that emphasises an Islamic principle (found in the Amman message) 
that could be related to coexistence and tolerance. And the second diagram 
illustrates six means (wasa’il) through which tolerance, as the textbook points out, 
could be achieved. These two diagrams stand in the lesson without a discussion 
of the messages they convey.
The lesson also includes six text-boxes that are distinguished from the rest of the 
text by having a different colour in the background. Five of these text-boxes, 
coloured blue, contain the word ‘think!’ (fakker!), followed by one or two 
questions/problems. The sixth text-box, coloured pink, contains the word ‘activity’ 
and asks students to write a report about “the values of tolerance that are 
encompassed in Amman Message"37. Two of the seven questions inside the blue 
text-boxes ask students ‘to mention more examples of, which could be argued not
36 In complex sentences, a subordinate clause follows and gives reason or purpose for a main 
clause, while in compound sentences each clause declares some sort of information that, while still 
serving the general theme of the whole sentence, could be regarded as independent of other 
clauses in that sentence.
37 Amman message was introduced in Level A of the analysis, and a copy of the message is found 
in Appendix Two.
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to invoke critical thinking. The other five questions are open-ended ones; they 
ask students: ‘to explain’, ‘what do you think of?’, and ‘what is the role of?’. 
Students might find answers (or hints for answers) within the lesson, as in the 
case of the question in the second text-box for which a brief answer is provided in 
the fourth paragraph of section one. However, the open-ended nature of these 
questions demands more than just searching for an answer in the textbook. Ira 
order to address these questions, students should be able to present arguments 
(and possibly counterarguments) in support of their answers. Given the 
declarative nature of the lesson and in the absence of examples of complex 
sentences, as will be made clearer in the clause combinations analysis that willl 
follow, students might not be able to properly address these questions.
Moving on to the second linguistic feature of the lesson, clause combinations, the 
following analysis aims to provide a closer look at how clauses are combined 
together in such a way that could contribute to the assertive non-dialogical nature 
of the language of the lesson. The fourth paragraph of the lesson (section one) 
can be used as a representation of this linguistic property. This paragraph states 
that
The practising of tolerance does not come into conflict with human
rights/ and it does not mean accepting social injustices/ or abandoning
one's rights and beliefs/or failing to take them seriously.
(MoE 2005b p71)
The paragraph above is a compound one that could be divided into four separate 
clauses or assertions (the slant marks are introduced to show where the 
paragraph could be divided). Each of these clauses informs students, in an 
assertive manner, about a certain feature of tolerance, and therefore, suggests 
that students are to take what is written for granted without further investigation. 
The declarative approach of this paragraph is evident in the absence of a warrant 
or evidence that may be used to allow the student to move from a premise to a 
conclusion in order to confirm the validity of these clauses in a rational and 
convincing manner. The absence of the ‘i f ... then’ structure or ‘premise- 
conclusion’ movement within the paragraph allows the four clauses to be rewritten 
in any order without changing the meaning of the paragraph.
Also in the absence of premise-conclusion movement, the paragraph under study 
could be understood in more than one way. One way of reading it could be along 
these lines: ‘there is no contradiction in holding one’s beliefs and being equally
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tolerant of the existence of other beliefs’, which could be interpreted as a way to 
assure and encourage believers to uphold the value of tolerance. One could also 
read it as a warning (or maybe as a threat): ‘be warned not to abandon your 
beliefs if you are going to uphold the value of tolerance’. And a third way could be: 
‘being tolerant does not mean tolerating all positions such as injustices and 
violations of human rights’. The way to read this sentence could be along any of 
the three readings above, or it may be left open on purpose to address different 
people who view tolerance differently.
Another example of how clause combinations could add to the declarative non- 
dialogical language of the lesson is the first paragraph of section four: ‘the 
Importance of Tolerance’. This paragraph (quoted below) is made up of four 
clauses that could be rewritten as four bullet points without disrupting the meaning 
and without the need for making any alterations to any of these clauses (the slant 
marks are introduced to show where the paragraph could be divided):
Tolerance is a key for solving disagreements, / 1 and a necessary 
condition for peace and social progress,/2 and through tolerance we 
can overpower bigotry, discrimination and hatred./3 And the following 
represents the most prominent positive effects that could be achieved 
through tolerance: . . . /  4 (MoE 2005bp72)
The first three clauses try to assert, in general terms, why tolerance is such an 
important value. These assertions are once again stated in a declarative manner. 
It may be argued, however, that the fourth clause and the seven numbered points 
that follow it38 are an attempt to justify, in a listing syntax, the assertions made in 
the first three clauses that precede it. While this may (or may not) be the intention, 
the way the four clauses in this paragraph are combined together does not back­
up this interpretation. There are ‘commas’ between the first three clauses and a 
‘period’ at the end of the third one. The fourth clause also starts with an ‘And’ in 
the same way as the two clauses that precede it, which makes the quoted 
paragraph (as in the previous quotation) an example of another compound 
sentence that lacks the necessary requisites of an argument.
In addition to the declarative compound statements that dominate the lesson, the 
lesson contains two paragraphs that may be regarded as complex. The 
arguments presented in these complex paragraphs, however, are implicit rather
38 The seven numbered points do not appear in the quotation above, but may be found in the 
translation of the lesson in Appendix Five.
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than explicit. These paragraphs are the two paragraphs of section two39. The 
first paragraph reads:
The human community (mujtama’ insani) incorporates a great deai of 
variance and unity at the same tim e./1 Variance is manifested in the 
big number of races, ethnicities, religions and nationalities that hold 
values and beliefs that lead to different civilizations (thaqafat),/2 and 
unity is manifested in the sharing of all members of these groups their 
seeking to live in dignity, peace and to achieve their ambitions and 
interests/3 and based on this, what brings people together is more than 
what divides them,/4 but, why the violence, struggle, ill-will and hatred 
that the world witnesses today?/5 (MoE 2005b p71)
The quoted paragraph above lacks the presence of obvious connecting words 
such as ‘therefore’, ‘nevertheless’, ‘if...then’, which could be used to make an 
argument explicit. The clauses are, as in any simple compound statement, 
connected via the connecting word ‘and’. However, it could be argued that the first 
three clauses are presented as a premise for a conclusion that comes in the fourth 
clause. The reason for making this assumption could be justified by the presence 
of the "... and based on this.. sentence at the start of clause four that could be 
seen as an implicit way for moving from a premise to a conclusion. Not being 
able, however, to clearly identify whether this sentence is intended to be an 
argument or not is mainly due to the fact that the premise does not exactly lead to 
the stated conclusion. The weak link between the conclusion and the premise that 
precedes it could be argued to justify the absence of explicit connecting words that 
may be used to direct the flow of a good argument. A paragraph like this one is 
closer to presenting knowledge through assertions than reasoning, and students 
are expected to accept its assertions without further investigation.
The argument in the second paragraph of section two is clearer:
“In the current age, the association between societies and the 
intertwining of interests between these societies, which resulted from 
the communication, information and transportation revolution, makes 
tolerance, coexistence, communication and open dialogue necessities 
that are crucial for achieving the interests of all societies.” (MoE 2005(b) 
p71)
Students are given reasons in support of the claim that tolerance and open 
dialogue are necessities in the modern world, for example to allow for mutual 
economic benefit. Here tolerance is justified in a pragmatic manner that 
addresses all students regardless of religious belonging.
39 The two paragraphs can be found in the translation of the lesson in Appendix Five.
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Going back to the quotation before last (first paragraph of section two), the fifth 
interrogative clause that comes at the end of the quoted paragraph allows shifting 
the discussion from clause combinations to the clauses themselves that make up 
the paragraphs. As has already been argued, most of the clauses in the lesson 
are in the declarative mood in the sense that they make assertions rather than 
engage students in a dialogue. The fifth interrogative clause, however, is the only 
clause that comes within the lesson’s main body and takes a different form. The 
interrogative mood of the clause under study could be seen as an invitation to 
students to join the dialogue. While this may be the case, given the declarative 
nature of the lesson, it could also be argued that this clause is rhetorical and does 
not actually demand an answer from students.
Another linguistic feature of clauses is modality. In the lesson under study, none 
of the clauses use modalizing expressions such as ‘we believe’, ‘in our opinion’ or 
‘it could be argued’, that have the effect of showing the reader that there are other 
points of view ‘but this is how we think it is’. Contrary to that, the language used 
claims a universal status, a totalizing story, where issues of right and wrong are 
judged based on this story. In this particular lesson, ‘coexistence’ and ‘tolerance’ 
are presented as unproblematic where controversial and shady issues are 
avoided.
Moving from clauses to the ‘word’ level, part of the non-dialogical language of the 
text could be realized in the vocabulary it uses. The textbook presents 
“forgiveness, pardoning, charity, replacing bad deeds with good deeds and 
shunning the ignorant” (MoE 2005b p72) as different meanings for the value of 
tolerance that are found in the Qur’an. While these values have some 
commonalities, they may also come into conflict with each other, something the 
text does not acknowledge. There is an underlying assumption that upholding the 
value of tolerance is the key to solving, at the very least, all problems mentioned 
under the section The Importance of Tolerance’ on page 72 in the textbook, 
without any mention that the value of tolerance could sometimes be difficult to 
uphold. Difficult issues, like for instance ‘honour killings’ are avoided altogether, 
let alone taboos like apostasy and same sex relations that students learn about 
mainly through the Internet and some satellite TV channels. As discussed in 
section 3.3.2, the value of tolerance is presented in a rather simplistic manner that 
lacks the necessary complexity needed to help students develop their critical 
thinking.
In almost every society, there are certain behaviours, attitudes and values that 
are more difficult to tolerate than others. Tolerating such values that the society 
regards as foreign may not lead to social progress, according to a given set of 
criteria, but rather may initiate resistance that may lead to social struggle.
An example of such resistance could be illustrated in the debate within the 
Jordanian parliament and society at large concerning crimes of honour. According 
to a BBC report (broadcast in January 2002), 24 women are reportedly killed in 
Jordan each year in honour killings (Hawley 2002). In 2004, Amnesty International 
reported that at least 15 women are victims of honour killings every year (Amnesty 
International 2004). Warrick (2005) writes that reliable statistics concerning the 
right number of honour killings are hard to find as some of these crimes are either 
unreported or reported as accidents or suicides. Murders of this kind are 
conducted in the name of cleansing the ‘family’ honour from the shame brought 
about to the family by an unlawful act of one of its female members (Feldner 2000, 
Warrick 2005). Crimes of honour, as Feldner writes, could be argued to be 
supported by the Jordanian criminal law itself. Article 340 of the criminal law 
states that
“(a) He who discovers his wife, or one of his maharim (female relatives 
of such a degree of consanguinity as precludes marriage), while 
committing adultery with another man and kills, wounds, or injures one 
or both of them, is exempt from any penalty; (b) He who discovers his 
wife, or one of his sisters or female relatives, with another in an 
illegitimate bed, and kills, wounds, or injures (one or both of them) 
benefits from a reduction of penalty” (Feldner 2000).
In addition to this ‘crimes of honour1 specific Article, there is Article 98 which has a 
more general nature and is also referred to in cases of a male killing a female 
relative, even if the murdered female is not one of the murderer’s maharim. Article 
98 states that
“He who commits a crime due to extreme anger caused by an illegal, 
and to some extent dangerous act, committed by the victim benefits 
from reduced penalty” (Feldner 2000).
These two articles ensure the perpetrator a light sentence, which, according to 
Feldner (2002), ranges from three to twenty-four months in prison. Such light 
sentences encourage some to believe that these crimes are socially acceptable.
In response to pressures exerted by Jordanian human rights activists, the
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Parliament went into session twice (the latest was in September 2003) with one 
of its agenda items being to amend Article 340. In both cases, these amendments 
were rejected by the House of Representatives.
The issue of honour killings, while it is not addressed in the textbook, is an 
example of how individual freedoms form a site of struggle between certain 
traditional understandings of certain values, such as family honour and pride, and 
liberal democratic citizenship values in which all citizens, men and women, are 
equal before the law.
Nevertheless, the textbook does address the important issue of women’s rights. In 
a lesson entitled The basic rights of woman and child’, reference is made to some 
of the main items of 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women (six basic rights 
presented as an illustrative diagram without making reference to them within the 
text) and some of the basic rights granted to women under the Jordanian 
constitution. The lesson also emphasizes that the Jordanian constitution does not 
differentiate between men and women in relation to their rights and duties (MoE 
2005b p49).
However, in the section on the rights of the child in the same lesson, the textbook 
writes:
... and let us recall what Omar Ibn al-Khattab, God bless his soul, said 
“the right of a boy on his father is to choose his mother, give him a good 
name and to teach him the Qur’an”. / 1 Also to recall how Islam 
prohibited the burying alive of girls that was practised by some Arab 
tribes before Islam /2 (MoE 2005b p 50).
While these two statements in this quotation may be referred to as a sign of the 
progressive nature of Islam within a Seventh Century context, they are not the 
best choice of statements for supporting the rights of women and children in the 
Twenty-First Century, mainly because of the way they portray the two sexes.
While the first statement may be regarded in a positive light as an emphasis on the 
important role women play, though not alone, in bringing up ‘boys’, it could also be 
understood as presenting, maintaining and legitimizing the authority which the 
dominant view of social life tries to invest in its male members. This quotation 
could be viewed to present women as if they have no choice or will, but rather they 
are chosen by men, who are socially superior to them, in order to carry out a 
certain mission assigned to them by these men. Girls are also brought to the
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picture in rather a dim context: prohibiting their burial alive when they’re young.
In conclusion, this section argues that the mainly compound sentences that make 
up the lesson are part of its declarative non-dialogical syntax that is tailored toward 
emphasising the authority of religion, tradition and the state rather than helping 
students develop a capacity for critical thinking. By doing so, the lesson creates a 
non-dialogical divide in which students could be regarded as subordinates to the 
authority represented by the author of the text, who, in turn, claims to have access 
to knowledge and has a duty to transmit this knowledge.
The lessons in this textbook would benefit from striking a better balance between 
making assertions and asking questions that aim to engage learners in a dialogue. 
These questions could take a more general form, such as; ‘does commitment to 
tolerance weaken one’s own religious commitments?’ and ‘to what extent can one 
be tolerant (where to draw the line)?’, as well as more culturally specific questions, 
including, but not limited to, the problem of honour killing, tensions that may arise 
as a result of normalizing relations with the state of Israel40 and whether 
justifications for constitutional essentials that are based on Shari’a law could 
address the needs of pluralist democratic societies. Answers for these questions, 
and others, must not be presented as warranted assertions, but rather reached by 
students through helping them to develop a capacity for recognising, and making, 
good arguments based on the values of public reason.
A Rawlsian conception of public reason, Nagel (2003) writes, is not guaranteed to 
produce agreement and may not at the end develop into a consensus. What it 
guarantees is disagreement, arguments and counterarguments in which the 
different parties rely on the use of methods of evaluation and evidence that are 
recognised and mutually accepted by, at least, the reasonable amongst them. As 
Nagel writes, even if an argument that is presented by an opponent is not 
convincing to ‘us’, we accept his/her argument on the basis of its appeal to reason 
to convince us, which is something an argument that appeals to faith fails to do.
For this reason, students would benefit from seeing examples of complex 
sentences where arguments and counterarguments are presented objectively and 
different pieces of evidence are used to support different points of view in a 
debating manner. Given the variety of ways of life, a student should not feel
40 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1994 that resulted in normalising the relations 
between the two countries.
98
threatened, or even ridiculed, if he/she upholds a different point of view from the 
dominant one.
3.4 Chapter’s conclusion
Rapid social change emerges as one of the features that characterise modern 
societies. What is less obvious, though, according to Fairclough (1992a p3), is the 
important role that language plays within the changes that are taking place in 
society.
The three-level analysis of the JCE programme concludes that citizenship 
education discourse in Jordan, while it aims to help students develop liberal 
democratic citizenship values, contributes to the ‘individual freedoms’ problem in 
two main ways.
Firstly, the citizenship education discourse is narrated by one voice that mainly 
resorts to traditional sources of authority (tradition, religion and the state) in order 
to justify knowledge claims. It emphasises one form of social life that presents 
democratic citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious 
values without paying due attention to conflicts that may arise as a result of 
marrying these values. The analysis suggests that the grade ten National and 
Civic education textbook does not make enough effort to address non-Muslim 
students and even non-committed Muslim students, who may feel alienated by the 
textbook they study. While this approach to citizenship education may succeed in 
helping devout Muslim students to tolerate other ways of life, it undermines the 
demands of freedom and equality as characteristics of constitutional democracies.
The second limitation could be exemplified in the largely declarative non-dialogical 
form of language that the textbook uses, which does not encourage the learner to 
take an active role in his/her learning. The assertiveness of the language of the 
textbook, coupled with constant reference to traditional sources of authority in 
order to justify truth claims, has the effect of placing learners at the receiving end, 
where their main role becomes to internalize the information transmitted to them. 
This approach, contrary to the objectives of the programme, seems destined to be 
unsuccessful in promoting critical thinking and reasoning as one of the demands of 
democratic citizenship. By not presenting students with enough examples of 
reasoned arguments and counterarguments, the programme is not geared
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towards helping students develop a capacity for taking part in public 
deliberations, which is another demand of democratic citizenship.
In general, the JCE programme is more tailored towards enforcing in the minds of 
youngsters a hierarchical order for the society that is underpinned by the authority 
of religion, tradition and the state. A lesson that is designed to contain more 
arguments, while it could be more successful in engaging learners in a dialogue 
that would help them develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking, would 
also place the textbook at the risk of opening itself up to counter-arguments. This 
may challenge the hierarchical structure of the society.
Given this summary, from a Rawlsian point of view, the image of the social world 
that the JCE programme presents, while it could be described as decent (in the 
sense that human rights are protected and external and internal conflicts are 
prevented), is illiberal (Rawls 1993b). In light of this, although these textbooks are 
devised, in part, to help students develop democratic citizenship values and 
attitudes; it may be argued that they are part of the problem rather than being part 
of its solution.
This chapter presented the JCE programme as example of a citizenship model 
that, while it still enforces traditional sources of authority as means for enhancing 
political stability and social cohesion, also aims to help individuals develop 
democratic citizenship values. The traditional outlook of the programme creates a 
certain image of the social world that, while it calls for tolerating diversity present 
within society and elsewhere, fails to take this diversity on-board. It presents a 
one-size-fits-all general way of life (the image of a tolerant open minded Muslim 
Jordanian) that fails, in many ways, to meet the demands of democratic citizenship 
education. Given the fact that modern democratic societies are pluralist societies, 
in which all citizens share equally with others in the exercise of political power 
(Rawls 1999), a democratic state (or one that aspires to consolidate democratic 
ideals) should not use its power (through education or other means) to undermine 
the political equality principle, which is one of the main pillars of any liberal 
understanding of democracy. Based on this, the following chapter introduces an 
understanding of citizenship education that is grounded in Rawls’ PL, which it 
argues to be better suited to address the demands (from a liberal democratic 
theory point of view) of traditional orientations of Arab societies, the demands of 




4.1 The case for a broader understanding of citizenship education in 
traditional Arab states
The analysis of the Jordanian citizenship education (JCE) textbook concludes that 
a reconciliatory solution to citizenship education that presents liberal democratic 
citizenship values as a subset of traditional cultural and religious values, while it 
has some virtue in drawing a decent well-ordered society, in Rawlsian terms, it is 
not successful in helping students develop an appreciation for diversity and 
rational autonomy viewed as two necessary values for democratic citizenship 
education in democratic societies. The traditional outlook of the JCE programme 
highlights the need for a broader understanding of citizenship education.
Section 2.3 introduced two opposite understandings of citizenship education that 
draw from the liberal tradition, one valorising rational autonomy (Gutmann 1995, 
2007, Levinson 1999) and the other toleration of traditional and cultural diversity 
(Galston 1995).
Considering these two positions in relation to the requirements of a citizenship 
education in Arab countries, it could be argued that a form of citizenship education 
that valorizes rational autonomy, as a way for general good life, faces moral as 
well as practical objections. Arkoun (1998) argues that there are no moral 
grounds for asking people to replace their culturally inherited way of life with 
another. Forcing a rational autonomy-dedicated way of life on all members of 
society, through formal schooling, could be argued to be similar to forcing an 
illiberal form of education; they both demand the application of coercive state 
power to be implemented, which a liberal democratic state should refrain from 
using.
Furthermore, a rational autonomy-dedicated approach to citizenship education 
could be argued to undermine traditional religious and cultural ways of life and 
provides reasons for younger generations to look down on their parents’ ways of 
life. This could lead to confusion in the minds of children who are forced to live 
two lives, one at school and another at home, and could also lead to alienating 
these youngsters within their own societies. An autonomy dedicated approach to
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citizenship education is also capable of widening the gap between those who 
champion tradition and those who are pro-autonomy. The problem becomes 
worse if these two groups focus on their differences rather than what they have in 
common. This would make it even harder for these two groups, particularly in 
young democracies where democratic ideals are not yet consolidated, to meet half 
way. In such an atmosphere, reaching a consensus on the objectives of 
citizenship education itself becomes problematic. The clash between traditional 
values and liberal democratic values could also lead to a confused hybrid 
generation in which youngsters and adult citizens are sometimes attracted to one 
system of values and in other times to another41.
Concerning the view that valorises traditional and cultural diversity, it could be 
argued that such an understanding of democratic citizenship education, in which 
students receive rhetorical knowledge about other ways of life without encouraging 
them to reflect critically on these ways, while it may help students to recognize the 
presence of other ways of life, does not necessarily help them develop a 
compassionate understanding of these ways. Mere tolerance, as discussed 
earlier in section 2.3, does not necessarily solve problems of discrimination within 
society. Furthermore, an uncritical approach to accepting diversity does not 
necessarily help students recognize reasonable from unreasonable ways of life42. 
Moreover, by putting a hold on students’ critical thinking skills, this approach could 
be argued to disadvantage students’ development as rational and critical thinkers.
The three paragraphs above suggest that neither of these two views can properly 
address challenges that face citizenship education in democratizing Arab 
countries. What is needed, this study argues, is a broader understanding of 
citizenship education that brings together the demands of tolerating diversity, 
traditional and liberal, individual and group, and the demands of rational 
autonomy.
Globalization theory suggests that global interdependence, even if it is based on a 
mere economic basis, urges educational policy makers, in Arab countries and 
elsewhere, to consider global diversity. There is growing recognition, as Osier
41 Such examples are already found in Jordanian society: a father allowing his son certain 
freedoms but denying the right of his daughter to the same freedoms, or a husband who ‘allows’ his 
wife to have a nine to five job, yet still considers the household in terms of cleanliness, cooking, 
tidiness and looking after children, to be wholly his wife’s responsibility (Jordan Human 
Development Report 2004, p113).
42 ‘Reasonability’ here is taken as Rawls defines it, which is introduced in section 2.5.
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(2005) writes, that national educational programmes which are designed to 
merely focus on nation building in its narrow sense, i.e. without paying due 
attention to the larger world in which nations exist and interact, lack necessary 
features that would provide students with necessary values, attitudes, skills and 
knowledge that could help them to develop a cosmopolitan understanding of 
citizenship. Theoreticians, such as David Held, have even gone on to suggest that 
cosmopolitan democratic models, in which international institutions and a universal 
code of human rights, should become part of states’ constitutions (Held 2006).
In relation to traditionally oriented understandings of citizenship, accommodating 
traditional ways of life does not provide grounds for suppressing individual 
freedoms and alternative conceptions of the good. As far as Islam is concerned, it 
could be argued that given its different understandings, no one is given *adequate 
ground for practicing authoritarianism through censorship or political restriction, 
since the legitimacy of adhering today to the views enunciated in the... [past]... 
has to be decided by those who live today” (Sen 1999b p32). Democratic 
citizenship education in Arab countries needs to find means to bring youngsters to 
come to appreciate that unity can be found in diversity rather than trying to impose 
unrealistic conformity in order to enhance unity. Helping students to appreciate 
plurality that exists within their own societies would aid them to relinquish feelings 
of being trapped in small, young and culturally poor nation states that have little to 
offer to the rest of the world.
In line with the above paragraph, globalization has given stronger reason for 
radical Islamists to fill the vacuum created by the weakening role of the family and 
the school as traditional sources of authority. These groups, as Sen (2006) writes, 
rely on “cultivating and exploiting a militant Islamic identity specifically aimed 
against Western people” (p30). Campaigning under the banner of Islam, and in 
increasingly involving themselves in welfare and charity activities, some of these 
groups have managed to brainwash some of the younger individuals who are 
either economically in need and/or, in an age of uncertainty, seek comfort in 
identifying with a group that provides them with direct answers and reminds them 
of a perceived faultless past, while at the same time promises them of future 
rewards whether on earth or even in heaven (Abu Khalil 1993).
The progress of societies towards increasing plurality (section 2.4.1), choice and 
the development of a new form of individuality (section 2.4.2), poses a challenge
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for the traditional view of education as a production process that the AHDR  
(2003) (section 1.6) describes national educational programmes in Arab countries 
to still hold. While such developments add to existing diversity that is present 
within every society, school, and even within every household, they also place 
increasing emphasis on the active role of the individual, who, from an early stage 
of life, is increasingly gaining more control over his/her own life, from types of food 
he/she chooses, to fashion, to satellite television channel, to subjects studied at 
school, sexuality preferences, political orientations, religious affiliations, etc. They 
also highlight the need for democratic understanding of citizenship education that 
helps students develop a capacity for making better informed and rational 
decisions that are based on evidence, reason and common sense knowledge.
However, in pluralist democratic systems, building relationships between society 
members that are based on mutual respect demands more than just rationality. 
Rationality involves assessing a particular situation from one’s own perspective, 
which may or may not be a selfish one. Rawls argues for advancing the ideal of 
reasonability. When it comes to suggesting terms of cooperation between society 
members, Rawls’ reasonability suggests putting oneself in the shoes of others and 
being able to suggest fair terms of cooperation that could be acceptable to others 
on the basis that all are free and equal.
In reference to the traditional stance that national educational programmes in Arab 
countries tend to emphasise, when education is offered in a form that mainly asks 
students to reproduce the facts that it provides them with or as a set of directives 
that students are asked to follow, learners become gradually convinced that the 
world should go along one route and deviations from this prescribed route are 
perceived as wrong. Learners are not provided with enough reasons to develop 
their ability to infer, question and explore. Equally important, this approach does 
not help students realize that there are other reasonable ways of life. The 
development of children as open-minded tolerant creative adults is harmed by a 
form of education that does not give them enough opportunities to use their own 
knowledge, skills and imagination to go beyond prescribed educational activities.
The above suggests that while democratic citizenship education in traditional Arab 
societies has an obligation to pay due attention to traditional religious and cultural 
ways of life, it also must pay due attention to the fact that democratic citizenship 
demands rationality, open-mindedness, accommodating change and accepting
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reasonable diversity as a fact of life in modern democratic societies. What is 
needed is a broader understanding of citizenship education that makes such 
values accessible to all students. ‘Accessible’ here means to make them available 
as ‘public goods’ (a term used by Rawls). To be viewed as a public good in 
Rawlsian terms means that while the state should make provision for these values 
through state education for all students (hence satisfying the equality condition of 
a Rawlsian based democratic system), it is up to students whether to make use of 
these capacities or not (hence satisfying the freedom condition of a Rawlsian 
based democratic system).
The following section argues that an understanding of citizenship that is grounded 
in Rawls’ political liberalism is better tailored to meet this understanding of 
citizenship education.
4.2 Why a liberal model? The case for Rawls’ political liberalism
One could argue that despite differences between Rawls’ political liberalism (PL) 
and other models that emerge from the liberal tradition, it is at the end a liberal 
representation of social life which clashes with some hierarchical representations 
found in Arab societies. Rawls (2001) himself identifies this incompatibility. In this 
regard he writes:
“Suppose that a particular religion, and the conception of the good 
belonging to it, can survive oniy if it controls the machinery of the state 
and is able to practice effective intolerance. This religion will cease to 
exist in the well ordered society of political liberalism” (p154).
While this may be true, it is also true that democratic systems of government are 
already in place in many Arab states and several steps were made in the direction 
of providing citizens with more basic liberties. Some Arab countries, including 
Jordan, present themselves as constitutional democracies (MoE 2005a). As for 
citizens of Arab states, several studies and public polls show that the majority of 
them, in different parts of the Arab world, are in favour of more transparent 
democratic systems of government. Tessler (2003), for instance, shows that 
among 2765 Egyptian interviewees, the majority favours democratic forms of 
governance over other forms. Equally important, Tessler’s study shows that being 
more religious or less religious has no effect on attitudes of interviewees toward 
democratic governance.
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In a background study conducted for the Arab Human Development Report 
(AHDR 2003), respondents from four Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco) were compared as a unit to eight other country groupings43.
Respondents from the four Arab countries grouping came at the top of the list 
favouring democracy as the best form of government and rejecting the notion of a 
*strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (AHDR  
2003 p19). They also came third in rejecting the statement “a university education 
is more important for a boy than for a girl" (p52). However, they came at the end 
of the list concerning gender equality in employment (if jobs are scarce, men are to 
take priority over women).
Concerning the question of how much control Islamic Shari’a law should have in 
Arab societies, Khuri (2005) argues that there are different views within and 
between Arab societies. He bases his argument on a public opinion poll 
conducted in 2004 (by the aforementioned, the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development at the University of Maryland and Zogby International). In the 
survey, respondents, from six Arab countries, were asked to choose between two 
statements, statement A: “Religion must be respected, but clergy should not 
dictate the political system” or statement B: “Clergy must play a greater role in our 
political system”. Responses show a split within each country and differences 
between different countries. In three of the six countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates) respondents favoured statement B over statement A 
(with 42%, 48% and 45 % respectively choosing statement B, as opposed to 36%, 
33% and 25% favouring statement A). The remaining respondents in each of 
these countries were either unsure or were in favour of other systems. 
Respondents in another two countries (Morocco and Lebanon) favoured statement 
A over B (51% and 50% respectively as opposed to 33% and 28%), while in Egypt 
responses were almost equally split (A: 50% and B: 47%) (Zogby 2004).
The results of the survey above indicate that there is no one view concerning the 
role Shari’a law should have in regulating societies. The high percentage of 
individuals, in the different Arab countries, who chose statement B, was 
counterbalanced by a high percentage of those who chose statement A.
43 The eight country groupings are: East Asia; Eastern Europe; Latin America; (non Arab) Islamic 
countries; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and Western 
Europe
The above paragraphs suggest that it is not unreasonable to make the 
assumption that there are citizens who want their governments to protect their 
rights and to provide them with basic negative liberties. In the case of Jordan, 
while the analysis of the citizenship education textbook shows that traditional 
sources of authority are important constituents of social life, there are also parallel 
demands by citizens for a liberal form of democracy that are recognised by the 
JCE programme. However, as the analysis of the JCE programme concludes, 
reconciliation attempts between liberal democratic citizenship values and 
traditional sources of authority give more weight to the latter. The hierarchical 
approach to citizenship education that the textbook utilizes, while it encourages 
students to tolerate different forms of social life, ties good citizenship with a belief 
in God. This condition undermines reasonable (in Rawlsian terms) ways of life 
that uphold different conceptions of the good. Furthermore, this approach to 
citizenship education places students within a certain cultural and religious 
category and does not allow them to think that they themselves could be different. 
While cultural and religious values could be welcoming to diversity, citizenship 
education that seeks the title ‘democratic’, in Rawlsian terms, should not advance 
one set of religious beliefs over other conceptions of the good, as this by its very 
nature is an act of discrimination against other reasonable ways of life.
According to Rawls (1993a), recognizing ‘reasonable pluralism’ is one of the 
characteristics of the political culture of democratic societies. Enforcing a shared 
comprehensive doctrine on all citizens can only be done through the use of 
oppressive state power. In constitutional democracies, public power, while it is 
always coercive, is power shared by all free and equal citizens. On Rawls’ 
account, to use public power to enforce one form of social life over others, whether 
by imposing sanctions on those who are ‘different’ from the majority of citizens or 
by using public venues, including education, undermines both liberty and equality 
of citizens and violates the basis of justice within society.
Whether it is in Jordan or another Arab country, while it is not easy for the 
citizenship education discourse to escape prejudices enforced by dominant 
hierarchical representations of social life, historical wisdom suggests that it can be 
done. The Catholic Church in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe was very 
domineering and in order to maintain the Catholic faith, strict measures were taken 
to suppress heresy. However, the Wars of Religion in Europe urged both 
Catholics and Protestants to reach a conclusion that, while no one system of
beliefs can speak for the other, shared religious faith alone cannot form basis 
for a stable society (Kymlicka 2002). Upon this, religious toleration, in Europe, 
took a specific form that built on individual freedom of conscience, which is 
something, Kymlicka writes, that was not tolerated before. The point that this 
analogy makes is that societies are not necessarily static, and radical solutions are 
possible.
Given this brief account, and in the absence of an adequately developed modern 
Arab or Islamic theory of education in which democratic citizenship education in 
democratizing Arab countries could be grounded, Rawls’ PL, despite its loyalty 
being to liberal theory, could be argued to be an appropriate approach (i.e. 
involves lesser trades-off) for reconciling conflicting democratic citizenship values 
with dominant traditional representations of social life.
The following section moves on to address the question of how Rawls’ PL could 
be realized at the larger societal level and how it could be translated into 
citizenship educational policy recommendations.
4.3 Translating Rawls’ political liberalism into citizenship education 
policies
Educating youngsters about the benefits of shared political values and helping 
them develop an appreciation for the variety of doctrines (present locally and 
globally) is very much linked with where adults in a society stand with regard to 
this issue. Formal education, and in particular citizenship education, is one venue 
for reaching youngsters, but in order to translate Rawls’ PL into citizenship 
educational policies, adults who are in charge of decision making, and who are 
legally responsible for youngsters, also need to come to realize these benefits.
By focusing on shared political values, a Rawlsian based citizenship education 
programme would help different peoples to come to realize that despite their 
differences, they have much in common. The aim of Rawls’ PL is not to enforce 
unrealistic forms of conformity, but to build bridges of communication, trust and 
mutual respect.
Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness builds on “the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the other” (Rawls 1993a
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p15). For this organizing idea to be realized, Rawls assumes the following two 
assumptions: first, citizens who are engaged in fair cooperation are both free and 
equal (in Rawlsian terms as introduced in section 2.5), and second, democratic 
societies are ‘well ordered’, meaning, they are regulated by a political conception 
of justice (in contrast to a comprehensive one), where political values take priority 
over all other private values that may come in conflict with them. This condition 
that regulates well-ordered liberal societies is different from the conditions that 
regulate well-ordered hierarchical societies introduced earlier in section 1.4.
As already introduced in section 2.5, the plurality of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines that modern democratic societies are bound to accommodate makes it 
unreasonable for a constitutional democracy to refer to one single doctrine to 
address fundamental questions of justice, or as Rawls (1993a p135) writes, “no 
comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional 
r e g im e Establishing this fact is central to the success of a Rawlsian-based 
citizenship education programme. Its importance lies in its ability to help students 
develop an appreciation for the value of reaching a consensus on fundamental 
political values (a Rawlsian conception of justice) that regulate society on a basis 
that could be shared by people belonging to different reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and along Rawls’ organizing idea of democratic society as a system of 
fair cooperation between equal and free citizens.
Rawls distinguishes between three levels for accepting a political conception of 
justice: modus vivendi, constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus.
At the modus vivendi44 level, two rival groups sign a treaty that aims to put an end 
to the sufferings of members of both groups. Signing a treaty of this kind does not 
mean in any way that the two groups will come to respect each other. They, for 
different reasons, respect the treaty itself, and, maybe, the values that underpin it, 
but not more than that. Should conditions change and one group, for any reason 
becomes more domineering within the society than the other, the treaty might be 
violated for the benefit of the domineering group. Under such conditions,
44 To clarify what Rawls means by ‘modus vivendi’, suppose two rival social, religious or political 
groups, or even nation states, where realizing the interests of one would inevitably come in conflict 
with the interests of the other and vice versa. The conflict is so powerful that events may develop 
in ways that could lead to social struggle and confrontation between these groups, which results in 
even worse conditions for members of both groups. The deteriorating situation forces the two 
groups, each for its own benefits, to sign a treaty that puts an end to the deteriorating situation and 
preserves at least some of the interests of both groups (Rawls 1993a).
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accepting the treaty and the political conception of justice that underpins it is 
according to Rawls (1993a) a modus vivendi.
A ‘modus vivendi’ treaty could develop into a constitutional consensus when 
political values that underpin the treaty become part of the state’s constitution. 
Adopting these political values into the state’s constitution enforces certain rights 
and liberties and creates a democratic culture that regulates relations between 
rival groups. Violating these values though becomes a punishable offence and to 
that effect these values are considered ‘liberal’. As a result, these liberal political 
democratic values which were unwillingly accepted at first become part of the daily 
political interactions between citizens who over time come to recognise diversity, 
not necessarily with enthusiasm, but as a fact of daily living (Rawls 1993a, 2001).
Furthermore, successful political and social cooperation, when maintained, 
provides reason for citizens to trust each other more and to have more confidence 
in the process itself that led to this sort of trust. Citizens, Rawls (1993a) argues, 
who live in a society whose basic institutions are just would become more 
committed to the cause of justice, and overtime, become more committed to 
applying and defending principles of justice that rule their social cooperation, 
which in turn leads to more cooperation and stability. When this happens, the 
political conception of justice that regulates citizens’ social cooperation becomes 
more of a moral object rather than as a mere set of rules and regulations.
Citizens, as a result, become more prepared to support an overlapping consensus 
that would serve as basis for public reason based on the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation (Rawls 1993a).
When different people reach an overlapping consensus, it means that they come 
to agree to be regulated by a political conception of justice (on the basis of the 
idea of society as a fair system of cooperation), which satisfies the Rawlsian 
condition of democratic societies being well-ordered. Such a consensus is likely to 
gain more and more acceptance among citizens and to last (and expand) over 
time, hence, satisfying the stability condition (overtime and from one generation to 
another) in Rawls’ organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation.
Such an overlapping consensus is hard to achieve if members of a society do not 
recognize reasonable diversity. An appreciation for a consensus on fundamental 
political values is therefore a core objective that a Rawlsian based citizenship
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education programme should aim to achieve. Given the centrality of this 
objective, this study identifies three requisites that it argues to be necessary for 
helping students to come to achieve this objective.
Requisite One:
For youngsters, and indeed adult citizens, to come to appreciate Rawls’ 
conception of justice, they must come to terms with the fact of diversity itself. 
Recognizing the value of diversity is identified by this study as the first requisite 
that a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme should aim to help 
students to develop if they are to come to appreciate a Rawlsian political 
conception of justice. The type of diversity that is referred to is defined in terms of 
citizens as individuals as well as collective groups. All adult citizens are free and 
equal. They all have equal civic and political rights, and they are all entitled to 
practise their role as citizens who are responsible for maintaining fair and lasting 
societal cooperation.
Requisite Two:
Democracy, as Rawls (1993a) writes, involves “a political relationship between 
citizens” (p217). To construct a shared political conception of justice, Rawls’ PL 
consults different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Given the fact that 
different doctrines may cherish values that may be conflicting, to advance a value 
into the political domain, this value has to be presented in a way that reasonable 
people who uphold different conceptions of the good would find enough reason to 
“endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality” (Rawls 1993a p218).
This suggests that a Rawlsian conception of justice could be viewed as a political 
settlement that is constructed with the ‘Other’ always in mind. While reasonable 
persons show readiness to suggest principles of justice, they are also willing to live 
with the burdens of their judgments. This characteristic of Rawls’ PL highlights the 
need for helping students to develop a capacity for political bargaining. On this 
basis, a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme should be aiming to 
help students develop a capacity for collecting and weighing evidence, presenting 
oral and written arguments, inferring and at the same time, a capacity to listen to 
others, to be fair minded, and to accept common sense knowledge. These values, 
which will be referred to as the values of public reason, are identified as the 
second requisite for a Rawlsian based citizenship education programme.
Requisite Three:
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Rawls’ organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation assumes a sense 
of responsibility that reflects readiness among reasonable people
“to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation”
(Rawls 1993b p49, Rawls 2001) and willingness “to recognize the 
burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of 
public reason in directing the exercise of political power in a 
constitutional regime” (Rawls 1993a p54, Rawls 2001).
Helping students to develop a sense of responsibility in line with this definition is 
the third and last requisite that this study presents as necessary for helping 
students to develop an appreciation for a Rawlsian conception of justice.
Diagram 4.1 below depicts these three requisites as the corners of a triangle, with 
a Rawlsian conception of justice placed at the centre of the triangle. While the 
development of any of the three requisites informs the development of the shared 
political conception of justice, it also provides grounds for the development of the 
other two requisites. In a similar way, the development of the political conception 
of justice informs the development of the three requisites. This reciprocal 
relationship is represented in the diagram by the two-way arrows that connect the 
four components of the triangle.
Requisite one (R1)




Consensus that is 
based on shared 
political values
Requisite two (R2) Requisite three (R3)
The values of public reason Sense of responsibility
Diagram 4.1: A Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme model
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In translating this model into practical educational activities, it should be made 
clear that these three requisites are entangled together in various ways, which 
makes it difficult to claim that one activity serves one requisite and not the other 
two. Educational activities that a Rawlsian-based citizenship education 
programme includes are meant to serve one or more points of the triangle.
Translating the above model into practical educational activities could be (and 
should be) done in a variety of ways that all, as the two-way arrows in diagram 4.1 
suggests, contribute to helping students develop an appreciation for a Rawlsian 
conception of justice. The following are suggestions and guidelines for achieving 
this goal. These suggestions though are by no means intended to be an 
exhaustive list or a finished product. They are to be regarded as an attempt to 
develop general guidelines and pointers that could be used to devise a citizenship 
education programme suitable in the Jordanian context that builds on a Rawlsian 
conception of justice.
As a start, John Rawls’ veil of ignorance45 is a useful tool that could be translated 
into educational activities that help students to see the world through the eyes of 
others. In discussing certain issues, e.g. rights of women, children and minorities; 
honour crimes or school rules, students could be asked to act as amnesiac 
legislators. The aim is to help students develop sympathy for others which would 
lead to affirming a shared conception of justice.
In a similar way, a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme could 
incorporate activities such as debating and exchanging roles (examples of 
exchanging roles could be boys/girls, employer/employees) in which students 
come to appreciate difference between people in an active, rather than rhetorical 
manner. Many ‘us’ and ‘them’ issues could be dealt with in this way; mothers and 
fathers, girls and boys, teacher and students, manager and employees, majority
45 Briefly, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is a hypothetical exercise in which legislators, who are preferably 
knowledgeable in the different fields of knowledge and human experiences, are in a state of 
amnesia concerning who they are. Any of these legislators does not remember, and there is no 
way for him/her to remember, whether he/she is a male or female, adult or under age, law abiding 
or criminal, straight or gay, believe in a certain religion or atheist and the list goes on and on. In 
brief, as long as his/her work is to legislate for laws, he/she is behind a veil of ignorance. Once the 
veil is removed, only then legislators remember whom they are. To legislate from behind the veil, 
legislators have to consider every possibility that what they legislate for or against must be fair and 
just and must not disadvantage any society member or group. For that, if they agree on a law that 
disadvantages a group or a minority, when the veil is removed, any of the legislators might discover 
that him/herself belongs to any of these disadvantaged groups (Rawls 1973, 1993a, 2001).
and minorities just to mention a few.
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With regard to the above paragraph, Amartya Sen’s view of people having multiple 
identities, in contrast to seeing identity as one rigid cast, is a useful concept for 
helping students to develop an appreciation of others. Sen (2006) argues that 
while the focus on one identity “can enrich our bonds and make us do many things 
for each other and can help to take us beyond our self-centred lives” (Sen 2006 
p2), it could also exclude and even harm others. Citizenship education activities 
that provide students with reasons to see themselves in their normal lives as 
belonging to multiple groups would help them underplay the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
distinction. A Rawlsian-based citizenship education would benefit from including 
activities that are designed to help students realize that they identify with more 
than one group at the same time. A student could be born to a Muslim family; he 
is also Jordanian who lives in a rural area; his parents are farmers; he may be 
diabetic, may be an environmentalist, an advocate of human rights, a fan of 
Manchester United, a piano player, enjoys rap music, a collector of Naguib 
Mahfouz novels, and many other things all at the same time. The point here is 
that each of the different aspects of a student’s character could be seen to be 
located in different realms, and there is no one single identity that could 
encompass all the different aspects.
A programme that presents students with more open-ended activities where, while 
there are different possible answers, there is room within every answer for critical 
evaluation, is one way for helping them to develop such an appreciation for the 
fact that the body of knowledge is not static, but rather, it keeps evolving as more 
evidence becomes available and as circumstances change. Such an approach, 
while it provides reason for students to engage in their learning, helps them 
develop an appreciation for the fact that they themselves could participate in the 
making of knowledge.
Reasonable plurality highlights the need for a citizenship education that helps 
students appreciate the fact that knowledge is not absolute, but rather, it is 
individually and socially constructed, and of course understood. The social 
construction of knowledge places demands on citizenship education to help 
students understand that knowledge needs justification. Justification, however, 
can take different forms and each form has its strengths and limitations, and even 
the more reliable amongst them cannot establish the truth of a claim with absolute
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certainty. This way, students develop their critical thinking and come to 
appreciate the limitations of knowledge and why it is constantly evolving.
When this is established students come to appreciate that even religious 
knowledge could be argued to be based on individuals’ interpretations of available 
evidence which leads to diversity of opinions. In an Islamic context, this is evident 
in the presence of different schools of jurisdiction along which the Islamic world is 
divided.
One of the main aims of this approach to knowledge is to help students come to 
understand that they, as individuals and as groups, exist among others who could 
be different in many ways. These differences, however, are reasonably justified. 
Students come to appreciate that no one comprehensive doctrine can be used to 
rule political life and therefore the need fora shared political conception of justice 
that resorts to reasons and arguments to bring different peoples together and 
allow them to cooperate on a fair basis and as free and equal.
Having said so, it should be made clear that the aim of a Rawlsian-based 
citizenship education is not to eliminate differences between peoples, but rather to 
aid students in developing a sense of sympathy towards others and to build 
bridges of mutual respect and appreciation amongst individuals belonging to 
different doctrines. While people, as individuals and as groups, could be in many 
ways different from each other, they also have many things in common. As these 
values develop over time, students start moving away from judging others based 
on their own private values and instead they come to appreciate a political 
conception of justice in which others have rights and responsibilities in the same 
way that ‘we’ and T have.
4.4 Is political liberalism an alien concept in an Arab context? 
Suggestions for further work
After presenting a general framework for a Rawlsian-based citizenship education 
programme, the question that this section addresses is whether Rawls’ PL is an 
alien concept in Arab societies. The difficulties of adopting a Rawlsian based 
citizenship education programmes in Arab countries should not be 
underestimated, but it could be argued that Arab societies are already developed 
in ways that make the acceptance of a Rawlsian based citizenship education
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possible. In addressing this question, while reference will be made to Arab 
societies in general, special attention will be given to the Jordanian context for two 
related reasons. Firstly, despite difference between Arab societies, Jordan was 
introduced, in Chapter One, as an example of a democratizing Arab country, and 
therefore what applies to Jordan could be argued to be relevant to other 
democratizing Arab countries. Based on this assumption, the JCE programme 
was selected as material for study (Chapter Three), which is the second reason for 
the special attention that this section places on the Jordanian context.
The question posed by the title of this section has no straightforward ‘yes/no’ 
answer. While radical religious groups, and some individuals who refuse to 
compromise their comprehensive doctrines, may reject the endorsement of any 
shared political conception of justice that does not comply with their holistic views, 
others, as Rawls (1993a p163) writes, would have no problem in accepting 
reasonable principles of justice, and if need be, to act upon them.
In support of this claim, figures taken from a survey-based study conducted in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001 (Nachtwey and Tessler 2002) reveal that 
inhabitants who support a reconciliatory solution with the state of Israel are three 
times more numerous than those who do not. The findings also show that those 
who support a reconciliatory solution are not likely to be less religiously oriented 
than those who oppose such a solution. Political attitudes, as Nachtwey and 
Tessler conclude, are very much influenced by political and economic (rather than 
religious) considerations that directly influence people’s own lifestyles and welfare.
As for the question of how much control Shari’a law should have in Arab societies, 
as argued in section 4.2, there are different and often conflicting views within each 
Arab country and across the Arab world (Khuri 2005). To assume that there is one 
unified view ignores the diversity of opinion present within Arab societies, and, at 
the same time, runs the danger of dealing with complicated issues in a rather 
simplistic manner.
The above affirms Rawls’ (1993a) argument that most individuals come to 
appreciate the benefits that a shared conception of justice could bring to them, to 
others whom they care for and to the society at large. Given these benefits, when 
one’s personal views come in conflict with constitutional principles of justice, a 
person might adjust, or even revise, his/her views, rather than deny these
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principles. When fair cooperation between citizens is sustained, individuals 
come to accept constitutional principles of justice and political practices without 
necessarily making any connections between these principles and their 
comprehensive doctrines.
However, to make better informed assumptions in relation to attitudes of citizens of 
Arab countries toward liberal understandings of democracy, more research is 
needed. While conducting more public polls and survey-based studies could 
provide a general idea about overall attitudes and inclinations of citizens, adults 
and youngsters, these studies need to be supplemented by more in-depth 
ethnographic studies that could be used to shed more light on aspects of Arab 
societies that public polls and surveys cannot reveal.
Living in societies where dominant representations of social life are hierarchical in 
structure may hinder the realization of ‘other1 representations of social life. This 
may render those in charge of devising, implementing and running a citizenship 
education programme that has the recognition of reasonable diversity as one of its 
main objectives not ready for this job. If this analysis is accurate, then this 
problem would face the enforcement of any educational programme that is 
dedicated to presenting the ‘Other1 as equal. The hierarchical image of social life 
that the JCE programme presents highlights the need for researching where adult 
and young citizens of Arab countries stand in relation to liberal democratic issues 
such as equality among the two genders and with others who uphold different 
conceptions of the good, individual liberties, freedom of conscience and how 
traditional sources of authority figure in the way adults and youngsters think and 
behave. Having a more informed understanding about where adults and 
youngsters stand from these issues would form the basis for citizenship education 
reform, including objectives, activities, assessment as well as teacher training.
While the results of the Nachtwey and Tessler study above could be used to 
support the assumption that Arab citizens would respond to reason and argument 
that are based on shared public principles, Rawls argues that we should not 
expect to find answers for many of our questions concerning political justice. 
Instead, “we must be prepared to accept the fact that only a few questions we are 
moved to ask can be satisfactorily resolved” (Rawls 1993a p156). Some 
democratic citizenship values could be more controversial than others. This 
highlights the need for identifying values that could be readily accepted as part of
a shared political conception of justice, from these values that may prove to be 
more difficult to reach a societal consensus on. Once these widely accepted 
political vales are identified, they could form the basis for citizenship education 
reform. The development of a political conception of justice that is based on 
shared political values has more chances to succeed if it is developed in a gradual 
manner. The aim should be helping students develop an appreciation for a 
consensus concerning fundamental justice questions. Once students start to 
develop awareness for such consensus, citizenship education could move on to 
addressing other (more difficult) questions of justice. This suggests that the 
implementation of a Rawlsian-based citizenship education programme is to be 
implemented over gradual stages, and in each stage, the circle of core political 
values expands to include more values as the society becomes more ready. A 
Rawlsian based citizenship education programme is work in progress.
In section 1.6, it was argued that the word ‘education’ in Arabic has two distinct 
dimensions, ta’leem that concerns the acquisition of knowledge, skills and 
competencies, and tarbiya, that concerns character building and the development 
of the social, moral and spiritual dimensions of the individual. This distinction 
highlights the question of whether an educational programme could be successful 
in helping students to develop a capacity for reasoning and critical thinking in 
certain aspects of the programme and, at the same time, demand obedience and 
uncritical acceptance of knowledge in other aspects. This could be another area 
for educational research in Arab countries to address.
As mentioned earlier, in section 1.2, only Saudi Arabia among all Arab countries 
still takes Shari’a law as its constitution, while other Arab countries have either 
adopted other more modern civic judicial systems that are built on Shari’a law or 
incorporate dual judicial systems: one civil and another religious. In the case of 
Jordan, where a dual system is in place, Shari’a law applies only to marriage, 
divorce and inheritance. Anything outside these three domains is subject to coded 
civil laws and in this regard there is a secular side to the state. Shari’a law, while it 
is highly respected, is not applied except on certain aspects of social life. In other 
words, while Islam, like many other religious and philosophical doctrines, seeks to 
be comprehensive, citizens’ conceptions of justice are not necessarily fully 
comprehensive in the same way. The application of modern coded criminal laws 
suggests that a divide is already in place between religion and the state.
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Having been used to responding to a dual judicial system could be regarded as 
a step on the long route to accepting the distinction that Rawls makes between a 
shared political conception of justice (represented by coded criminal laws) and 
citizens’ private comprehensive doctrines. However, there are many obstacles 
that need to be overcome. Christianity, for instance, is the only other religion that 
enjoys freedom of public worship in Jordan. For Christians living in Jordan, 
though, while their own religious marriage and divorce laws apply, Islamic 
inheritance law applies to all citizens.
The aim of the section is to show that a Rawlsian conception of justice is not a 
totally alien concept, neither in Jordan nor in other democratizing Arab countries. 
As already introduced in section 1.4, Jordan, similar to other democratizing Arab 
countries, has a constitution (and a national charter) that guarantees and protects 
basic liberties and rights, and the signing of the UN Universal Human Rights 
declaration affirms these rights. Furthermore, parliamentary life in Jordan is 
active, which is evident by constant debate and delegations that take place inside 
the parliament and in the press. And more importantly, at the grass roots level, 
Jordanians of different backgrounds and origins are not only used to coexisting 
alongside each other, but also their peaceful coexistence and cooperation for 
hundreds of years suggests that their relationships are to a large extent based on 
respect for each other and an appreciation for the peculiarities of other ways of life 
that exist in the society.
The above, however, is not to present a rosy view of democratic life in Jordan or to 
claim that democratic life in Jordan is developed enough to accept Rawls’ PL46 
without resistance, but what this section is trying to argue for is that the bases are 
there. These bases, however, need to be enforced and expanded gradually.
4.5 Assumptions and limitations
A main reason for suggesting Rawls’ PL as grounds for citizenship education in a 
democratizing Arab country such as Jordan -where education is trying to strike a 
balance between traditional orientations and modern democratic citizenship 
demands that are informed by a more liberal view- lies in its dedication, at least at
46 Chapter Three presents major obstacles that democratic life in Jordan faces.
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the philosophical level, to laying the grounds for fair societal cooperation in 
which all citizens, despite of their private beliefs, are equal and free.
A Rawlsian-based citizenship education, while providing students with knowledge 
about their basic constitutional rights, would aim to help them develop a 
consensus on shared political values (a Rawlsian conception of justice) that would 
lead to better social unity and long term stability.
This study assumes that using a public venue, such as formal education, to 
enforce one dominant representation of social life or one comprehensive doctrine 
is to use coercive state power to exclude those who do not view the world through 
the same pair of eyes, which is something a democratic state should not do.
The following three paragraphs introduce three main factors that put limits on the 
applicability and scope of the suggested Rawlsian based citizenship education 
model. These limitations move from the general to the particular, and will be 
introduced starting from the most general one.
1. The first limitation concerns the applicability of the model. Suggestions and 
recommendations that this research makes are applicable in a Jordanian 
context. This study makes the assumption that Jordan is one Arab country 
that is dedicated to keep going along the long route to democratic reform, 
as otherwise, PL, and indeed other attempts to achieve democratic reform, 
would be no more than an empty rhetoric. This assumption is made based 
on claims to democratic status made in Jordanian citizenship education 
textbooks47 and in the Jordanian constitution and the National Charter. 
Applicability of this model to other democratizing Arabic-language speaking 
countries, however, is a matter of degree depending on their particular 
political, social and economic circumstances.
2. The second limitation affects the scope of this research. This research 
makes suggestions and recommendations for a citizenship education as if it 
is detached from the larger educational system. In response to this 
limitation, it could be argued that democratic reform is always work in 
progress and is never a finished product. In Jordan, and other 
democratizing Arab countries, where traditional representations of social life 
are dominant and are infused in different aspects of national educational
47 For more detail check Chapter Three.
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systems, citizenship education could be regarded as a reasonable 
starting point for helping students develop an appreciation for a political 
conception of justice in which all people, despite their different affiliations, 
are viewed as free and equal.
3. The third limitation also affects the scope of this research. The area that 
this research is mainly concerned with is helping students to develop an 
appreciation fora Rawlsian political conception of justice, and any 
suggestions made in this research are limited to this effect.
4.6 Evaluation
Chapter One argued that despite differences between Arabic language-speaking 
countries, they share, to a varying degree, a classical culture that is encoded in 
the use of formal Arabic. Among the characteristics that they share is a tendency 
to emphasise the authority of tradition, religion and the state. This claim could be 
better supported with more empirical data. However, in the absence of such data, 
the argument presented in support of this claim is assumed to be sufficient and the 
generalizability of the results of this research (to other democratizing Arabic 
language-speaking countries) is limited to this assumption.
Chapter One also argued that hierarchical representations of social life that are 
dominant in Arab states inform citizenship education discourse in these countries, 
and the analysis of the JCE programme supports this assumption. This claim 
would be better informed if it were based on comparative studies that look at 
citizenship education programmes of different Arab countries. In a similar way to 
the first point above, in the absence of such studies, the results of this research 
are limited to this assumption.
The choice of critical discourse analysis (CDA) for analyzing the JCE programme 
reflects some of the biases that the Author (researcher) has. The aim is to 
highlight how traditional hierarchical representations of social life may come in 
conflict with liberal democratic citizenship values, and for this reason, CDA, that 
has its roots in cultural Marxism, proves to be a useful tool. Analysis focused on 
certain aspects of the textbook that are in line with the Author’s biases. Others 
may pinpoint other strengths and/or weaknesses of the text that this analysis did 
not pay attention to. Analysis could have benefited from taking into consideration
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how the consumers of the textbook, teachers and students, would see it.
The choice of certain lessons from the grade ten textbook is also biased towards 
highlighting the individual freedoms problem. Analyzing more lessons from more 
than one textbook could be more representative of the citizenship education 
programme of Jordan.
4.7 Concluding remarks
The dynamics within Arab societies are changing at a rate faster than ever before. 
Globalization and the knowledge economy are aiding in spreading values among 
youngsters that could interfere with local values and traditions. Societies are 
progressing in directions that lead to more individualisation, and young men and 
women are assuming a more active role in the running of their lives. Societies are 
becoming more diverse and plurality, particularly in democratic societies, is 
emerging as a fact of life. Such developments have led to weakening the role of 
traditional sources of authority as a means for social stability and political control.
While the effects of such developments are more obvious in liberal democratic 
societies, Arab societies are not immune from their influences. The JCE 
programme comes as an attempt to reconcile liberal democratic citizenship values 
with traditional representations of social life dominant in Jordan (and in other Arab 
countries). The analysis of the JCE programme, however, suggests that the 
conflict between traditional representations of social life and liberal democratic 
citizenship values is real and genuine and it is not expected to be reconciled in any 
perfect way that fully satisfies the demands of both orientations. While the 
Jordanian citizenship approach is one way for addressing this conflict, there are 
other ways and each of these ways has its own trade-offs. The issue is rather 
what solution(s) will work best in addressing the demands of democratic 
citizenship, including those of diversity and autonomy, without undermining 
traditional cultural and religious ways of life dominant in Arab societies. Rawls’ PL, 
this study argued, provides a view of liberalism that, uniquely perhaps, can 
accommodate traditional viewpoints, and this, according to this study, creates 
opportunities for citizenship education in democratizing Arab countries.
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Appendix One quotes the full text of ‘Jordan First’ document, which is available 
from King Abdullah II webpage. Referencing details of the document could be 
found in the References list under King Abdullah II 2002.
Date: October 29, 2002 
Title: Jordan First
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
His Excellency, Brother Ali Abul Ragheb,
Our Prime Minister
I send you a genuine Jordanian Hashemite greeting.
Conditions in our region, coupled with challenges dictated by the situation in the 
world around us, which both affects, and is affected by us, have made it incumbent 
upon us to focus most of our official and popular efforts on issues pertaining to our 
people and the priorities and interests of our homeland.
Launching the Jordan First slogan, was initially our plan of action, which would fuse 
Jordanians in a consolidated social fabric, that stimulates their sense of belonging to 
their homeland, pride in their Arab Nation and Islamic religion, in an atmosphere of 
freedom, democracy, pluralism, tolerance and social justice.
Hence, it was essentially inevitable to share the conviction, as well as the unity of 
purpose, that “Jordan First” is more than a slogan. It is, indeed, a national canon we 
want to consecrate as a methodological course of action and a daily practice for all 
Jordanian men and women. This slogan targets every Jordanian man and women, 
who believes in this homeland as a refuge, a warm haven and a promising future, 
and strive in his/her pursuit to realise his or her self through his/her homeland, not 
through external allegiances, whatever their aims or objectives.
Jordan is proud of its Islamic identity and Arab allegiance. It will, as expected from it, 
indefatigably strive to protect the rights and interests of the Nation, raise the slogan of 
Arab unity, construction and solidarity, and adhere to the tolerant tenets of the Islamic 
religion. Nobody should take the “Jordan First” call as a bid for introversion, but rather 
as a deep conviction that Jordan's economic and political strength, as well as its 
social security, are prerequisites that need to be safeguarded in order to strengthen 
our Arab surroundings and support our Arab brethren.
In order to be successfully implemented, the Jordan First slogan will have to depict a 
clear state of mind and an act of voluntarism, rather than an ephemeral “reaction” that 
pacifies the conscience of those who simply utter and echo the slogan. The 
fundamental objective is to stimulate the Jordanian citizen's deliberate positive 
energies and to review his/her priorities, with a view to creating the certitude that
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his/her pursuit, effort, cause, ambitions, objectives and aspirations start all with 
“Jordan First”
The “Jordan First” slogan must be a common denominator for all Jordanian men and 
women, whatever their origin and irrespective of any diversities in their attitudes, 
views, creeds, beliefs and races. This concept needs to be dedicated, starting with 
the family, school, university, and youth centres, as well as governmental and civil 
society organisations, to become a reality, a tangible matter of fact and a conscious 
act
On the basis of this act of volition, and in the midst of shuffled priorities that sway the 
clarity of our thinking and the efficiency of our performance, we are in need of a “focal 
idea” and a “pure and fundamental national attitude. ” This will spark our thinking and 
practices and measure our performance and civism. A successful healthy society is 
an aggregation of cells or individuals, who together constitute the society's unity and 
social fabric.
To achieve this, it is inevitable that we adopt the “Jordan First” slogan as a plan of 
action and a catalyst that brings together the fabric of our unified society. This slogan 
is meant for Jordanian men and women, in villages and desert encampments, in 
cities and refugee camps. It is also meant for students in their schools and 
universities; for soldiers who guard the Homeland; for intellectuals, politicians, trade 
unionists and partisans, be they Islamists, nationalists or centrists. It should be 
distant from all political, religious and racial alignments. We have to pursue a social 
contract that, through daily practices, establishes our priorities, starting with this “first 
priority.”
The need for such a matter is decisive and cannot stand any delay or improvisation.
We have got to give “Jordan First” an integrative immunity in the face of negative 
ideas, incriminating interpretations that may attempt, ignorantly or maliciously, to 
deprive the “Jordan First” slogan of its pure and sublime essence into a narrow racist 
corner. This is what we would not entertain against our selves and our people and will 
never accept.
In essence, human nature strives to protect itself and advance its standard of living. 
Hence, we have to launch the "Jordan First" slogan initially on a solid economic and 
social ground, without falling into the trap of contradictory political cliches. If we 
establish "Jordan First” on a ground of economic and social realities and achieve 
stability and prosperity, and, consequently, self-reconciliation for our people, we will 
finally arrive at the desired political limpidity, spontaneously and without fabrication.
As we see it, our people give credence to these convictions, but they cannot be 
transformed into central realities without a review of some of the arguments put 
forward by representatives of the various groups of our people and by our political 
parties and trade unions. This review should be conducted in such a manner as to 
make the interests of Jordan, as far as all Jordanians are concerned, come before 
any other interests or issues. The opposition should be in opposition of the 
Government's policies, not the approach and fixed premises of the State. The 
opposition's role is to serve the causes and interests of our Jordanian people and to 
strive to build Jordanian capacities, before defending other interests and objectives.
The Jordanian press should devote its largest spaces to addressing internal 
Jordanian affairs, as well as the citizens' concerns and issues, before getting involved 
in external issues.
Even though this conviction may sound axiomatic, it still requires from all of us 
diligent action and clear vision to carry our message across to all the educational, 
academic and social segments of our people, in both the private and public sectors.
The difficult dues, currently being faced and conquered by the Homeland, are only
apparently easy, but, when it comes to details, they are gruelling. Therefore, 
adopting "Jordan First” requires us to face all the negative probabilities and to 
mobilise all the positive capabilities of our civil society: This will levitate the civil 
society above all contrarieties by being nationalistic, avoid all discord by being 
unified, and transform differences into a civilised and humanitarian wealth.
For all the above arguments, and for the sake of "Jordan First, " we see a need to 
establish, back, support, and mandate a national body to look for ways and 
mechanisms for delivering the "Jordan First” message and confirm this idea in the 
daily practice of our educational, economic, social and developmental affairs. The 
body shall consist of the following personalities:
1. His Eminence Sheikh Izzidine Al-Khatib Al-Tamimi
2. Mr. Marwan Dudin
3. Dr. Abdullah Ensour
4. Dr. Rajai Al-Dajani
5. Mr. Sa'id Bino
6. Mr. Sameer Habashneh
7. Mr. Abdul Karim Al-Dughmi
8. Mr. Ayman Al-Majali
9. Mr. Saleh Qallab
10. Mr. Abdul Rahim Ukour
11. Dr. Bassem Awadallah
12. Dr. Ruwaida Al-Ma'ayta
13. Mr. Sa'ad Hayel Al-Srour
14. Mr. Mamdouh Al-Abbadi
15. Mr. Assem Ghosheh
16. Mrs. Subhiyyah Al-Ma'ani
17. Dr. Sima Bahous
18. Dr. Muhammad Al-Masalha
19. Mr. Amjad Al-Adhaileh
20. Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh
21. Mr. Sabih Al-Masri
22. Mr. Mahmoud Al-Kharabsheh
23. Dr. Sa'ad Hijazi
24. Mr. Bassem Al-Salem
25. Mr. Uraib Rantawi
26. Mrs. SuhairAI-Ali
27. Mrs. Rana Sabbagh
28. Mr. Ghazi Abu Jneib Al-Fayez
29. Dr. Hussein Touqa,
30. Dr. Wajeeh Uweiss
31. Mr. Ahmad Salameh.
This body shall initially complete its mandate during a first stage. Other bodies and 
committees shall be formed at later stages to follow up on this matter in such a 
manner as to befit our vision for Jordan in the future.
May peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.
Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein
Amman, 22 Sha'ban 1423 Hijri 




Appendix Two quotes Amman Message, which is available from the ‘Amman 
Message’ webpage. Referencing details of the document could be found in the 
References list under Amman Message 2004.
Amman Message
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Peace and blessings upon His 
chosen Prophet, and upon his household, his noble blessed companions, and upon 
all the messengers and prophets:
God Almighty has said: O humankind! We created you from a male and female, and 
made you into peoples and tribes that you may know each other. Truly the most 
honored of you be fore God is the most pious of you. (49:13)
This is a declaration to our brethren in the lands of Islam and throughout the world 
that Amman, the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is proud to issue 
during the blessed month of Ramadan in which the Quran descended as guidance to 
humankind and as clarifications for guidance and discernment. (2:185)
In this declaration we speak frankly to the [Islamic] nation, at this difficult juncture in 
its history, regarding the perils that beset it. We are aware of the challenges 
confronting the nation, threatening its identity, assailing its tenets (kalima), and 
working to distort its religion and harm what is sacred to it. Today the magnanimous 
message of Islam faces a vicious attack from those who through distortion and 
fabrication try to portray Islam as an their enemy. It is also under attack from some 
who claim affiliation with Islam and commit irresponsible acts in its name.
This magnanimous message that the Originator—great is His power—revealed to the 
unlettered Prophet Muhammad— God’s blessings and peace upon him, and that was 
carried by his successors and the members of his household after him, is an address 
of brotherhood, humanity, and a religion that encompasses all human activity. It 
states the truth directly, commands what is right, forbids what is wrong, honors the 
human being, and accepts others.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has embraced the path of promoting the true 
luminous image of Islam, halting the accusations against it, and repelling the attacks 
upon it. This is in accordance with the inherited spiritual and historical responsibility 
carried by the Hashemite monarchy, honored as direct descendants of the Prophet, 
the Messenger of God—peace and blessings upon him—who carried the message. 
For five decades, his late Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal— God rest his so u l- 
demonstrated this way with the vigorous effort that he exerted. Since the day he took 
the flag, His Majesty King Abdullah II has continued this effort, with resolution and 
determination, as a service to Islam, fortifying the solidarity of 1.2 billion Muslims who 
comprise one fifth of humanity, preventing their marginalization or extrication from the 
movement of human society, and affirming their role in building human civilization 
and participating in its progress during our present age.
Islam is founded upon basic principles, the fundamentals are attesting to the unity of 
God (tawhid Allah); belief in the message of His Prophet; continuous connection with 
the Creator through ritual prayer (salat); training and rectifying the soul through the
fast of Ramadan; safeguarding one another by paying the alms tax (zakat); the unity 
of the people through the annual pilgrimage (hajj) to God's Sanctified House, 
[performed] by those who are able; and [observing] His rulings that regulate human 
behavior in all its dimensions. Over history these [basic principles] have formed a 
strong and cohesive nation and a great civilization. They bear witness to noble 
principles and values that verify the good of humanity, whose foundation is the 
oneness of the human species, and that people are equal in rights and obligations, 
peace and justice, realizing comprehensive security, mutual social responsibility, 
being good to one’s neighbor, protecting belongings and property, honoring pledges, 
and more.
Together, these are principles that provide common ground for the followers of 
religions and [different] groups of people. That is because the origin of divine religions 
is one, and Muslims believe in all Messengers of God and do not differentiate 
between any of them. Denying the message of any one of them is a deviation from 
Islam. This establishes a wide platform for the believers of [different] religions to meet 
the other upon common ground for the service of human society, without encroaching 
upon creedal distinctions or upon intellectual freedom. For all of this we base 
ourselves upon His saying:
The messenger believes in what has been revealed unto him from his Lord as do the 
believers. Each one believes in God and His angels and His scriptures and His 
messengers. We make no distinction between any of His messengers - and they say: 
“We hear, and we obey. [Grant us] Your forgiveness, our Lord. Unto You is the 
journeying. ” (2:285)
Islam honors every human being, regardless of his color, race or religion: We have 
honored the sons of Adam, provided them transport on land and sea, sustained them 
with good things, and conferred on them special favors above a great part of our 
creation. (17:70)
Islam also affirms that the way of calling [others] to God is founded upon kindness 
and gentleness: Call to the path of your Lord with wisdom and a beautiful exhortation, 
and debate with them in that which is most beautiful (ahsan). (16:125) Furthermore, it 
shuns cruelty and violence in how one faces and addresses [others]:
It is by some Mercy of God that you were gentle to them. Were you severe—cruel 
hearted—they would have broken away from you. So pardon them and ask 
forgiveness for them and consult with them in the conduct of affairs. And when you 
are resolved, put your trust in God; truly God loves those who trust [in Him]. (3:159)
Islam has made clear that the goal of its message is realizing mercy and good for all 
people. The Transcendent has said, We did not send you [Muhammad] but out of 
mercy for all creatures. (21:107) And the Prophet Muhammad—blessings and peace 
upon Him—said, “The Merciful has mercy upon those who are merciful, be merciful to 
those on earth, He who is in heaven will be merciful unto you. ”
Islam calls for treating others as one desires to be treated. It urges the tolerance and 
forgiveness that express the nobility of the human being: The recompense for an evil 
is an evil equal thereto, but who forgives and reconciles, his recompense is from 
God. (42:40) Good and evil are not equal. Repel with what is most virtuous. Then he 
between whom and you there is enmity will be as if he were an intimate friend.
(41:34)
Islam confirms the principle of justice in interacting with others, safeguarding their 
rights, and confirms that one must not deny people their possessions: And let not the 
hatred of others make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is 
closer to piety; (5:8) God commands you to return trusts to their owners, and if you 
judge between people, you shall judge with justice; (4:58) So give [full] measure and 
[full] weight and do not deny the people their goods, and work no corruption in the 
land after it has been set right. (7:85)
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Islam requires respect for pledges and covenants, and adhering to what has been 
specified; and it forbids treachery and treason: Fulfill the covenant of God when you 
have entered into it, and break not oaths after they have been confirmed and you 
have made God your surety; truly God knows what you do. (16:91)
Islam recognizes the noble station of [human] life, so there is to be no fighting against 
non-combatants, and no assault upon civilians and their properties, children at their 
mothers' bosom, students in their schools, nor upon elderly men and women. Assault 
upon the life of a human being, be it murder, injury or threat, is an assault upon the 
right to life among all human beings. It is among the gravest of sins; for human life is 
the basis for the prosperity of humanity: Whoever kills a soul for other than slaying a 
soul or corruption upon the earth it is as if he has killed the whole of humanity, and 
whoever saves a life, it is as if has revived the whole of humanity. (5:32)
The primordial religion of Islam is founded upon equanimity, balance, moderation, 
and facilitation: Thus have we made of you a middle nation that you might be 
witnesses over the people, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves. (2:143)
The Prophet Muhammad—peace and blessings upon him—said: “Facilitate and do 
not make difficult, bear good tidings and do not deter. ” Islam has provided the 
foundation for the knowledge, reflection and contemplation that has enabled the 
creation of this deep-rooted civilization that was a crucial link by which the West 
arrived at the gates of modern knowledge, and in whose accomplishments non- 
Muslims participated, as a consequence of its being a comprehensive human 
civilization.
No day has passed but that this religion has been at war against extremism, 
radicalism and fanaticism, for they veil the intellect from foreseeing negative 
consequences [of one’s actions]. Such blind impetuousness falls outside the human 
regulations pertaining to religion, reason and character. They are not from the true 
character of the tolerant, accepting Muslim.
Islam rejects extremism, radicalism and fanaticism—just as all noble, heavenly 
religions reject them—considering them as recalcitrant ways and forms of injustice. 
Furthermore, it is not a trait that characterizes a particular nation; it is an aberration 
that has been experienced by all nations, races and religions. They are not particular 
to one people; truly they are a phenomenon that every people, every race and every 
religion has known.
We denounce and condemn extremism, radicalism and fanaticism today, just as our 
forefathers tirelessly denounced and opposed them throughout Islamic history. They 
are the ones who affirmed, as do we, the firm and unshakeable understanding that 
Islam is a religion of [noble] character traits in both its ends and means; a religion that 
strives for the good of the people, their happiness in this life and the next; and a 
religion that can only be defended in ways that are ethical; and the ends do not justify 
the means in this religion.
The source of relations between Muslims and others is peace; for there is no fighting 
[permitted] when there is no aggression. Even then, [it must be done withj 
benevolence, justice and virtue: God does not prevent you, as regards those who do 
not fight you in religion’s [causej nor drive you from your homes, from dealing kindly 
and justly with them: truly God Icves the just; (60:8) Then if they cease, let there be 
no aggression, save against the oppressors. (2:193)
On religious and moral grounds, we denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism 
that is associated with wrongful practices, whatever their source and form may be. 
Such acts are represented by aggression against human life in an oppressive form 
that transgresses the rulings of God, frightening those who are secure, violating 
peaceful civilians, finishing off the wounded, and killing prisoners; and they employ
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unethical means, such as destroying buildings and ransacking cities: Do not kill the 
soul that God has made sacrosanct, save for justice. (6:151)
We condemn these practices and believe that resisting oppression and confirming 
justice should be a legitimate undertaking through legitimate means. We call on the 
people to take the necessary steps to achieve the strength and steadfastness for 
building identity and preserving rights.
We realize that over history extremism has been instrumental in destroying noble 
achievements in great civilizations, and that the tree of civilization withers when 
malice takes hold and hearts are shut. In all its shapes, extremism is a stranger to 
Islam, which is founded upon equanimity and tolerance. No human whose heart has 
been illumined by God could be a radical extremist.
At the same time, we decry the campaign of brazen distortion that portrays Islam as a 
religion that encourages violence and institutionalizes terrorism. We call upon the 
international community to work earnestly to implement international laws and honor 
the international mandates and resolutions issued by the United Nations, ensuring 
that all parties accept them and that they be enacted without double standards, to 
guarantee the return of rights to their [rightful] holders and the end of oppression. 
Achieving this will be a significant contribution to uprooting the causes of violence, 
fanaticism and extremism.
The way of this great religion that we are honored to belong to calls us to affiliate with 
and participate in modern society, and to contribute to its elevation and progress, 
helping one another with every faculty [to achieve] good and to comprehend, desiring 
justice for all peoples, while faithfully proclaiming the truth [of our religion], and 
sincerely expressing the soundness of our faith and beliefs—all of which are founded 
upon God’s call for coexistence and piety. [We are called] to work toward renewing 
our civilization, based upon the guidance of religion, and following upon established 
practical intellectual policies.
The primary components of these policies comprise developing methods for 
preparing preachers, with the goal of ensuring that they realize the spirit of Islam and 
its methodology for structuring human life, as well as providing them with knowledge 
of contemporary culture, so that they are able to interact with their communities on 
the basis of awareness and insight: Say, “This is my way. I, and those who follow me, 
call for God with insight;” (12:108) taking advantage of the communication revolution 
to refute the doubts that the enemies of Islam are arousing, in a sound, intellectual 
manner, without weakness or agitation, and with a style that attracts the reader, the 
listener and the viewer; consolidating the educational structure for individual Muslims, 
who are confident in their knowledge and abilities, working to form the integral identity 
that protects against corrupting forces; interest in scientific research and working with 
the modern sciences upon the basis of the Islamic perspective that distinguishes 
between creation, life and the human being; benefiting from modern achievements in 
the fields of science and technology; adopting an Islamic approach for realizing the 
comprehensive development that is founded upon [maintaining] the delicate balance 
between the spiritual, economic and social dimensions [of life]; providing for human 
rights and basic liberties, ensuring life, dignity and security, and guaranteeing basic 
needs; administering the affairs of society in accordance with the principles of justice 
and consultation; and benefiting from the goods and mechanisms for adopting 
democracy that human society has presented.
Hope lies with the scholars of our Nation, that through the reality of Islam and its 
values they will enlighten the intellects of our youth—the ornament of our present age 
and the promise of our future. The scholars shield our youth from the danger of 
sliding down the paths of ignorance, corruption, close-mindedness and subordination.
It is our scholars who illuminate for them the paths of tolerance, moderation, and 
goodness, and prevent them from [falling] into the abysses of extremism and
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fanaticism that destroy the spirit and body.
We look to our scholars to lead us in partaking of our role and verifying our priorities, 
that they may be exemplars in religion, character, conduct, and discerning 
enlightened speech, presenting to the nation their noble religion that brings ease [in 
ail matters] and its practical laws in which lie the awakening and joy of the nation. 
Among the individuals of the nation and throughout the regions of the world, they 
disseminate good, peace and benevolence, through subtle knowledge, insightful 
wisdom and political guidance in all matters, uniting and not dividing, appeasing 
hearts and not deterring them, looking to the horizons of fulfillment to meet the 
requirements and challenges of the 21st century.
We ask God to prepare for our Islamic Nation the paths of renaissance, prosperity 
and advancement; to shield it from the evils of extremism and close-mindedness; to 
preserve its rights, sustain its glory, and uphold its dignity. What an excellent Lord is 
he, and what an excellent Supporter.
God Almighty says: This is My straight path, so follow it. And follow not the [other] 
ways, lest you be parted from His way. This has He ordained for you, that you may 
be God-fearing. (6:152-153)
The last of our supplications is that praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.
Amman
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
Ramadan 1425 Hijri
November 2004 AD (Amman Message 2004)
Appendix Three
List of contents of the Jordanian grade ten ‘Civic and National 
Education’ textbook
The grade ten ‘Civic and National Education’ textbook (MoE 2005b) comprises 27 
lessons that are divided over 8 teaching unit units. Students are introduced to 
these lessons over the academic year that is divided into two semesters. The 
following is a translation for the ‘list of contents, as it appears on pages three and 






Unit one Educational and media institutions 7
Lesson one Education in Jordan 8
Lesson Two Vocational education in Jordan 13
Lesson Three Culture and media 18
Unit Two The State of Jordan and its institutions (citizenship) 23
Lesson one The concept of citizenship and its components 24
Lesson Two Citizenship: objectives, duties and rights 28
Lesson Three Citizenship values and it demands 31
Unit Three The State of Jordan and its institutions (democracy) 35
Lesson one Democracy: principles and objectives 36
Lesson Two Democracy: domain and applications 40
Lesson Three Democracy and human rights in Islam 44
Lesson Four The basic rights of woman and child 48




The State of Jordan and its institutions (political parties) 55
Political parties 56
Political orientations and comprehensive system 59
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the second semester
Unit Five Reason, logic and dialogue 63
Lesson one Public opinion 64
Lesson Two Fanaticism and discrimination 68
Lesson Three Coexistence and tolerance 71
Unit Six The managerial process and its features 75
Lesson one Management and leadership 76
Lesson Two Communication 80
Lesson Three Human incentive 83
Lesson Four Effective Jordanian institutions 87
Unit Seven National security and international peace 93
Lesson one The Arab Army- the Jordanian Armed Forces 94
Lesson Two National security and development 98
Lesson Three Ministry of Interior 102
Lesson Four Security apparatus 105
Unit Eight Biography of Jordan’s civilization 109
Lesson one Al-Mafrq Province 110
Lesson Two Ma’daba Province 115
Lesson Three Theaban 120
References 124
Appendix Four
Distribution of religious quotations per lesson
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Appendix Four shows the distribution of direct religious quotations per lesson. 
Religious quotations are taken to include any direct quotation taken from the Holly 
Qur’an, sayings of Prophet Mohammed and/or one of the First Four Caliphs in the 
early days of Islam. The total number of religious quotations in the textbook is 47 







Unit one Educational and media institutions -
Lesson one Education in Jordan 3
Lesson Two Vocational education in Jordan 1
Lesson Three Culture and media 0
Unit Two The State of Jordan and its institutions 
(citizenship)
Lesson one The concept of citizenship and its components 3
Lesson Two Citizenship: objectives, duties and rights 1
Lesson Three Citizenship values and it demands 1
Unit Three The State of Jordan and its institutions 
(democracy)
Lesson one Democracy: principles and objectives 0
Lesson Two Democracy: domain and applications 1
Lesson Three Democracy and human rights in Islam 17
Lesson Four The basic rights of woman and child 5
Lesson Five The democratic experience of Jordan 0
Unit Four The State of Jordan and its institutions (political 
parties)
Lesson one Political parties 0
Lesson Two Political orientations and comprehensive system 0
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The second semester
Unit Five Reason, logic and dialogue -
Lesson one Public opinion 0
Lesson Two Fanaticism and discrimination 2
Lesson Three Coexistence and tolerance 8
Unit Six The managerial process and its features -
Lesson one Management and leadership 0
Lesson Two Communication 1
Lesson Three Human incentive 0
Lesson Four Effective Jordanian institutions 1
Unit Seven National security and international peace -
Lesson one The Arab Army- the Jordanian Armed Forces 0
Lesson Two National security and development 2
Lesson Three Ministry of Interior 0
Lesson Four Security apparatus 1
Unit Eight Biography of Jordan’s civilization -
Lesson one Al-Mafrq Province 0
Lesson Two Ma’daba Province 0
Lesson Three Theeban 0
TOTAL 47
Appendix Five
Translation of a sample Lesson
Appendix Five is an Author’s translation of the Third Lesson (Coexistence and 
Tolerance) of the Fifth Unit (Reason, Logic and Dialogue). The linguistic analysis 
undertaken in section 3.3.3 mainly draws on this lesson in which four linguistic 
features were looked at (whole-text language organization, clause combinations, 
clauses and words).
The translation aims to convey to the reader an accurate account of the lesson 
using grammatical and lexical items from the English language. It also aims to 
maintain the same paragraph and sentence structures as they appear in the 
original text (as long as the translation is accurate). The reason for keeping the 
same paragraph and sentence structures as they are in the original text is to 
ensure that the linguistic analysis of the lesson is as accurate as possible.
Words that could give different meanings when translated to English are followed 
by the Arabic word written phonetically in italics inside two brackets.
Titles of Qur’anic Surahs (chapters) were not translated to English, but written 
phonetically (as translating them to English would not aid or obstruct the linguistic 
analysis of the lesson). The Qur’an comprises 114 Surahs and each Surah 
comprises different number of verses. Translations of Qur’anic verses were taken 




The Lord said: “Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that you may be 
witnesses over mankind. And that the Messenger may be a witness over you”
(Surah Al Baqarah: verse 143)
Firstly: the tolerance concept
The tolerance concept is associated (yrtabet) with human rights, and the value of 
tolerance concerns a bundle of rights that characterises any dem ocratic system including 
the freedom  to express opinion and organization, equality under the rule of law, 
mercifulness to prisoners of war and respect or acceptance of the opinion of minorities.
To lerance is a practice that m ay be undertaken by individuals, groups and states. From  
tolerance stems the readiness for allowing for expressing ideas and interests that 
contradict our own. Tolerance could be defined as: respect, acceptance and appreciation  
for cultural diversity, ways of expression and the different human attributes (syfat).
This definition of tolerance means, before anything else, taking a positive stance that 
acknow ledges the rights of others in enjoying their rights and their basic freedom s that are  
universally acknowledged.
The practicing of tolerance does not com e into conflict with human rights and it does not 
m ean accepting social injustices or abandoning one’s rights and beliefs or failing to take  
them  seriously.
Secondly: the effect of tolerance in human relations
The human community (Mujtama insani) incorporates a great deal of variance and unity at 
the sam e time. Variance is manifested in the big number of races, ethnicities, religions 
and nationalities that hold values and beliefs that lead to different civilizations (thaqafat), 
and unity is manifested in the sharing of all members of these groups their seeking to live 
in dignity, peace and to achieve their ambitions and interests and based on this, what 
brings people together is more than what divides them, but, why the violence, struggle, ill- 
will and hatred that the world witnesses today?
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In the current age, the association between societies and the intertwining of interests 
between these societies, which resulted from the communication, information and 
transportation revolution, makes tolerance, coexistence, communication and open  
dialogue necessities that are crucial for achieving the interests of all societies.
Think!
1. Racial or religious extremism com e into conflict with the tolerance principle, 
explain.
2. W hat do you think of the role of school in developing the values of tolerance?
Thirdly: Amman Message
M any verses appeared in the Holy Q ur’an that em phasised the tolerance principle through 
the m eanings of “forgiveness, pardoning, charity, replacing bad deeds with good deeds  
and shunning the ignorant” and other meanings that call humans to be endowed by the 
value of tolerance. And the issuing of ‘Am m an M essage’ in Novem ber 2004A .D . cam e to 
show the real tolerant image of Islam, to protect it from external attacks and to stop false 
accusations against it. In this regard, Am m an’s M essage em phasised a bundle of Islamic 
principles, the most prominent among them are:
To honour human being, without Tolerance and forgiveness (refer
distinction of colour, race or to Surah al-Shura: verse 40,
religion (refer to Surah a l-lsra ’a: Surah Fussilat: verse 34)
verse 70)
G entleness, mercy and shunning Respect for conventions and
violence (refer to Surah al-Nahl: pledge and condemnation of
verse 125 and Surah al-lmran: treachery (refer to Surah al-Nahl:
verse 159) Am m an verse 91)
Balance, moderation and M essage To ensure mercy and welfare to all
equanimity (refer to Surah al- people (refer to Surah al-Anbiya’a:
Baqara: verse 143) verse 107)
Treating others justly and To uphold human right for non­
safeguarding their rights (refer to fighters (refer to Surah al-Maida:
Surah a l-M a ’ida: verse 8, Surah verse 32, Surah al-Mum tahina:
a l-N i’sa ’a: verse 58, Surah al- verse 8, Surah al-Anaam : verse
A ’araf: verse 85) 51)
Figure (5-6): Principles of ‘Am m an M essage’.
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Think!
There are those who consider tolerance a form of surrender and submission to the 
other. W hat do you think about that?
Activity
W rite a report about the values of tolerance that are encom passed in Amman  
M essage.
Fourthly: The importance of tolerance.
Tolerance is a key for solving disagreem ents, and a necessary condition for peace and 
social progress, and through tolerance we can overpower bigotry, discrimination and 
hatred. And the following represent the most prominent positive effects that could be 
achieved through tolerance:
1. Mutual respect between religions, sects and denominations.
2. Stability and peacefulness of the society.
3. Establishing the values of coexistence and free and rational dialogue.
4. Overcoming attitudes of bigotry and discrimination.
5. Providing social harmony in multicultural societies.
6. Openness between different cultures and the achievem ent of common gains.
7. Respect for human freedom s and rights.
To achieve the values of tolerance, it is necessary to unite efforts of formal and civil 
institutions of the state as this reflects positively on all m em bers of society and its 
institutions. And the United Nations General Assem bly approved the announcem ent of 
tolerance related principles on 16 Novem ber 1995A .D , and it declared that day as the 
International Day for Tolerance.
Think!
W hat is the role of the media and political parties in engendering tolerance and 
coexistence in society?
Fifthly: Forms of tolerance and its means
Tolerance has different forms that concern social relations between individuals and 
groups and relations between countries, and the most prominent of these forms are:
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1- Religious tolerance
The Lord said: “Lo! those who believe, and those who are Jews, and Sabaeans, and 
Christians- Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does right- there shall be 
no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve”.
Surah a l-M a ’idah: Verse (69 )
2- Tolerance in dealings
The Lord said: “Repel evil with that v/hich is better. We are best aware of that which they 
allege
Surah a l-M u ’minun: Verse (96 )
3- Racial tolerance
The Noble Prophet said in the farewell deed speech: “Your father is one, you all belong to 
Adam and Adam is made of earth. The most honourable amongst you in the eyes of God 
in the most devout, and the Arab has no advantage over the Persian except in devotion”.
4- Cultural tolerance
Every society has its own culture and has the right to be proud of it and to promote it.
Think!
1 - Mention other forms of tolerance.
2- Mention other instances from the Q ur’an or the traditions of Prophet 
Moham m ed, al-Sunna, that address the different forms of toleration.
Tolerance has its tools and m eans through which it could be achieved. The figure below  
illustrates the most prominent of these:
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Giving priority for the 
common good
Soothing Patience
Respect the freedom  
of others
Figure (5-7): Means of tolerance.
Think!
How can education (tathqeef) be used as a m eans for tolerance?
Questions:
1 - Mention four positive effects for tolerance.
2- W hat is the relationship between tolerance and bigotry?
3- Derive the meaning of tolerance in the following Holy verses.
The Lord said:
a. “We make no distinction between any of His messengers -  and they say: We 
hear, and we obey. (Grant us) Your forgiveness, our Lord. Unto You is the 
journeying’’ (Surah al-Baqarh: verse 285 )
b. “There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct 
from error”. (Surah al-Baqara: verse 256 )
c. “And argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in (a w ay) that is 
better” (Surah al-Ankaboot, verse: 46)
d. “The food for those who have received the Scripture is lawful for you, and you 
food is lawful for them”. (Surah al-M aida, Verse 5)
4 - How can dialogue be a m eans for tolerance?
5- Mention three m eans for achieving the principle of tolerance.
6- W hat is the role of the family in the developm ent of the value of tolerance?
Appendix Six 
Globalization from a Middle Eastern perspective48
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Views about globalization in Arabic literature range from viewing it as a relatively 
new phenomenon that was made possible by developments in science and 
technology (el-Azm 1999), to viewing it as a continuation of an old imperialist 
Western project (Amin 1998). For some, ‘the economy’ is the instigator and the 
motive behind globalization, and for others it is much more than that; it represents 
a direct offensive that is determined to spread political and cultural ‘American’ 
hegemony over national and traditional ways of life, in which economic 
interference and open market strategies are just influential means for achieving 
this purpose (al-Jassour 2000).
The relation between globalization and the role of the nation state is viewed in 
different ways depending on how globalization itself is viewed. While globalization 
is seen by some to undermine the authority of the nation state (Amin 1998), others 
argue that globalization cannot progress without the backing-up offered by a 
strong nation state (al-Azm 1999).
Globalization is associated with the rise of multinational corporations. Such 
corporations, backed up by huge budgets, international trade treaties and 
advanced technology, are becoming increasingly influential in national policy 
planning (Abdullah 1997, al-Jabri 1998). Governments that wish to attract such 
corporations must provide an environment that allows them to operate and invest. 
Those who regard globalization as a threat to the authority of the nation state 
argue that governments that are bound by international treaties cannot have a 
free hand in making their own decisions, but often have to give priority to the 
international over the local, and the compromise, as Brecher and Smith (1999) 
argue, becomes even more alarming as governments compete to attract such 
capital.
On the other hand, those who see a strong relation between globalization and the 
role of the nation state argue that capitalism had always depended on the 
presence of a strong nation state, which promoted it and facilitated its spreading 
(Brown & Lauder 1997, al-Azm 1999). Globalization, Mayo (2005) argues, is often 
associated with neo-liberal polices which became increasingly influential at the 
international level during the eighties of the past century. Starting from the 1970s, 
the economic boom that followed the Second World W ar started to slow down. 
Neo-liberals argued that this slowing down was a natural result of the expanding 
role of the state as a welfare provider and its control over market operations.
State resources, they pointed out, were used to support inefficient public 
enterprises and state bureaucracies rather than being used productively.
The spread of neo-liberal policies was aided by the bigger role played by 
international agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade 
Organization. During the 1980s, different governments turned to the IMF and the 
World Bank for financial aid. Borrowing governments needed first of all to put their 
own houses in order through the adoption of pragmatic policy strategies that
48 This brief account of globalization is mainly taken from an EdD assignment prepared previously 
by the Author as part of the requirements of the programme.
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allowed them to reduce rates of inflation and minimize public expenditure. To 
be able to do so, borrowing countries had to roll back the role of the state as a 
welfare provider and instead turn to the private sector to provide some of the 
services that used to be offered by the state. Countries had to increase market 
mechanisms and charge in return for offering public services like education and 
health. At the international level, these governments had to open up their 
economies for foreign investments and liberalize their international trade policies 
by opening up theirs markets and reducing tariff barriers (Mayo 2005).
Globalization and technological developments particularly in the field of 
communications, whether regarded as independent agents or tied together, did 
open the door wide for new opportunities. At the same time, they also created 
new risks that nation states, societies and individuals had to deal with. 
Development “is being reinvented by new markets (e.g., foreign exchange and 
capital markets), new tools (e.g., the Internet and cellular phones), new actors 
(e.g., non-governmentalorganizations, the European Union and the World Trade 
Organization) and new rules (e.g., multilateral agreements on trade, services and 
intellectual property)” (AHDR 2002 p1). As a result of these developments, 
change in the different fields of life is occurring at a pace that states, societies and 
individuals are sometimes finding hard to catch up with.
Whether globalization is seen to undermine the role of the nation state or whether 
globalization does demand a strong nation state that backs it up, it is clear that the 
role of the nation state must be redefined in order to meet the new challenges and 
demands of the new era. The constant change in market demands brought about 
by globalization brings with it a sense of instability on the side of employees and, 
at the same time, presents a new challenge for nation states that regard 
employability as one of their main objectives. For employees to survive the 
dynamics of a changing global market, they need to be willing and capable to 
adapt. The best employee, in this set-up, is one who is able to extract and 
assimilate new information and is willing to obtain training whenever needed (Witte 
2000). In light of this, life long learning becomes an important quality that 
educational policy and planning in Arab states need to enforce. Life long learning 
helps employees to improve their adaptability enabling them to deal with a variety 
of situations that may be unforeseeable in an economically and politically changing 
world, and hence improves their own productivity and employability.
As a result of knowledge becoming increasingly shared in the globalization age, 
values, attitudes and behaviours are crossing borders much more easily than 
before making the distinction between local and foreign values harder to maintain. 
However, globalization is accused of not providing fair opportunities for mutual 
cultural encounters (al-Askari 2001) and concerns are raised about the 
imbalanced flow of cultural messages that are “heavily weighted in one direction, 
from rich countries to poor” (UNDP report 2000 p345). Questions are raised about 
the relation between globalization and the margin of freedom left for traditional 
societies to protect and preserve their cultural and religious identities. Questions 
are also raised about the extent to which the more influential countries in the 
globalization debate are willing to learn about and respect societies that are more 
traditional in their outlook (UNDP report 2000).
Concerning the materialization of a standardized global culture, some Arab and 
non-Arab writers present a different perception that concludes the possibility of the 
emergence of more distinctive national and regional identities which pose another 
threat to the role of the nation state. They argue that although peoples could be
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increasingly receiving the same information, buying the same products, etc., 
yet, this would occur in their differing settings of rich and poor countries, and 
differing cultures (Abu Halaweh 2001). Holders of this view argue that our 
surrounding history, culture and values have a much greater impact on us than we 
are sometimes aware, and that humans are constantly in search of a sense of 
belonging. The splitting up of nations according to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian 
lines is becoming a trend in the age of globalization (al-Askari 2001, Smith 2000) 
so that instead of an amalgamation of world cultures, globalization is providing 
chances for cultural encounters that may lead to disagreement and conflict.
Robins (2000) provides illustrations of this phenomenon in the tension between 
the Western and Islamic worlds, the defensiveness of Europeans against 
American media and products, and the traditional European identities such as 
Basque, Briton, and Scottish that have been reasserting themselves as a counter 
reaction to cultural globalization.
Globalization could also be regarded as an important factor in hastening the 
political and social liberalization in the Arab world. The free flow of information has 
challenged the control and censorship imposed by state and traditional sources of 
authority in the region. Individuals are becoming better informed about democratic 
experiences in other parts of the world, which allows them to compare and 
contrast their experiences with others and helps them make better informed 
decisions. Globalization is also argued to bring international guarantees for 
human rights in general and for minorities in particular.
Despite the importance that conservatives place on the need for maintaining 
social, cultural and religious values, practically speaking, the unavoidable 
infiltration of foreign values and behaviours through the different means of 
communication forces the concept of protection to take on a new meaning. Askari 
(2001), among other Arab social commentators, argues that the difficult political, 
and in many cases economic, conditions in the different Arab states, coupled with 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which attempts to impose conformity among 
people, have the effect of encouraging individuals to escape their harsh realities 
into the more attractive world of the media and cyberspace that is dominated by 
the technologically developed countries, which increases the challenge for 
traditional sources of authority. In other words, protection through censorship is 
not an option any more and the innocence of young children cannot be assumed 
to be true any longer. Individuals, as Stables writes “have become less and less 
the unquestioning recipients of a role allotted to them by society, and more and 
more the conscious agents of their own career and lifestyle choices” (2003 p4). 
Students cannot be regarded “as ‘empty vessels’ to be stuffed full of unquestioned 
facts and narrowly enculturated” (Stables 2003 p4) as the traditional Fordist view 
of education used to regard them. Despite the fact that these changes are, to 
varying extents, affecting all societies, this same Fordist view is still influential in 
educational thinking and practices in traditional societies, like Arab societies, 
where collectivist traditional cultural and religious norms still hold a strong grip on 
the different aspects of life.
It is becoming more and more important in order to cope with the huge flow of 
information, that youngsters need to be equipped with the skills of accessing, 
analyzing, and utilizing appropriate knowledge available through the different 
means of communication. Equally important is the equipment of youngsters with 
the qualities of thinking independently, making judgments and decisions, and 
evaluating information that provide them with the means to adapt in a fast 
changing world (Cogburn 2001).
